Office of the Historian

740.0011 EW (Peace)/4–2047: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
urgent
Moscow, April 20, 1947—3 p. m.

1481. Kosmos 55. Personal, Eyes Only, for Acheson from Marshall. Reference Moskco 68.1 I should be deeply concerned if deferment of hearings on peace treaties were construed as decision on our part to make separate peace treaty with Italy and possibly other satellite countries. If treaties are discarded or rejected I do not believe better treaties could be secured by common agreement. Discarding or rejection of Italian treaty would impose prolonged military commitment on us in Venezia Giulia and in view of their economic position, British would probably ask us to take over their share. The leverage (for what it is worth) which the Balkan and Hungarian treaties give us to use against excessive concentrations of Soviet troops in these countries would be gone. Moreover, the effect on the German situation of dropping the proposed treaties cannot be disregarded. While failure to reach agreements with Soviet Government in this Conference should not delay necessary developments under bi-zonal arrangements,2 it is my thought that we should do nothing to close the door to Soviet cooperation. For that reason we should guard against action which might be construed as definitely closing the door.

According to present indications I expect to be back in Washington within a week or ten days at latest. If hearings on treaties start on [Page 543] April 21, I should be back before they close. If President should conclude that he wishes to have hearings deferred pending my return, I hope the deferment may be arranged in a way which will not give rise at this time to talk that we have decided not to proceed with them.

Related subject: reference your Moskco 68, Mr Dulles3 requests the following be delivered to Senator Vandenberg:

“I am inclined to feel that it is preferable to ratify Italian and satellite treaties but I think there is sufficient doubt so that final decision on policy should await exchange of views after our delegation returns. I agree that any postponement of hearings should avoid impression that any adverse policy decision has already been made.”

[
Marshall
]
  1. Supra.↩
  2. For documentation on this subject, see vol. ii, pp. 909 ff.↩
  3. John Foster Dulles, Special Adviser, United States Delegation, Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, March 10–April 24, 1947.↩