Lot 64 D 563, Box 20027
Memorandum Prepared for the Use of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)1
We Americans are deeply concerned over the production and exchange difficulties which you people in Europe are experiencing.
We had hoped that the outside aid which your countries have already received would have sufficed, together with the facilities of the agencies which have now been established for international financial assistance, to bring you to a point where your import requirements could be [Page 248] handled on a normal commercial basis. We recognize that many of the factors which have caused these hopes to be disappointed are ones which were beyond anyone’s control, and that for some of the others we share a measure of responsibility.
We are most anxious to find out from you the causes why the various measures undertaken by the European Governments themselves and the assistance furnished from the United States and other non-European countries have not further advanced the restoration of economic health in Europe. Only if we and you have a clear understanding of the real causes of the present serious economic situation of Europe can remedies to correct the situation be intelligently sought.
We regard the question of the restoration of economic health in Europe as a matter requiring joint consideration. Before the U.S. Government can take any effective action to be of help it must know from the European Governments directly concerned what measures these Governments either jointly or separately have in mind in order to remove the causes of the present troubles. This is particularly important because it affects the whole problem of future American aid for Europe.
It is generally recognized in the United States that a stable and self-supporting Europe is a matter of immediate interest to the American people. Our people have already demonstrated their willingness to aid Europe. But they are naturally concerned that any future aid shall be productive of more effective results than the aid they have extended in the past. And unless the American Congress can receive some convincing reassurance on this point, we doubt that its members would feel justified in making further appropriations of American money for this purpose.
You Europeans know your own continent and your own problems better than we ever can. Furthermore, it is you who are administering the economies of Europe. For these reasons we would like to have your ideas and plans as to the future course of European recovery and for joint or cooperative efforts among you. It would be much easier for us to consider the whole question of further American assistance to Europe if you could provide us with facts and figures showing just how you envisage the restoration of your economy.
What we are interested in here is in learning the size and character of the specific problems. What are the bottlenecks impeding recovery? What form of outside help added to your internal efforts would prove most effective, and what are the prospects of prompt cooperative efforts?
Our people would wish to have the assurance that in facing these problems maximum advantage has been taken of the possibilities for better exchange among European nations. We know that this is more a [Page 249] question of creating export surpluses than of reducing barriers. We also recognize as one of the powers occupying Germany, the importance of making surpluses from that country available to the other peoples in Europe. We will continue to do our best to make the US–UK zones in Germany useful and productive units in any European pattern.
In this connection, it would be a great help to us if any or all of you could get together and give us your common views on these matters. We have no desire to force on you any measures which you would not feel would be timely and useful. But Americans would feel greater confidence about the effectiveness of their support if there were some degree of agreement on the course of and the measures required for your recovery.
Many things have been said in Europe about the aims which underlie American assistance to other countries and the conditions which might be attached to this assistance. Most of these statements were foolish or unjust, or both. But there is one condition which Americans will attach to any future aid and with good reason: namely, that it should really do its work of putting the economies of European countries on their feet.
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An early draft of this memorandum was prepared in Mr. Acheson’s morning meeting of June 5, 1947. A revision of the above dated June 9, 1947, bears the following notation: “Mr. Secretary: The attached memorandum contains suggestions as to the line it would be advisable for Mr. Clayton to take in discussing with representatives of European Governments the question of further American aid to Europe.
“This memorandum has been concurred in by Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lovett.—George F. Kennan.” Secretary Marshall in a chit made the following comments: “Dear Lovett: It seems to me that this statement indicates too much of American cash and too little of European organization, however elementary, to facilitate the European states in helping themselves and in making it possible for American aid to be more effective.—GCM.” Mr. Lovett, then a Special Assistant to the Secretary, redrafted the memo and said: “Mr. Secretary, I have taken a crack at rewriting this memo which is designed for use by Mr. Clayton as a reminder of the points to be covered in any conversations he has on this subject. Do the changes meet your views? The first draft is attached for comparison.—L.” (Lot 64 D 563, Box 20042, 1947 Chron File)
The Lovett draft was revised by Secretary Marshall and this revision is printed here. It bears the notation “O.K. as amended G.C.M.”
Under Secretary Clayton arrived in London for talks with British officials which began on June 24, 1947.
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