740.00119 Council/3–1347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President and the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

799. Delsec 1297. For the President and Acheson from Marshall. Fourth CFM meeting, Bevin presiding, 13 March.

I opened discussion on denazification with brief statement of our [Page 250] activities to date and cited lack of uniform implementation in the four zones with consequent distrust incident thereto.15

I proposed resolution instructing ACC to have enacted a uniform German law based on ACC Directive No. 38 to assure equal and just treatment of all persons.16

Bidault pointed out that democratization flowed naturally and inseparably from process of denazification and likewise stressed need for uniformity of processes in the four zones. He stated that democratization was interdependent with economic stability on a unified zonal basis, and agreed in principle with my resolution.17

Molotov expressed dissatisfaction with efforts of Allied Control Council, and launched a lengthy attack against U.S. and British procedures and non-compliance with intent of Berlin agreements.18

As usual, he glorified complete Soviet compliance. Although stating his agreement in principle to my resolution, Molotov introduced recommendation [Page 251] directing ACC to take immediate and accelerated measures for denazification. He then went on to state that political zonal disunity seriously jeopardized the end results desired and after attacking both British and US electoral procedures, stated that Soviet belief that in order to obtain a democratic unified Germany the CFM must: (1) give German Democratic parties and Free Trade Unions the right to organize and operate on an all-Germany basis and not to be limited by zones; (2) establish uniform principle of democratic elections with proportional representation; (3) approve ACC recommendation that land reforms be carried out by end of 1947.

Bevin then followed his usual line of counter attack against the Soviet accusations. He cited chapter and verse against the Soviets in as much detail as Molotov had attacked the British and US operations. He expressed a dim view of public press and radio accusations by any government against the other and recommended that when one govt believes irregularities exist, it should inform the other through normal procedures. He then went on record, and asked Council agreement to, his gratification at progress of ACC on denazification.

On democratization, Bevin caustically referred to other elections since the war and stated his opinion that the “list” system was a great contribution to the rise of Hitler. He said we must join to avoid the rise of militant minorities into totalitarian regime which will threaten the security of all of us.

The exchange between Molotov and Bevin, again, as yesterday, was well interspersed with propaganda for home consumption.

I closed the meeting with the statement that I would circulate well before hand, tomorrow, my views on democratization, liquidation of war potential plants, and a statement on our prisoner of war holdings, rather than engage in lengthy procedure of presentation orally with necessity of translating first into Russian and then into French.

Sent Dept as 799, repeated Berlin as 95.

[
Marshall
]
  1. The statement by the Secretary of State on German denazification was circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M) 10, March 13, 1947; for the text of the statement, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 107–109, or Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1947, pp. 522–523.
  2. The text of the resolution proposed by the Secretary of State was as follows:

    “The Council of Foreign Ministers notes the report of the Control Council on Denazification and concludes that uniformity of denazification practices and procedures throughout Germany is imperative. It instructs the Allied Control Council to direct the appropriate German authorities to enact a uniform German law based on Control Council Directive No. 38 to assure equal and just treatment of all persons in accordance with the degree of their responsibility, said German legislation to be effective unless disapproved by the Allied Control Council.”

    For the text of Directive No. 38 of the Allied Control Council for Germany, October 12, 1946, under reference here, dealing with arrest and punishment of war criminals, Nazis, and militarists and the internment, control and surveillance of potentially dangerous Germans, see Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany, pp. 168–179.

  3. For the text of the first portion of Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement on German democratization, see Déclarations de Bidault , pp. 7–8. According to the United States Delegation’s Record of this meeting of the Council, Bidault’s observations on the American draft resolution were as follows:

    • “(1) The French Delegation agreed in principle to uniform practices in the four zones;
    • “(2) The French Government does not object to German legislation being substituted for directives of the Allied Control Council on the understanding that these would be issued only by the local Laender in each province;
    • “(3) There must be unity of legislation and jurisprudence. The method outlined in the United States draft provided that the Allied Control Council give instructions directly to the German authorities. This was a new proposal compared to the existing situation and was not desirable in the view of the French Government. The directives of the Allied Control Council should pass through the intermediary of the Military Commander of each zone. Therefore, the draft should be modified to reach [read] as follows:

      ‘The Council of Foreign Ministers instructs the Allied Control Council to direct the appropriate German authorities through the intermediary of the Allied Commander in each zone to enact a uniform German law based on Control Council Directive no. 38 to assure equal and just treatment of all persons in accordance with the degree of their responsibility, said German legislation to be effective unless disapproved by the Allied Control Council.’

    M. Bidault said that this would be in conformity with the formula of Directive 38 itself.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 60: USDel (47) (M) 4th Meeting)

  4. For the text of Molotov’s lengthy statement on German disarmament and denazification, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M) 9, March 13, 1947, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 348–358.