Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)¹

[Washington, July 18?, 1947.]

1. There is a serious gap between what is required of Germany for European recovery and what is being produced there today. Unless this gap can be overcome no European recovery program will be realistic.

2. It is clear that any attempt on the part of the British and ourselves to arrive at measures for eliminating this gap without consultation with the French will undermine Bidault’s position and prejudice the success of the Paris talks.

3. I see no reason why we should not ask for early tri-partite conversations with the French and British on the subject of general policy toward Germany. The aim of such conversations would be to arrive at a general consensus on what has to be done and what ought to be done to raise German production. There would be no question of arriving at any written agreement, and it would be left to each of the three powers to translate into action in Germany, within the limits of its direct responsibilities, any common set of views that might be arrived at.

4. In this way we could place squarely before the French the choice between a rise in German production or no European recovery financed by the U.S. I believe that we could actually come to a meeting of the minds. What puts Bidault in a hard position is not to be consulted at all when we take decisions on Germany.

5. I can see no objection to having the coal talks merged with these tri-partite discussions if this would be preferable from the British standpoint.²

6. As for level of industry, I am afraid we must insist that instructions be sent to General Clay to the effect that the agreement arrived at between him and General Robertson³ should be held in abeyance pending final approval by the two governments in the light of the development of the general situation in Europe. It could be made clear to Clay that this implies absolutely no criticism of his procedure or of his work in negotiating the agreement but that a situation has simply arisen in Europe which makes it advisable, as a matter of government policy, that this matter should be held open for a little while.

1. Marginal notation: “GFK Notes for Mr. Lovett July 18, 1947”.
2. For documentation regarding German production levels, coal distribution, and tripartite discussions, see volume ii .
3. For documentation, see vol. ii, pp. 977 ff. For text of revised Plan for the Level of Industry in the United States–United Kingdom Zones of Occupation in Germany, signed August 27, 1947, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 358–362, Department of State Bulletin, September 7, 1947, pp. 468–472. Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948, pp. 626–632, or Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany, pp. 239–245.