Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

840.50 Recovery/9–847: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

top secret
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Washington, September 8, 1947—9 p. m.

3903. For the Ambassador. British opposition, reported by you by phone to Bonesteel,¹ to discussing bizonal area economic program in CEEC with view to coordination with a broader CEEC recovery program focuses attention on problems of utmost seriousness. As stressed in all US communications with CEEC, essence of Secretary’s proposals was preparation of program based on maximum European self-help and mutual aid and that such a program could only be prepared if the separate national programs and requirements statements were examined and coordinated so as to produce the greatest European contribution to recovery at earliest moment. Most recent US action along this line is contained in Dept’s circtel, Sept 7 (1 a. m.) in which heads of missions to CEEC countries requested to make oral representations stressing that a program developed by CEEC which did not emphasize and show tangible evidence of application of the principle of mutual aid would run serious risk of being unacceptable to US.

Dept’s impression as confirmed by reports from Conference and all senior US reps who have had contact with Conference activities is that element of mutual aid and subordination of separate national aims to cooperative approach has been generally lacking.

The force of US pressure to achieve this cooperative approach is seriously weakened if the one European area in which the US has direct responsibility abstains. As pointed out in London’s 4552 (repeated to Paris as 469), holding ourselves aloof from mutual discussion of separate programs will only encourage other participants to subordinate the cooperative approach to their individual national objectives. In recognition of this fact, Dept had hoped to include in the oral representations made pursuant to Dept’s circtel Sept 7 (1 a. m.) the offer to consider bizonal German plans in CEEC. If British position prevails and we withhold discussion of bizonal area, we can hardly expect to be successful in opposing a French desire to protect Monnet Plan, Scandinavian tendency to withdraw from full participation and other centrifugal forces working against a coordinated area approach.

Dept questions Bevin’s statement that bizonal area being adequately discussed. Dept has no evidence that appropriate discussion has taken place and reports from Conference have indicated that Conference considered discussing Germany outside its jurisdiction. (Paris’ 3325² and 3327 to Dept, rptd London as number not known and 649) London’s 4552 (repeated to Paris as 469) expresses view that in absence of US delegate, UK representatives not considered by CEEC adequate spokesmen for bizonal area.

Provision in CEEC II report³ of mining machinery exports from bizonal area of only $13 million 1948–51, rough bizonal output expected to reach $1,000 million, suggests lack of adequate discussion of bizonal figures in CEEC. Similar impression from absence in CEEC III report³ of any net steel exports from Germany after 1947.

Dept analyzes Brit position as reflecting Brit reluctance to coordinate its recovery program with that of western Europe. So long as bizonal area, for which US has direct responsibility, is not correlated with CEEC program, US sanctions exclusion of certain areas of western Europe from program, and this justifies Brit excluding themselves. It appears to the Dept that Brit wish to benefit fully from a European program as suggested by Sec State while at the same time maintaining the position of not being wholly a European country.

Thus the offer of appropriate discussion in CEEC of bizonal program in effect raises question of whether Brit program must be subject to same discussion. Dept does not desire to use bizonal offer as occasion to force the issue with Brit on this matter.

Dept therefore recommends that in your discussion with Bevin and Franks, you explore the Brit position on both the UK and the bizonal area relation to CEEC, that you point out that failure of bizonal area to participate genuinely in CEEC in preparation of program along the line described in Dept’s Circular of Sept 7 (1 a.m.) may seriously prejudice the achieving of such a program. You should point out the difficult position of the US if it urges cooperative approach to sixteen nations while withholding cooperation on behalf of the bizonal area. You should urge the Brit to consider the consequences of their reluctance to join with the US proposal regarding the bizonal area and to make every effort to evolve a position which would permit the carrying out of the line of action suggested in Dept’s 3841. You might point out that proposed offer to discuss bizonal program is subject to conditions in Dept’s 3841 and, pursuant to schedule foreseen in circtel Sept 7 (2 a.m.) would presumably take place in course of revisions to be made after publication initial CEEC report.

Repeated to Paris as 3393.

Marshall

1. In addition to his duties as Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State Lovett, Colonel Bonesteel in September became vice-chairman and executive secretary of the newly-formed interdepartmental Advisory Steering Committee on the European Recovery Program.
2. Not printed.
3. Reports prepared by CEEC technical committees and circulated as conference documents as basic material for preparation of the final report of the conference.
3. Reports prepared by CEEC technical committees and circulated as conference documents as basic material for preparation of the final report of the conference.