840.50 Recovery/8–2247
Memorandum by Lt. Col. Charles H. Bonesteel, III, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
secret
[Washington, undated.]
Minutes of Meeting on Marshall “Plan” 3:00 P. M., August 22, 1947
| Present: | C–Mr. Bohlen |
| S/P–Mr. Kennan | |
| Le–Mr. Gross | |
| EUR–Mr. Hickerson | |
| EUR–Mr. Jackson | |
| GA–Mr. Kindleberger | |
| PA–Mr. Swihart | |
| U–Mr. Bonesteel |
Informal discussion revolved around the questions listed in Tab A attached. There follows a summary of the conclusions reached with regard to each of these questions.
The paragraph numbers below refer to the question numbers in Tab A.
- 1.
- A comprehensive departmental position has not been officially approved. Considerable work has been done and is expressed in the report of the Policy Planning Staff on European reconstruction and in a series of documents produced by the committee working under Mr. Kindleberger.1
- It was concluded that the time has come to firm up the
overall departmental position. It was the consensus that the
two sets of documents mentioned above should be circulated
to selected representatives within the Department for hasty
review and comment to the end that a departmental position
be established early next week.
- a.
- It was the consensus that Mr. Clayton, while generally aware of departmental thinking with regard to the “Plan”, holds fundamental divergent views on some aspects, notably the importance of a Customs Union for Europe, the over-riding importance of financial and multilateral exchange arrangements, and his aversion to continuing European machinery to implement the European reconstruction plan. These divergencies held by Mr. Clayton may fundamentally affect the form and acceptability of the final plan presented by the Europeans. It seems essential that, as soon as the departmental position is clarified, that every effort be made to bring Mr. Clayton’s thoughts in line with the clarified position.
- b.
- It was felt that the following procedure would be best to bring Mr. Clayton fully in line with the departmental position: Send him a comprehensive cable covering, in its first part, a review of basic political factors in the present European scene; in the next part, a brief but fairly detailed review of the essentials of the Department’s position; a third part, asking him to prepare his comments on part two and be prepared to discuss them with Mr. Lovett by teletype. If the teletype conversation indicated any remaining divergencies of view, Mr. Kennan should make a quick trip to London for the purpose of discussing the outstanding matters with Mr. Clayton.
- 2.
- The consensus was that sufficient friendly aid is not being given. It seems fundamentally necessary that the European nations go through a screening procedure of the committee reports being presented with a view to substantially decreasing the aid requirements therein and making a greater showing of cooperative effort. This, in [Page 371] effect, would extend the present target of 1 September by some appreciable amount.
- 3.
- The screening of committee reports, suggested in 2 above, will almost inevitably lead to an extension of the target date. This will achieve the purpose suggested in question 3, and is a better way to delay submission of the report than to suggest directly to the European nations that the report should be further considered.
- 4.
- It was agreed that the critical situation in Britain2 may have some serious effects on the cooperation expected under the European recovery plan. Mr. Kennan undertook to review, in light of the present situation, his basic paper, particularly the chapter on Great Britain therein.
- 5.
- Discussion on this question brought out the necessity for a clearer idea of the mechanics of presentation of the European plan to Congress. It appears highly desirable to establish that the initial report from the European countries will be reviewed by the Administration and further questions asked the Europeans if, in our opinion, the plan is not wholly satisfactory. Such a course is, in effect, a form of negotiation but it seems impossible to avoid it. If the first report from the European countries is to be passed directly to Congress it seems very likely that the best action from the Hill will not ensue.
- 6.
- All agreed that an Administration position should be established as soon as possible. We understand that the Treasury Department, Commerce, et cetera, are becoming somewhat restive since they have heard nothing as to State Department thinking with regard to the Marshall program. As soon as the departmental position is clear, it was felt that copies of the position papers should be transmitted to the appropriate Cabinet officers by a letter which asks them to have the paper reviewed in their departments and their comments transmitted to the State Department through a designated representative, who could meet in an ad hoc committee with Mr. Kennan and other State Department representatives. As soon as the Administration position was clear it should then be given Mr. Harriman’s committee and appropriate Congressional leaders and interested Congressional committees.
- 7.
- A separate memorandum has been prepared on the public relations aspects of the Marshall Plan and will be reviewed in the light of such action as is taken in regard to the matters discussed above.
- The important questions of the special session of Congress and the question of Germany in relation to the European plan were not completely discussed. Further meeting will be held on these subjects in the near future.
- Charles Kindleberger was the executive secretary of the Committee on European Recovery Program organized on June 25. This Departmental Committee studied the projected aid program from many points of view and prepared a substantial corpus of background and operating materials. Copies of these are in Lot 122.↩
- For documentation, see pp. 1 ff.↩
- August 14, p. 356.↩