840.50 Recovery/7–1047: Telegram
The Ambassador in Poland (Griffis) to the Secretary of State
urgent
1089. Following an apparently most cordial reception by all Polish officials whom I have thus far met here and unprecedented [apparent omission] arrangement to present credentials, my first diplomatic effort yesterday resulted in perfect score—100 percent failure.
As already advised reached Embassy Monday morning and was received by Foreign Minister within three hours. During general discussion he volunteered information that Polish Government expected send delegation Paris Conference 12th.
Yesterday I presented credentials to President and in following conference at which Keith was present I had general discussion on Polish-American questions. I expressed delight at news that Polish delegation would attend Paris Conference. I felt that good impression of such attendance on US public opinion would vary directly with extent of cooperation by Poles in Paris with other conferees. I stated that importance of this could not be over-estimated; that full cooperation might mean definite turning point in Polish–American relations, and failure to cooperate would bring disastrous and adverse repercussions in US. We discussed this matter for nearly an hour President [Page 321] stressing that England and France would largely control Conference and that most of its decisions had already been made in advance. He repeatedly referred to devastation in Poland to direct need of US aid and relief in Poland but expressed great antagonism to theory that Germany should be rehabilitated and put in position start another war as she had twice in past. He stated that in his opinion present policy of US was to rehabilitate the aggressor nation whereas assistance should be given nations which had suffered most from aggression during war. Nevertheless he stated that matter of Paris Conference would be decided at a govt meeting at six o’clock. The President also stated that there were many people today who did not realize that it was impossible to bring back the life which existed in Europe before war and that in all countries there had been great changes and that this was a new world. At 9:30 Keith and I were called to Foreign Minister’s office where Modzelewski,1 after various preliminary statements as to how fully Paris Conference had been considered, stated that Polish Government was giving a negative answer. He stated that he had desired have copy of govt’s reply as a courtesy to US but he was simultaneously advising “our friend and ally Russia”. He then gave me copy of their note, translation of which is being transmitted in following telegram.2 He then gave reasons for this decision referring to copy of note (addressed to British Ambassador) replying to French and British.
Polish Government chief contention was that Poland would have little or nothing to say at Paris Conference; that whole trend of his discussion with British and French Ministers was to effect that plan was already substantially in form; that French Ambassador had told him previous evening that no political discussion should be permitted or included in Paris agenda. I stated that I did not quite understand where any political questions were involved as Marshall Plan was entirely an invitation to peoples of Europe to present a balance sheet of economic and reconstruction needs and a program of mutual cooperation. He replied that entire question of the rehabilitation of Germany, the aggressor nation, was a political question. The Foreign Minister stated that there was already an economic commission for Europe and that this proposal of the British and French brought into being a new organization to accomplish something which should be carried out by the UNO.
I expressed great regret at decision of Polish Government and asked if my strong representations to the President and to him that afternoon as to effect of such action on American public opinion had been [Page 322] taken into consideration at the Ministers’ meeting. Foreign Minister stated that this had been done but nevertheless Polish Government decision was adverse for reasons given. I reiterated my views as to the wisdom of sending a Polish delegation to Paris and of making an honest attempt to work out a plan even if Poles were unable finally agree to it. He replied in effect that cards were already stacked against Poland by the Western Powers.
Foreign Minister stated that he had in his portfolio a Polish plan for the rehabilitation of Europe and asked if our Government would care to have Polish Government submit it. I stated that I could not answer that question (my theory was that possibly Dept might wish me informally discuss plan later with the faint hope that whatever plan eventuated in Paris the Polish plan might somehow be reconciled with it, perhaps by a third party nation). Minister stated that despite decision of Polish Government the US could expect to have the fullest cooperation from Poland; that Poland intended to use surpluses for rehabilitation of Europe and that under those circumstances he hoped that great aid in rehabilitation could be obtained from US. He asked if I thought that this would be forthcoming. I stated that he must fully realize that both American Government and the Ambassador were the slaves of American public opinion and that such public opinion would give the answer to his question.
Sent Dept 1089; repeated Paris 153; London 888.