740.0011 EW (Peace)/5–247
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Reber) and by Mr. Jacques J. Reinstein, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp), to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Mr. Acheson: At the close of the public hearings today Senator Vandenberg asked us to stop for a few minutes conversation with him. He said before the bridges were burned that the Secretary should have one last look at the situation and give serious consideration to determine whether the situation had not so changed as to make desirable a postponement of ratification at least until after the Austrian settlement. He asked that the Secretary’s review of the situation take into account the Truman doctrine, the failure of the Moscow Conference and the fact that all testimony so far submitted to Congress would give the impression that only the Communists favor early ratification of the Italian Treaty.
The trend of the hearings has been such as to advance very telling arguments, at least from the American political point of view; that this treaty is not consistent with the Truman doctrine, that it will accelerate Italy’s very rapid disintegration into Communism, and that it still represents a policy of appeasement. The Secretary’s own remarks to the effect that we should not accept an improper settlement merely to have an agreement on the record have been cited repeatedly to show that we are adopting a different policy with respect to Italy than we are in Greece and in Germany and Austria.
Senator Vandenberg asked the Secretary to consider what effect ratification will have in Italy, whether it will accelerate its progress towards Communism and what effect on our future policy and the negotiation of future peace settlements non-ratification of the Treaty would have. He said that these were questions which must be answered.
The situation was such that a grave mistake might be made in going ahead with ratification and that this was the last opportunity to rectify it if such was the case. We must realize that there is a political danger in this country that if Italy goes Communist there will be a strong current of domestic opinion which will lay it at the door of ratification. He pointed to the unruly situation in the House which could easily [Page 545] take this opportunity to break away from the present bi-partisan Senate leadership in foreign relations.
He said that he himself had some doubts about the Italian Treaty, but if the Secretary, after considering the matter in the light of the above, was satisfied that we should go ahead, he would go along with us. Without a very strong statement from the Secretary answering these questions, however, he thought that the Senate might not give its consent to ratification. He mentioned the fact that most Senators are not primarily interested in the situation in Italy, but are more concerned over the effect of ratification on their constituents. Up to the present all arguments presented by the Italo-American elements have been against ratification except for the one Communist proponent of the Treaty.1
Although he did not say so, we got the impression that Senator Vandenberg would welcome an opportunity to talk this matter over with the Secretary. It is also significant, we believe, that when he was asked by Senator Connally when the Secretary and Mr. Byrnes would appear he said the date had not been fixed, thus leaving it open for such discussions.2
J[acques] J. Reinstein
- Michael Salerno, editor of the New York newspaper, L’Unità del Popolo. For his testimony, see Treaties of Peace With Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on Executives F, G, H, and I (80th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 77.↩
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A handwritten notation at the head of this document reads: “Mr. Secretary. I think that it is important for you & Mr. Byrnes to have a talk with Vandenberg & Connally on Monday & get word to them to this effect on Saturday [May 3]. Do you agree & do you wish to be briefed before such a meeting? D[ean] A[cheson]”
Both Secretary Marshall and former Secretary Byrnes testified for ratification before the Committee on May 6.
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