840.50 Recovery/7–447: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
urgent
niact
3668. For the Secretary. Had a long conversation with Bevin last night covering the Paris Conference of the three Foreign Ministers. He said that because of the very shaky political position of France and the strength of the Communists, Bidault had acted with very great courage, particularly was the position he had taken brave because Molotov had come with more than 100 in his entourage who had been carefully selected, he thought, because of their contacts with the French Communist organizations. These agents had attempted through the French Communists to put as much pressure as possible on Bidault and Ramadier. Notwithstanding, however, the influence the Communists brought to bear, Bidault had Stood by his side with great firmness and Ramadier had given complete support. He said that both the French and he though[t] they had done everything which they reasonably could to prevent a breakdown without frustrating the prompt development of the program, had taken great risks. (I have formerly [Page 311] reported to you Bidault[’s] and Bevin[’s] respective responses to Molotov’s “curiously worded warning”).
While Bevin was worried about the effects of the impasse, he was, he said, more worried about the United States. Would she provide in time the assistance which Europe desperately needed? He was worried about the Soviets because he interpreted Molotov’s warning to mean that they would use a very [every?] subversive device to prevent other European nations from joining in the formulation of a program and would employ every method to create internal trouble.
He believed that France would stand firmly in the immediate future, but that sometime, probably after the first meeting of the Cooperative Committee, if we could find some method of giving France some immediate and temporary assistance, it would have the effect of assuring French stability until such time as Congress might act. He was hopeful that we would be able to include the UK in this but that he was more concerned during the interim period with France than with the UK. I reminded him of our reluctance to act in a piecemeal way.
He went on to observe that the program would be completed by the first of September, but that we would be kept completely informed from time to time in the intervening period of the progress and development of the program in all of its details. This, he said, would enable us to digest the programme before it was finally formulated and would enable us, if we so concluded, to call a special session of Congress sooner than would otherwise be the case. If, he said, no action is taken by the United States until late fall or winter, he thought that France, and with her most of Europe, would be lost.
I asked him what nations in his judgment would join and made particular reference to Holland and Belgium which, because of their overseas possessions and the pool of natural resources, when combined with the resources of the British commonwealth, the British Crown colonies and the French colonies could make available on their own account large volume of raw materials for the reconstruction of such European countries as joined in the program. He replied that he was confident that Holland and Belgium would join (I have already given you his views about France), that Molotov had made particular reference to Norway and Bevin doubted, therefore, whether she would come in; that Sweden might join although she was in a difficult position; that while it was clear that Czechoslovakia and Poland want to participate, he questioned whether they would be permitted to do so. As to Austria, he was doubtful (I emphasized your concern with Austria). In regard to Italy, he said that she had been so vacillating and was under such pressure from Communists that while he recognized [Page 312] the extreme importance of Italian participation, he could not now give positive assurance that she would enter the scheme with them and he expressed the hope that such pressure as we could legitimately bring on Italy to participate would be exerted. Switzerland would participate.
If Poland does not participate, he emphasized his opinion that we should not at this juncture by-pass the European program and the Committee on Cooperation by making credits available to Poland either through the International Bank or from some other American source.
Invitations to all European countries, excepting Spain and Russia, will be sent out today and the first meeting of the Committee on Cooperation will be held on the tenth. He had himself suggested that Paris be the center for the Committee’s work because he wanted to give France a feeling that she was important, restore her confidence, and thus give strength and support to her and particularly the Ramadier government.
As to the western zones in Germany and coal production in the Ruhr he had reviewed the proposals put up by Clay and Robertson and felt that unless we made some commitment that the coal properties, even though temporarily held by trustees or custodians, would be ultimately publicly owned, we would lose Germany to the Communists. He also referred to difference between US and UK proposals and stated UK plan for custodian under land [sic] was consistent with US position on decentralization.
I replied by referring to contemplated meeting in Washington at which presumably these questions would be discussed.
Bevin said he was meeting trade union leaders today to stiffen their support of his actions.
I suspect that Bevin’s views regarding socialization Ruhr coal at least partly influenced by his need for strong trade union support and his fear that it may not be sufficiently strong if he even temporarily abandons programme for public ownership of German coal properties.