740.0011 EW (Peace)/2–1147
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
Under instructions from his Government the Italian Ambassador called this afternoon at his request and left with me the attached declaration of the Italian Government concerning that Government’s desire for a revision of the peace treaty.1 He said that he hoped I would agree that the statement was as moderate in tone as could possibly be expected under the circumstances and given the unpopularity of the treaty in Italy. After reading the statement I told him that I agreed.
Mr. Tarchiani then spoke of what he describes as the very stupid British last minute move prior to signature insisting the Italian signature was the equivalent of Italian ratification.2 This step, he said, caused such indignation in Italy that De Gasperi at the last moment was almost compelled to give up the idea of signing. Tarchiani said that such a position in effect merely made a rubber stamp out of the Constituent Assembly and no self-respecting body could accept it. He expressed confidence that De Gasperi will succeed without much difficulty in obtaining ratification of the treaty by the Constituent Assembly but he had not felt that he could attempt to bind the Assembly before signature.
Tarchiani then referred to yesterday’s disturbances in Italy and pointed out what seemed to him a significant fact: neither the French nor the Soviet Embassies were the object of patriotic demonstrations against the treaty in spite of the fact that both the French and Soviet Governments had taken positions with regard to the treaty far more hostile to Italy’s interests. He recalled, for instance, how the whole country had been seething at the prospective ceding of Tenda and Briga to France last summer. He felt, therefore, that the demonstrations before the British and American Embassies were largely Communist inspired in order to make the western Allies unpopular. As for the attack on the Yugoslav Legation he attributed that to a curious omission on the part of his Government. Since Italy has no diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia now and that Legation therefore did not appear on the diplomatic list he assumed that the Minister of the Interior had forgotten about it and had stationed no guards there. The Legation building had, however, been inhabited by some members of the Yugoslav Military Mission and it was these people [Page 528] who were the objects of the demonstrators’ wrath. This group of demonstrators he considered to be “spontaneous nationalists” as distinct from the Communist groups at the American and British Embassies.
I asked the Ambassador whether his Government had anything specifically in mind in its suggestion for a revision of the treaty. He said that three things were, of course, uppermost in their minds: (1) the revision of the eastern frontiers; (2) the military clauses which kept Italy in an inferior position vis-à-vis her neighbors and did not permit adequate Italian defense; and (3) the question of the Italian colonies. As to the first, he saw little likelihood of anything being accomplished in the foreseeable future. As to the second, he hoped that the military inferiority clauses could be revised at some stage. The most important, however, was the third. Italy had no thought of regaining her colonies for herself but was anxious that the French proposal be accepted whereunder Italy would be given some form of trusteeship over the Colonies under the United Nations. He pointed out that this was a matter very dear to Italian hearts and he thought it was important to do what We could to keep Italy orientated toward the western Powers by giving the De Gasperi government as much support as possible … he fears the results of the next elections which will take place either in June or in October. He was emphatic in the need that some further tangible support be given to De Gasperi. I told him that as he was well aware we appreciated the importance of helping Italy but pointed out some of the difficulties in connection with the Colonies.