Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/3–647

Minutes of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the President of France (Auriol)⁵⁸

secret

[Paris, March 6, 1947.]

After having welcomed General Marshall, personally and in the name of the French people, President Auriol said:

“Monsieur Bidault, as you know, was obliged to leave for Moscow before you arrived, but I know you will see a great deal of him there.

“Actually France is faced with two grave problems: reconstruction and security. With your aid, the people of France have made considerable efforts. They must accomplish even more. The installation of our permanent democratic institutions, the agreement which exists among the different elements of our government, the efforts of Leon Blum and Ramadier, have allowed us to begin our uphill climb; but the French people are still subject to harsh privations which, if prolonged too long, could give birth to uneasiness, leading in the political realm to further uncertainty with grave consequences.

“Our problem, General Marshall, is coal. Our annual production is actually 50 million tons, which exceeds the production of 1938. At that time we imported 25 million tons: at the present time we no longer receive such importations. In 1946 we imported 12 million tons: 6 million from the United States and 6 million from Poland and Germany. In 1938 we had at our disposal 73 million tons; we now have only 61 million tons. To reach the total figures of 1938, which we need in order to exist, we must find 12 million more tons: to commence our work of reconstruction we need much more than this. Furthermore, I should add that we were able to produce 50 million tons of coal by utilizing labor furnished by prisoners of war. If this labor is taken away from us we must further increase our importations. The most modest estimate of our vital coal needs for this year is an importation from Germany of 500,000 tons per month, and for next year 1,000,000 tons per month. We do not wish to deal a death blow to Germany, but it seems to us that the figures I have just given only represent what equity calls for. It would be useful, I believe, to study the conditions necessary to increase the production of the Ruhr mines, and it seems to me desirable that American and French technicians be consulted in this regard. The new formula of coal distribution recently adopted does not seem to have taken into account the promises which were made by the British Foreign Minister.”

Monsieur Teitgen, Acting Foreign Minister, then continued:

“The situation is actually as follows: our minimum coal requirements of German coal for 1947 are 500,000 tons per month, and we are actually receiving 235,000 tons. Germany is only exporting 10 per cent of its production and of that percentage France is only receiving 235,000 tons per month, which is less than half of our indispensable minimum requirements. In recent conversations, though it is true there were no formal engagements, it was understood that if (German) production was increased the percentage made available for export would also be increased. Production has increased, and we were hoping to have the allocation of coal to France increased in the same proportion. We have obtained an increase of 25,000 tons per month, making a total monthly allocation of 260,000 tons, which is entirely insufficient. (Teitgen added that allocations are already fixed for March, April and May.)

“In such conditions, the problem is a vital political question for France. Our entire reconstruction is in the balance. The future of our country can depend on the negotiations being conducted regarding Germany. If essential dispositions are not taken in time, Germany will be restored much more quickly than France. This question of French reconstruction and of German reconstruction dominates, in my opinion, the political picture. If we were to receive precise guarantees on coal, the political problems themselves would perhaps appear to us more simple. (Teitgen’s remark actually was: ‘If the United States could find a way to meet French views on German coal exports, the French would find it possible to go along with the United States views on other German problems’.)

“It is for this reason that the French Government instructed Bidault, who represents France at Moscow, to raise the question of coal before considering the other political and economic problems concerning Germany.

“Such is the French situation in so far as reconstruction is concerned. This question is not a purely French problem, but exists for all Europe. In all equity, Germany should not be reconstructed before France and the other countries that it ravaged. I will add that a strong France is indispensable to Europe and the world, a France surrounded by members of the French union, and I should like to say in passing that I formulate the wish that as a result of the efforts which we have made to create democratic and fraternal ties between members of this same family (French Union), to see disappear the difficulties in this regard which have arisen in the organization of the United Nations.”

The President (Auriol), who (said he) did not want to refer in detail to the various memoranda given by the Foreign Minister to the diplomatic representatives of the Governments of the United States, of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union concerning the future organization of Germany and of the Ruhr, reminded General Marshall of the unanimous agreement reached in the French Parliament concerning these documents and concerning French foreign policy in general. He said he would limit himself, if he might, to a reference to his already ancient recollections as a statesman:

“I must admit”, said the President of the Republic, “that in 1919 I believed in the strength of democracy in Germany, and, a Socialist myself, I believed in social democracy. I was convinced that a democratic spirit could develop in vanquished Germany. Nothing came of it. I would not like us to make the same mistakes once again. Doubtless the Versailles Treaty specified that weapons of all kinds would be turned over to the Allied powers and reports of Marshal Foch and of General Nollet had allowed room for some optimism. The German armed forces for the (German) territory as a whole had been reduced to 100,000 men. This figure was soon increased to 200,000 men by the SPA decisions. Weapons, most of them, under pressure of the Control Commissions, were surrendered but Germany, preserving her industrial potential, was nevertheless capable of building modern and efficient weapons. Adopting the theories which Jean Jaures had expressed in The New Army, the German staff taught the small army at its disposal and turned it into a remarkable cadre of officers. At the right moment the Third Reich found troops which had received their physical training in sport clubs and in youth organizations, troops whose morale had been built up in the German schools. At the opportune moment the industrial trusts and the banks gave their support to the spirit of revenge and aggression which smashed democracy. A Germany, stronger than ever, had sprung up from the Treaty of Versailles. It is no longer possible to leave Germany the possibility of using similar methods and of transforming tomorrow its police forces into instruction cadres and to rebuild its military potential. We consider (continued the President) that centralized power in Germany constitutes a real danger for peace in the constitutional period. It is not necessary to refer to the Weimar Constitution and to where this constitution led Germany. Federalism could be a remedy to the danger of centralization. It is not possible for the security of Europe to leave the Ruhr in the hands of industrial magnates. Only international control could remove this danger. M. Georges Bidault will go into greater detail, but it was appropriate that I should point out the lessons gained from a bitter and painful personal experience and from the aggression of a nation which can once again think of revenge tomorrow.”

General Marshall then spoke. He first took up the question of coal.

“I am happy to be here”, said the Secretary of State. “I came to Paris purposely to obtain first hand information concerning the situation of France, the state of her economy and of her reconstruction and to gather also at first hand information concerning the reorganization of Europe. Many things which I shall tell you, Mr. President, I have already said to the Prime Minister a half an hour ago.

“I would like you to be convinced that I realize perfectly well the critical character of the present situation. I know that France wishes to secure that efficient tranquility which would permit her to restore her economy. I will not go into any details, Mr. President. I intend to meet with General Clay in Berlin, to inform myself concerning the coal problem in Germany and in France. I trust, Mr. President, that you not lose sight of the fact that I fully appreciate the privations and the sufferings of the people of France and the consequences which may result from them. I spent two and one-half years in France myself during the First World War. Two of these years before joining General Pershing I spent in the country side by side with artisans, workers and peasants. I was able to gauge the work of destruction wrought by the Germans and the sufferings and the courage of the French population. I was in France some while back during the recent battles and once again I saw German destruction and French suffering. During the entire occupation of your country, Mr. President, and within the field of the responsibilities which had been assigned to me, the liberation of France was my great concern. I can tell you without boasting that among the men who are not Frenchmen I know as much as anyone else about the sufferings of this country, about its present situation and its worries. It is through my own personal experience that I look at your problems perfectly conscious of the situation wrought in France through the fault of Germany.

“I come back to the question of coal. I want to be informed about this. I was happy to obtain directly your views on this matter. I would like to say that I shall give it my full attention.

“As you just did a few moments ago, Mr. President, I am taking the liberty to refer to the political reactions to which you have alluded. We, representatives of the American Government, must take into consideration the situation of the occupied nations as well as of the liberated nations. It is a question of finding a balance between the urgent needs of France and the urgent needs of Germany. There is the question of avoiding that the United States of America be compelled to continue paying the heavy contributions which Germany is now costing the American taxpayer. The situation is the same in Japan. The problem is not an easy one for in addition it is a question of finding a happy balance between these political and economic considerations and the political situation within the United States.

“I must therefore size up, with precision, France’s situation and gather information from our representatives in Germany.

“I must be able to inform American public opinion in order to justify what we shall decide to do. In France there are very direct reactions towards Germany—reactions which are not easy to guide from a governmental point of view. I realize that this state of affairs renders difficult any satisfactory solution.

“I can assure you, Mr. President, that I shall forget nothing of what you have told me and more particularly of what you have told me concerning the problem of coal. I shall take it up at once with our representatives in Berlin. It is an urgent question which belongs to today and not to tomorrow.

“I now come to the problem on security. The President of the Council of Ministers reminded me of France’s painful experiences.⁵⁹ The Government of the United States places vital importance on the question of providing for security until the organization of the United Nations becomes sufficiently strong. We believe that security lies in a treaty signed by the four major powers. Any regional agreement such as the one which has been signed recently at Dunkirk must, we believe, come within the framework of a wider security. It is this basic security that a treaty between the four powers could insure. This treaty implies the commitment of the American Government, which means a complete change of American policy when compared to the events which followed the First World War. Rather than separate proposals, it would be desirable to have such a document define the control clauses over German war potential and establish the broad principles of disarmament and of demilitarization.

“I know what happened after Versailles. I was placed in charge of a school with 400 officer students, most of whom have since taken part as officers in high command, in the liberation of your country. At that time we could know nothing of what was going on in Germany: the War Department had no information on the subject. I decided to send to Europe some of my professors on their vacations. One of them visited von Blumberg, who was in command in East Prussia. This officer brought back to us information which left no doubt as to the intensive development of German aviation. This was later brought to the world’s attention by the Lindbergh visit to Germany and attendant publicity. That was in 1931. All of these military visitors agreed as to the military training to which German youth was subjected and as to the use of the methods about which you have just spoken: the Germans were training 100,000 officers. I know these German methods: just like compulsory military service, they date back to the Napoleonic wars.

“Mr. President, once again I come back to the necessity of guaranteeing security. An agreement is needed which offers reasonable guarantees and which can assure lasting peace in Europe: and that agreement is to be found in the Four Power treaty. I am not a diplomat: I mean exactly what I say and there is no use trying to read between the lines because there is nothing to be read there.”

58. The source text is accompanied by a cover sheet from the American Embassy in Paris reading as follows:

    “The following is a free translation of the French minutes of conversation between Secretary of State Marshall, and President Auriol and Monsieur Teitgen, Acting Foreign Minister, of France, which has been cleared by both, and text of which was only completed and given to us late this afternoon, March 8.”

    According to telegram 1036, March 7, from Paris, not printed, the Secretary of State, who arrived in Paris at 12:40 p. m. March 6, called on President Auriol and Acting Foreign Minister Teitgen at 6:30 p. m. The Secretary left Paris by plane for Germany at 2 p.m. March 7 (740.00119 Council/3–747).

59. Secretary Marshall had a forty-minute meeting with French Premier Ramadier just prior to his conversation with President Auriol. A translation of the French minutes of the meeting with Ramadier were sent to Secretary Marshall by Ambassador Caffery on March 17, 1947 (711.51/3–1747). In his conversation with Ramadier, Marshall emphasized the importance the United States placed in the strengthening of the United Nations and in the conclusion of the proposed Four-Power treaty on German disarmament.