840.50 Recovery/8–1247: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
secret
urgent
niact

3222. For Lovett and Wood from Clayton. All right, your 2967, will await further instructions but would like to point out that a clear-cut decision on this question is necessary. As you say, it is so vital that the plan be an effective and acceptable one that I strongly recommend against a negative approach. For example, until I talked with Spaak he was prepared to push the adoption of a wholly unworkable and unacceptable provision for allocating among sixteen nations all increased production resulting from our aid. He was doing this in the belief that he was following our wishes.

[Page 356]

There may be some risks involved in a positive and affirmative position but I think they are minor and certainly not nearly so serious as those attendant upon a timid and negative approach.

I would confine our aid to a few broad policy suggestions such as those contained in our 3122 refusing to be drawn into details. I would make it perfectly clear that we are not dictating and that the plan must positively be a European plan to which the Secretary and the President are in no sense committed until the completed plan is received, carefully examined, approved and presented by them to Congress. I would further make it clear that, even then, Congress must take the final action. As a matter of fact, I have been saying just these things over and over to all these people. I feel sure they all clearly understand we are not committed. [Clayton.]

Caffery