Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/3–1147: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President and the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

Moscow, March 11, 1947—11 p.m.

761. Delsec 1291, for the President and Acting Secretary Acheson from Marshall. The CFM met today 11 March from 4 to 7:30 p.m. with me presiding.

It was agreed that the letter from the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency¹ would be considered at the time we considered the overall matter of reparations, and not as a separate item on the agenda.

On the information report Molotov desired on China, both Bevin and myself agreed, and so stated, that it was not a matter for CFM but that we had no objection to an informal exchange of data among the three ministers concerned as an item entirely separate from the Council table. Bidault disassociated France from any discussion thereof. Molotov proposed that any discussions result in a communique such as that of the Moscow Conference, I and Bevin opposed any discussion of such a matter at the Council table. There being no agreement, we passed to the next item.²

On the limitation of occupational troops, Molotov stated that since the item was not included in the agenda agreed upon at New York, he reserved his position. Both Bevin and Bidault indicated no prior objection and hence none now. I stated that the matter was pertinent to the issues we were now considering, that we had circulated our proposal on December 6,³ and believed that it was pertinent to the conference. It was agreed to hold the matter in suspense pending further Soviet consideration.

The report of the deputies for Germany on procedure to be followed by CFM in considering ACC report indicated a priority for discussion of important items and recommended a further directive to the deputies to study the matter and make specific proposals after a general discussion on CFM.⁴ The first and only item discussed today in the priority list was demilitarization of Germany.

Bidault was glad to note the non-existence of a German army but expressed concern over the delineation between war potential and industrial potential.⁵ Bevin stated that the British views were contained in the ACC report itself. Molotov then made a prolonged attack on failure of the western zones to demilitarize armed forces and forces of non-German national and suggested instructions to the Allied Control Council as follows:⁶

A. By 1 July 1947, submit plan for elimination of war industry potential. Such elimination to be completed by the end of 1948 with special emphasis on trusts, cartels, et cetera.

B. Expedite destruction of war material and installations for waging war on land, sea and air, to be completed by the end of 1949.

C. Disband and liquidate by 1 June 1947 all remaining German military and auxiliary units.

D. Disband and eliminate all remaining military units, camp guards and personnel of non-German national.

I stated my general acceptance of the ACC report except for the reduction of heavy industry. The removal contemplated cannot be done without economic agreement and controlling Germany on a purely zonal basis requires a higher level of economy in each zone. I submitted a resolution that CFM note the ACC report on demilitarization and the substantial progress made by ACC therein, and direct continuation of action along these lines in accordance with ACC agreements and procedures.⁷ I then recommended that Molotov’s instructions and my resolution be referred to the deputies for a report.

Bevin stated his desire to study Molotov’s and my statements further in writing before committing his government. He then presented a detailed and rather caustic defense against the Soviet allegations, concluding with his view that in spite of misunderstandings on the Potsdam Agreement the ACC seems to have done pretty well.

Molotov stated that the Soviets do not share the general optimism of the other colleagues but accepted my recommendation that the deputies consider our views in greater detail.

At this point Bidault suggested that certain French views expressed in the report should also be considered by the deputies.⁸

Bevin pointed out that much of the confusion was a result of no clearcut definition of war potential plants and cited several examples to support the confusion.

I agreed with Bevin’s concern as to what were and what were not war potential plants and stated emphatically that the United States Govt and people desire to see Germany completely disarmed and demilitarized. I said that Germany is not capable of waging war today and we all know it. Further that the Four-Power pact or treaty, in our opinion, would be the determining factor in keeping Germany in a state of demilitarization. I then pointed out that we must avoid dissension over details of procedure on such matters, that allied unity would be the determining factor in continuing the state of German demilitarization.

It was agreed to await Bevin’s statement or proposed directive to be presented tomorrow.

The meeting then adjourned.

[

Marshall

]

1. Post, p. 391.
2. On March 15 the Secretary of State wrote to Foreign Minister Molotov proposing that they and Foreign Secretary Bevin exchange information concerning the execution of the Moscow declaration on China. The information would be exchanged by April 1 and copies would be sent to the Chinese Government. In a letter of March 24, Molotov agreed to Secretary Marshall’s proposal. The Secretary and Molotov subsequently exchanged information in communications dated March 31 and April 1, respectively. For texts of the communications referred to here and other related documentation, see volume vii .
3. Document CFM(46) (NY) 59, December 6, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 1466.

4. The Deputies for Germany held their 31st Meeting (their first meeting during the Moscow Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers) on March 11 at 10 a.m. to consider the order of discussion of the Report of the Allied Control Council for Germany. The report of the Deputies, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M) 4, March 11, not printed, recommended that the Council of Foreign Ministers consider the following questions in the following order:

   1. Demilitarization,

   2. Denazification,

   3. Democratization,

   4. Economic principles,

   5. Reparations,

   6. Displaced persons,

   7. Territorial reorganization,

   8. Creation of central administrative agencies.

5. For the text of Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement, see Déclarations de M. Georges Bidault: President de la Délégation Française au Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères: Session de Moscou Mars–Avril 1947 (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), p. 5.
6. For the text of Foreign Minister Molotov’s statement and suggestions, see V. M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy: Speeches and Statements April 1945–November 1948 (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), pp. 343–347.
7. The draft resolution of the United States Delegation described here was circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M) 5, March 11, 1947, not printed.
8. The French views under reference are printed in Déclarations de Bidault, p. 6.