740.00119 EW/1–2447: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy
107. Dept has no recent info indicating Yugos might reject treaty, and is still inclined to opinion they will sign. Pls ascertain basis for De Gasperi’s contrary opinion.
Failure of Yugos to sign and ratify treaty would of course make Art 891 (old 77 bis) operative against them and thus prevent them [Page 518] receiving benefits mentioned penultimate para ur 156 Jan 21.2 It would also render difficult if not impossible implementation treaty clauses re Trieste, and Dept therefore considers consultations this regard among Big Four would be required. In meantime status quo would be maintained in Venezia Giulia with Allied forces remaining in present positions. Treaty would however be submitted to Senate for ratification so that peace might be formally concluded and other treaty provisions put into effect.
Foregoing is for your guidance, but may also be communicated informally to Ital Govt as Dept’s preliminary views.
- Article 89 reads: “The provisions of the present Treaty shall not confer any rights or benefits on any State named in the Preamble as one of the Allied and Associated Powers or on its nationals until such State becomes a party to the Treaty by deposit of its instrument of ratification.”↩
- This paragraph read: “With regard to De Gasperi’s formal inquiry whether Anglo-American forces in Zone A will be withdrawn from Morgan Line should Yugos not sign, it would seem essential to reply categorically that article 77 bis (of old draft treaty) would apply and that Allied troops would remain in disputed area pending other solution. Should treaty go into effect on R–Day without Yugo signature and should its territorial provisions be made applicable along with withdrawal of Allied Forces, Yugoslavia would of course be in position of having received major benefits of treaty without being bound, and could continue pressure of threat of coup de main in more advantageous position.” (865.00/1–2147)↩