840.50 Recovery/6–2847: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
urgent
niact
2577. I have just seen Duff Cooper who has given me a confidential account of the first Bevin–Bidault–Molotov meeting which opened at four o’clock this afternoon.1
At the outset, the question of how the press should be handled was raised by Bidault who said they should be told everything or nothing. It was agreed that for the present and until there was some progress to report the meetings would be secret with no press handouts of any kind whatsoever.
Molotov then said he wished to inquire what additional information the French and British Governments had received from the United States Government other than had been contained in the Secretary’s Harvard speech.
Bidault and Bevin both replied that there had been no additional information from the US Government. Bevin added that he had seen Under Secretary Clayton in London but that the latter had nothing further to add to the imative [initiative?] which the Secretary had suggested that the European countries should take.
Molotov then said he wished to ask what agreements the French and British had arrived at during the Bidault–Bevin talks last week. Bevin and Bidault replied that the only decision they had made was to invite Molotov to meet with them to discuss a European economic plan as set forth in the terms of the invitation.
Bidault then distributed several papers. The only important one being a tentative form of agenda relating to the ad hoc committees outlined in my 2412, June 18; 2423, June 18 and 2440, June 19.2
It was then after six o’clock and Bidault suggested that the meeting might adjourn until tomorrow to give the delegations time to study the papers.
At this juncture, Molotov said that he wished to make a proposal. Since none of the three governments knew anything more about the seriousness of the United States Government’s proposal than had [Page 298] been contained in the Secretary’s speech, he proposed that they should ask the United States Government:
- 1.
- The exact sum of money which the United States was prepared to advance to aid European recovery.
- 2.
- Whether the United States Congress would vote such a credit.
Bevin at once replied that he could not agree to such a proposal. In the first place, he said, in a democracy the Executive Branch of the Government cannot engage the responsibility of the Legislative Branch. Secondly, the Secretary’s speech had not contained any United States offer of any specified sum of money but had suggested that European countries get together and formulate a constructive plan for European rehabilitation. Thirdly, debtors do not lay down conditions when seeking credits from potential creditors. It was therefore imperative that they get down to business and work out a coherent plan.
Bidault then said he agreed with Bevin. However, since a passage in the Secretary’s speech seemed to suggest that the United States Government might be willing to assist in the drafting of European plan, he proposed that the three governments might ask the United States for more specific enlightenment in this regard.
Bevin replied that he interpreted the passage in question to mean that after a European plan had actually been drafted by the European states, the United States would be willing, if the plan were realistic, to assist in the final stages, but that until such a plan had been drafted he did not think that any useful purpose would be served by Bidault’s proposal.
It then being eight o’clock the meeting was adjourned by unanimous consent. The Soviets requested that it not be reconvened until four tomorrow afternoon in order “to have sufficient time to study the French papers”, but obviously, as Duff Cooper put it, to gain time for further instructions from Moscow.
In conclusion Duff Cooper remarked to me that the Soviets today were obviously feeling out the ground and sparring for time. “Molotov after the meeting and indeed during it was comparatively affable”.
Duff Cooper is not sure what line Molotov will next take but said that Bevin is determined not to let the Soviets get away with any obstructionist or delaying tactics. The British, he said, realize the vital importance of meeting rapidly and courageously the Secretary’s suggestion. He believes that Bidault recognizes this equally well and will go along in this sense, although “Bidault’s position is more difficult because of the strength of the French Communist Party. [”]
[Page 299]In Duff Cooper’s opinion, the outcome of the present conference depends on what develops in the next two days.
- The meeting actually was held on June 27. In telegram 2580 from Paris, not printed, Ambassador Caffery conveyed the French account of the meeting, given to him by M. Couve de Murville of the French Foreign Ministry.↩
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Telegram 2423 not printed. The Ambassador also transmitted the texts of the papers tabled by the French at the meeting in telegram 2581; for texts of the papers, see French Yellow Book, pp. 25–27.
In London telegram 3564, June 28, 7 p.m., Ambassador Douglas cabled a “personal message” from Mr. Bevin to Secretary Marshall which described the meeting in general terms (840.50 Recovery/6–2847).
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