862.6362/6–1347
The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: There are two problems in Army occupation in Germany which are of the most urgent importance. One has to do with preventing famine. The other has to do with the British program of socializing the coal mines in the Ruhr. We will need the guidance and assistance of the State Department if we are to avoid disaster.
Famine
We are in the most critical condition in preventing wholesale famine in the U.S.–U.K. zones.
The official ration is 1550 calories. How meagre this official ration is may be seen by the fact that the British ration is 2900 calories a day, while the average American consumes 3300 calories a day.
The official ration of 1550 calories, however, is not being made available. The average ration for the combined zones for the past six weeks has been 1200 calories, and in many places it is as low as 900 calories. This is slow famine. Stocks of food are so low that even if planned shipments from this country are fulfilled, the likelihood of getting back to the 1550 level is poor.
We have this further fact, that we and the British are committed to raise the ration to 1800 calories by October 1st. Our chance of fulfilling this commitment is very dim, unless we can supply one million more tons to the two zones in the next crop year than are being supplied in the current crop year.
[Page 1152]No other European country, except Austria, is faced with conditions anything like as critical. Experienced observers, including Herbert Hoover, who have surveyed the situation in the other countries of Western Europe have reported that in none of them are there signs of serious undernourishment. Nowhere are food stocks so low or rations so slim as in Germany.
Occupation has no chance of success if these conditions continue. This state of affairs has been foreseen, and I have urged repeatedly that priority be recognized for food shipments to Germany. The basis for the priority is that the prevention of famine in the U.S.–U.K. zones of Germany is our particular responsibility, jointly with the British, together with the fact that food conditions prevalent in the two zones are the worst of anywhere in Europe.
We will not get the priority unless we have your help. As I see it, the priority will be needed in allocation of food supplies for export, in loading at the ports, and in shipping.
Socialization of Coal Mines
The greatest need in Germany, next to food, is coal. The daily production, 215,000 tons, is far below the level programmed for this time last year. The situation is discouraging because the daily rate has been declining in the last few months, instead of rising.
The British, who are in direct charge of production of coal in the Ruhr, have the purpose of carrying out a socializing of the mines. Lord Pakenham, the Foreign Office man on Germany saw Petersen a few days ago in Berlin and told him candidly that it was the firm purpose of his government to bring about a nationalization of the coal mines.
Our people in Germany have the view, and I share it, that the need is for maximum production of coal at this critical time, not for experiments in socialization. As I see it, such experiments are certain to interfere with current production. If my house is on fire, I do everything I can to put the fire out, I do not engage in arguments on the state of title to the house.
Our people in Germany have been unable to take a firm position with the British. At present we have no policy on the matter, although we have been trying for some time to induce the State Department to take a position. Unless one is taken, the matter will go by default.
I submit that strong representations should be made to the British government, to the effect that it must at least postpone its socialization program until the present emergency in production of coal has been overcome. We have every right to insist on this, since the load of carrying the two zones in Germany, particularly in the vital matter of food, is falling more and more on our shoulders.
[Page 1153]I should like to discuss these two problems at the next meeting of the Committee of Three.55 I am sending a copy of this letter to the Secretary of the Navy.
Sincerely yours,
- Beginning in 1945, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy or their alternates, together with a few members of their staffs, met periodically, sometimes as often as each week, to discuss problems shared by their Departments. When meeting as a group, the three secretaries were sometimes referred to as the Committee of Three. At their meeting on June 19, 1947, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy considered Secretary Patterson’s letter and agreed to refer the question of the priority of food shipments to Germany to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, for consideration and report as a matter of urgency. Subsequently, in a memorandum of October 27, 1947, not printed, to the Secretary of the State-War-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (the successor to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee), Assistant Secretary of State Saltzman asked that the matter of the priority of food shipments to Germany be withdrawn from consideration by the Committee because the matter had been discussed at high levels of the State and Army Departments and a letter on the subject had been sent to Secretary of Agriculture Anderson on September 12, 1947 (see p. 1162). (862.5018/10–2747).↩