840.50 Recovery/7–147: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
urgent
niact
2603. For the Secretary of State. Bevin asked me to come to see him at 10 this evening.1 He said that to all intents and purposes the conference had broken down today, that it would probably terminate [Page 302] tomorrow and that he wished you to know exactly what had happened and where he stood.
He began by stating that after the French had tabled their proposal Friday2 (my 2577, June 28) and the Soviets had taken an obstructionist position on both Friday and Saturday3 (my 2588, June 29) he had decided that the issues should be clearly stated and “laid on the line.” Accordingly he had taken the French proposal (my 2581, June 284) and reduced it to a “single page” which embodied the French suggestions “but stripped them of words” (text of Bevin’s (1) stripped proposal as well as his (2) clarifying statement which he made when the conference reconvened at four this afternoon5 is transmitted in my immediately following telegram.6)
Bevin sent his “single page” paper to Bidault and Molotov at eleven this morning.
When the conference convened this afternoon at four, Molotov immediately got to his feet and reiterated all his arguments of last Friday and Saturday to the effect that “there could be no infringement on the sovereignty of European states; that they should individually establish their needs and submit the total dollar costs of their combined needs to the US Government and ask it if it were prepared to advance the necessary credits; etc. .”
Bidault then took the floor and in a “very strong statement” supported Bevin’s stand.
At this juncture, Molotov was handed what Bevin described as “an obviously partially decoded telegram from Moscow.” In brief, “it reviewed all his previous arguments and added nothing to what he had previously elucidated.” (Bevin said the telegram from which Molotov read was without doubt Moscow’s reply to the paper he had given Molotov at eleven this morning).
Bevin then replied to Molotov: “I said with a smile, in effect what you are asking the United States Government to do is to give us a blank check. If I were to go to Moscow with a blank check and ask you to sign it I wonder how far I would get with your end.”
Bidault supported Bevin again and the meeting adjourned on this general note.
Bevin then went on to discuss with me the implications of today’s conference. He said that Bidault had shown “great courage and had given the fullest, and even surprisingly, solid and wholehearted support having in mind the present critical state of French internal politics.” He continued, “this conference will break up tomorrow. I am glad that the cards have been laid on the table and that the [Page 303] responsibility will be laid at Moscow’s door. They have tried to sabotage it in the conference room from the very beginning as I knew they would. In addition, however, Molotov after pressing for secrecy gave a complete handout of the Soviet position to the Tass Agency (my 2600, June 307). Accordingly I have given to the press this evening my clarifying statement made at the conference this afternoon (paragraph two (2) above) and I hope that it will convey clearly to your people where we stand.”
“In the face of the breakdown this conference, which I had anticipated and even wished for—given my certainty that Molotov had come to Paris to sabotage our efforts—I wish to raise another point: whereas we (the British) are determined to go forward and do everything in our power to take advantage rapidly of the initiative—indeed the life-line thrown us by Secretary Marshall—and I must point out that my position with the Labor Party is happily strong—the French are in a very dangerous position both politically and financially. I repeat that the French have supported me wholeheartedly and with great courage in view of the precarious French political situation.8 If the French in the face of the position they have taken and facing the critical political considerations they must meet in the next three weeks—have no hopes for even interim credits which can hold out to the French public until we can work out a plan to save Western Europe, I fear greatly that they may waver at a time when the battle can be won. If they stand with us I hope you will not abandon them. Give them something to hope for.”
In conclusion Bevin said that after the conference breaks up tomorrow he intends to send you a message on Wednesday giving his over-all views of the situation. There is no doubt in my mind that he is determined to do his utmost to produce a worthwhile plan and to bolster and encourage the French to go along wholeheartedly despite their critical internal political situation.
Repeated to Geneva for Clayton, repeated to London for Douglas.
- June 30. The telegram was received in Washington at 1:11 a. m. on July 1.↩
- June 27.↩
- June 27 and 28.↩
- See footnote 2, p. 297.↩
- June 30.↩
- Telegram 2604, July 1, not printed. For texts of Mr. Bevin’s proposal and statement, see French Yellow Book, pp. 47–48.↩
- Not printed.↩
- For documentation on the situation in France, see pp. 688 ff.↩