740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2247
The Secretary of Agriculture (Anderson) to President Truman 56
Dear Mr. President: Knowing as I do your intense and continuing interest in world food problems, particularly those of the occupied areas where the United States has a direct responsibility, I hope you will find items of interest in the following report of the survey I have just made in Germany with members of my staff at the request of the Secretary of War, and which, since my return, I have discussed with him.
By dividing my staff into small working parties to obtain essential data and information while in Germany and by studying earlier reports by former President Hoover, Dr. D. A. Fitzgerald,57 Secretary-General of the International Emergency Food Council, and others, and also as a result of the excellent cooperation by General Clay and his staff, I was able to assemble a more complete informational and statistical picture than would ordinarily be possible in the rather limited time available.
Following are the impressions I received that I consider to be of primary significance to you:
The mission of the United States Forces in Germany is one of extreme importance and complexity. The necessity for making it a success is obvious.
If the purposes of our occupation of Germany are to be achieved, and Western Europe’s economy restored, the rehabilitation of Germany’s industry and agriculture must be accomplished. While the subject of industrial recovery will be reported separately to you by the Secretary of Commerce, nevertheless I feel you should know that a more adequate scale of feeding, coupled with assurances that such a scale can be maintained on a continuous basis, is a prerequisite to the economic rebuilding of Germany, and that the two problems cannot be considered independently of each other.
[Page 1155]The appalling condition of the German population nutritionally indicates that no time should be lost in establishing a more adequate feeding program. It will require, temporarily at least, increased food imports from the United States. This need not become a permanent liability if vigorous action is taken to stimulate further German food and fertilizer production, establish more effective controls over food collections and distribution, develop sources for foodstuffs in Europe and other areas outside the United States, and above all on the industrial side increase German exports until they are able to pay for food and raw material imports.
The return at the earliest possible date of German prisoners of war to Germany is imperative to relieve the manpower shortage and supply the skill and know-how necessary for both industrial and agricultural recovery.
[Here follows a portion of the Secretary of Agriculture’s letter, comprising nearly six typewritten pages in the source text, which dealt with the following topics: 1) the reasons for Germany’s food problem, 2) health and nutritional status of Germany, 3) production of food and fertilizers, 4) collections, rationing, consumption and utilization, 5) food import requirements and cost. Several statistical appendices also are not printed here.]
The situation in Germany requires courageous action. The longer we delay taking the steps essential to German recovery, the greater is the risk of failure in accomplishing the objectives of occupation of Germany and the greater will be the expense in the long run.
One of the first essentials in getting the German economy off dead center is more food and particularly advance assurance of the amount which this country will supply. This assurance will ease the task of the U.S. occupation authorities and will provide necessary encouragement for German workers, particularly coal miners. For these reasons, I gave General Clay assurance that this government would supply 300,000 tons of grain per month. Someone had to take a first step. I took this one.
Another essential now is to establish firm policies for the guidance of our occupation authorities in Germany and to place full responsibility upon these officials for operation within the policies outlined.
To this end I would suggest a Cabinet Committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Agriculture to determine policies for the occupied areas.
As I pointed out previously in this report, the problems of industrial recovery and of agricultural recovery are so inextricably woven together [Page 1156] that they cannot be considered or dealt with separately. For this reason I believe a Cabinet Committee providing a means of considering food problems in relation to industrial problems and industrial problems in relation to military or diplomatic problems would offer a distinct advantage.
Respectfully,
-
Secretary Marshall transmitted the source text to Under Secretary Lovett under cover of the following memorandum dated July 18, 1947:
↩“Attached is a report to the President from the Secretary of Agriculture on his trip abroad. I have only had time to read the first two pages. Mr. Anderson wished to know whether the State Department thought it was inadvisable to give public release to all or any particular part of this report. He asked me to advise the President in the matter.
“Please get me the opinion of the Department as quickly as possible and if I am absent communicate it to Steelman at the White House.”
- Excerpts from Dr. Fitzgerald’s report to the Secretary of War, dated June 16, 1947, on the food situation in Germany are included in file 862.5018/6–1647.↩