Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

740.00119 EW/3–147: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State ( Acheson ) to the Embassy in Italy

top secret

Washington , March 6, 1947—7 p. m.

322. Department believes Yugos will ratify Ital treaty and therefore feels no action shd be taken now which might delay or complicate ratification by others (ur 444 Mar 1¹). If at time treaty is about to come into force, Yugos have still not ratified, Dept anticipates Big Four discussion may be necessary on implementation all treaty provisions re VG,² and consideration could then be given to delaying deposit US ratification pending outcome such discussion.

As regards Gen Lee’s³ views re withdrawal US forces from Italy,⁴ Dept does not now foresee possibility that ratification by four powers and deposit of ratifications can be completed prior to April 1.

Acheson

1. Not printed; in it Ambassador Dunn reported: “Military authorities AFHQ are greatly concerned over logistical problems that would be involved in maintaining allied troops in strength in disputed strip between Morgan Line and treaty boundary (French Line) while at same time complying with other provisions of treaty including those pertaining to withdrawal of allied forces in Italy. It is their opinion that even maintenance of troops in disputed area would be wholly impracticable.” (740.00119 EW/3–147)
2. Venezia Giulia; for documentation on U.S. interest in the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste, see vol. iv, pp. 51 ff.
3. Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, named Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, January 3, 1946; succeeded Gen. Morgan as SACMED in April 1947.
4. Also in telegram 444, Ambassador Dunn stated that “… General Lee has indicated to me that in order to assure smooth working of plans for 90 days withdrawal, it is considerable importance to MTOUSA that Senate should not ratify treaty prior to April 1. He states that delay after April 1, if prolonged, might cause military some difficulty, but situation would by no means be as critical as it would be if treaty should come into force prior to that date.”