Office of the Historian

740.0011 EW Peace/2–2747: Telegram

The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State 47

secret
urgent
London, February 27, 1947—9 p.m.

1352. From Matthews. Accompanied by Murphy, I met with Harvey, Strang, and other Foreign Office officials working on Germany yesterday for an informal exchange of views on questions expected to arise at Moscow.

I made it clear that any views I expressed must be considered as purely tentative, since the various problems were still under study by [Page 183] the Secretary and others in the Department. In general, neither Murphy nor I discovered any major differences between the British and ourselves. The British do not appear yet to have concluded their preparatory work, nor to have prepared texts for circulation to the CFM. There follows a summary of some of the points discussed. (My talk this morning on Mr. Byrnes’ Four-Power treaty will be reported separately.)48

1.
Provisional German Government. The British do not seem to have given much thought to this other than the aspects covered by the establishment of German central administrative agencies. I outlined briefly and orally the thoughts contained in our paper on the subject, and they seemed to find our plan interesting and constructive.
2.
Laender. British thinking on the number and areas of German laender is generally similar to ours.
3.
Future German Government. While they do not seem to have thought out the structure in as much detail as we have, their ideas are similar to ours. They feel that the French plan for a confederation goes too far, and is not practical in a modern economy. They have so informed the French. They seem strongly opposed to any highly centralized Government such as the Russians wish. They were interested in our ideas for a bicameral legislature, but have not made up their mind on this. They said the French are opposed to any popularly elected national diet. The British agree that there should be no federal control over police or education, and likewise that the federal bureaucracy should be kept to a minimum. They have prepared a detailed study of a system of courts, and attach much importance to an independent, appointed judiciary removable only for cause similar to the British system. They agree with us generally that powers over foreign affairs, foreign trade, communications, finances, et cetera, should be granted the federal government are [garbled] similar to ours.
4.
Polish frontier. I told them the general lines of our thinking, and they are pleased that we propose to seek a reduction of the existing areas transferred to Polish administration. They said that they would support us on this. (Previous indications given the Department that the British were prepared to accept the existing administrative boundary as permanent apparently did not originate with them.49) I told them that our present thinking is that it might be preferable to leave the matter open for the time being if our proposals are not accepted.
5.
Dutch claims.50 The British are inclined to go along with a major portion of the Dutch claims, though not to grant their claims to certain coalmines.
6.
Belgian claims. They consider the Belgian claim as a “minor rectification” which is well founded.
7.
Luxembourg claims. They believe the Luxembourg claim considerably exaggerated, but might be inclined to grant a small area permitting a power plant near the Our River.
8.
Czechoslovak claim. They favor granting some of the Czech claims on the theory that it would be inconsistent to grant rectifications to the western Allies and not to Czechoslovakia.
9.
Danish claim. They wish to leave Schleswig frontier as it now is, and not to remove the German refugees or provide a separate administration.
10.
Austrian claim. The British agree with us that Austria should be granted free transit rights across the Berchtesgaden salient, but that the area should remain in Germany.
11.
Saar claim. While agreeing to accept the economic integration of the Saar into France, they do not agree that the additional territory should be included which the French have administratively embodied in the Saar. They might, however, accept some compromise with regard to the eastern part in view of the railway passing through it.
12.
Treatment of Germany as an economic whole. Their views on this are similar to ours as well as on the measures required to implement it. They feel Russia and France should bear their share of the costs.
13.
Reparations. They are opposed to reparations out of current production on grounds similar to ours.
14.
Coal. They did not discuss the coal report other than to express some gratification at the recent increase in Ruhr production.
15.
The Ruhr. Their views on the Ruhr have not changed since the drafting of their two proposals. They are firm against the establishment of any international control or supervision at the present stage. When such supervisory body is established, however, they believe that the Soviet should be included. They think that some troops should be stationed in the Ruhr, but not Soviet troops. They, therefore, favor during the post-occupation period, the establishment of national [units?] in various parts of Germany rather than quadripartite units. They feel that the French have “come part way” on the Ruhr, but do not find the French plan acceptable. They believe it carries Allied managerial functions down to an unworkable degree.
16.
Post-surrender acquisitions in Germany. I outlined steps taken by the Soviet in this direction. While they seem equally disturbed, they do not appear to have given much thought to measures which should be taken. They do wish to insist on obtaining full information both as to past Russian removals and to Russian acquisitions in Germany.

Sent to Department as 1352, repeated to Berlin as 172, to Paris as 154.

[
Matthews
]
  1. This telegram was sent via the facilities of the Embassy in London.↩
  2. The reference here is to the Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany which Secretary of State Byrnes circulated to the 2nd Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris as document C.F.M. (46) 21, April 30, 1946. Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 190. In telegram 1353, February 27, from London, not printed, Matthews reported that he had gone over the draft treaty with officers of the British Foreign Office who said that they attached great importance to the treaty and hoped the United States would push it at the forthcoming Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. (740.0011 EW Peace/2–2747)↩
  3. In the course of a conversation with Matthews on March 1, Foreign Secretary Bevin indicated that he had an open mind on the Polish-German boundary question and was prepared to support the American proposal to move the boundary further east.↩
  4. The territorial claims referred to in this and succeeding paragraphs of this telegram are summarized in the Report by the Deputies for Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers, February 25, 1947, p. 40.↩