740.00119 Council/1–2547: Telegram
The United States Deputy for Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
531. Delsec 1140 from Murphy. Although Gousev in high-handed exercise of deputies chairmanship Wednesday evening20 unilaterally instructed Secretary General CFM to notify Australian representative that he could not speak on procedural question. Hodgson, Australian Minister to France, at January 23 hearing presented Australian views in uninhibited fashion, mixing some remarks on substantial German issues with lengthy consideration of procedural question.21
Australian representative grounded interest of his Government in German problem in fact that twice in 25 years Australia has sent its [Page 10] manhood overseas to fight in European wars. Australian Government regards as a duty to its people full participation in peace settlement with Germany. His Government was also concerned lest there be repetition of Paris Peace Conference, which had not been preceded by adequate consultation between the four powers and other allies, and where consequently allies had been presented with fait accompli in form of agreed clauses, with no amendment possible unless four powers agreed.
Australian Government appreciates fact that in contrast with Paris procedure, views of active belligerents are now being heard at start of consideration German problem. He requested adoption of liberal attitude toward Australian proposal regarding procedure for hearings. (Delsec 1112, January 16; Delsec 1115, January 1722). Three major requests were: (1) Access to all documentation by representatives of countries invited to hearings; (2) Presence at all hearings of representatives of all invited countries; (3) Participation of representatives in general discussion with deputies. Allied countries in question can only play useful part in preparation of German peace settlement, if they engage in discussion of issues and are enabled thereby obtain from outset clear picture of views of others. Australian representative declared that two major facts regarding German problem had to be taken into account: (1) There is no government in Germany, similar to government in Italy and Austria. The longer Germany remains divided in separate zones, more remote becomes time when there will be one German Government to accept terms of peace settlement. (2) Germans are at present unfit to govern themselves. Nothing would be worse than to hasten formation of central German Government in order, for convenience of certain allies, to enable early signing of peace treaty. A German Government forced prematurely to sign peace treaty would, as consequence, lose at once confidence of German people and would be set aside as happened in period after Versailles.
Before propitious time for a peace treaty is reached, interim agreement signed by all allies and imposed on Germans is needed. This interim agreement should establish central German administration, not central government, and outline form of future German state. Such interim agreement is necessitated because impossible to distinguish between problems properly those of AC eventual peace treaty and problems properly those of current occupational administration. Interim agreement is envisaged as an enlarged Potsdam agreement, having what Potsdam lacked, the authority and sanction of all belligerents.
[Page 11]Australian representative assumed CFM would work out general principles for interim agreement and peace settlement at Moscow. Regarding association and consultation of active belligerents with four powers, he proposed following: (1) Active belligerents would comment upon and discuss with deputies general directive received from CFM. (2) Assuming diverse committees would be set up under deputies, e.g. political and territorial, disarmament and security, reparations and restitution, etc., representatives of active belligerents would be closely associated in work of some or all of these committees.
Australian representative regarded fixing of German frontier as major political issue. He urged decisions be based on Atlantic Charter and Charter of UN, with reservation respecting application Article II of Atlantic Charter23 to Germany in view of security and certain economic considerations. Regarding how obtain facts, information should be obtained by above-mentioned committees from Allied Control Authority in Germany. Final decision on such questions as eastern frontier, Saar, etc., should rest with full conference of all belligerents. There should be full discussion of final text and free right to introduce amendments. However, this stage should be a formal matter, since through continuous consultation appropriate unanimity should have been achieved. In closing, Australian representative emphasized that above are his general comments on German problem, that later Australian Govt will present views on specific aspects.
Referring to Australian representatives remarks on question of procedure, Soviet deputy insisted deputies were acting under precise instructions from CFM in New York and deputies were not instructed to discuss substance of German problem now but just to hear views. Also he objected strenuously to Australian charge that Allied powers were presented with fait accompli at Paris, since four powers had only prepared drafts, respecting which Paris Conference had full opportunity to make comments and many proposals of Paris Conference had been accepted for inclusion in final treaties.
When Australian representative interposed that he could not understand why four powers had arrogated to themselves authority to draft peace treaties, Gousev answered that this right had been bought with great amount of blood. He declared that apparently Australian representative was not pleased with agreement between four powers on peace treaty, insinuating that Australian representative does not desire see continued cooperation in peace of four powers. Hodgson hotly rejected Gousev’s insinuation as misconstruction of Australian view.
[Page 12]USDel welcomed closest association with Australian representatives as with representatives of all other allies in our work here pointing out that the closer the association of all the Allies in the preparation of the peace settlement, the closer will be their cooperation in enforcing peace treaty. British deputies voiced sympathy with Australian view on question of procedure for current hearings as well as later meetings and promised to do best to secure final solution along such lines. Deputies discussed how answer letter dated January 20 from Canadian High Commissioner (Delsec 1128, January 2224,) since High Commissioner has sent further letter asking postponement Canadian hearings scheduled afternoon January 25, in view no response to his letter of January 20. Soviet deputy declared no assurances of any kind could be given Canadian Govt re future opportunity to discuss German settlement either with deputies or with CFM. I suggested that Canadian Govt did not desire formal guarantee but rather indication of type of discussion they can expect to have with CFM or deputies, in particular re London hearings and that in answer we should offer them benefit of as full discussion of German problem here as could be agreed to by all deputies. Although deputies unable agree on tenor of answer, Secretary General was instructed to draft a reply for consideration at next meeting.25
Deputies will hear views of South African representative afternoon January 24 and of Yugoslav representative afternoon January 25.26
Repeated USPolAd Berlin 38.
- The 6th Meeting of the Deputies for Germany, January 23, 1947, 3:30 p.m.↩
- Minister Hodgson’s statement of the general views of the Australian Government on the preparation of the peace treaty with Germany was subsequently circulated to the Deputies for Germany as document CFM(D) (47) (G)25, January 24, 1947, not printed. The views of the Australian Government on the substance of a German settlement were set forth in a memorandum circulated to the Deputies for Germany as document CFM(D) (47) (G)61, February 14, 1947, not printed. Summaries of the views of the Australian Government on the principal aspects of the German problem were included in the Report by the Deputies for Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers, February 25, 1947, p. 40.↩
- Telegram 315, Delsec 1112, January 16, from London, is printed on p. 5. Telegram 346, Delsec 1115, January 17, from London, is not printed, but see footnote 11, p. 6.↩
- The reference here is to the Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367. For documentation regarding the preparation of the Atlantic Charter, see ibid., pp. 341 ff.↩
- Ante, p. 7.↩
- Telegram 629, Delsec 1157, January 29, from London, not printed, reported that the Deputies for Germany, at their 9th Meeting, January 28, had been unable to agree upon a written response to the Canadian letter. The Deputies agreed, however, that the Chairman should orally inform the Canadian High Commissioner that the instructions to the Deputies would not permit giving the assurance on the question raised by the Canadian Government but that the Deputies would be glad to hear the Canadian views (740.00119 Council/1–2947).↩
-
The views of the South African Government were presented to the Deputies for Germany at their 7th Meeting, January 24, by E. K. Scallan, Acting South African High Commissioner in the United Kingdom. Summaries of the views of the South African Government on the principal aspects of the German problem were included in the Report by the Deputies for Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers, February 25, 1947, p. 40. The South African Delegation also presented to the Deputies for Germany a memorandum outlining proposals for the association of the active belligerent Powers with the further considerations on the problem of Germany. This memorandum, which was subsequently circulated to the Deputies as document CFM(D) (47) (G) 26, January 28, 1947, not printed, set forth proposals similar to those already advanced by the Australian Government.
The Yugoslav representatives made their presentation at the 9th Meeting of the Deputies for Germany, January 28. Summaries of the views of the Yugoslav Government on the principal aspects of the German problem were also included in the Report of the Deputies for Germany.
↩