740.00119 Council/2–1247

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Participants: The Secretary.
M. Bonnet, the French Ambassador.
Mr. Matthews.

The French Ambassador called on me at his request this afternoon. He said that he is returning to Paris in a few days and that his Government is anxious to know how we view the several memoranda which he has submitted to us on German problems coming up at the Moscow Conference.23 He said that he had been instructed to deliver the memorandum on the Ruhr to me personally but before he could do so, he had read the text in the New York Times and had consequently not wished to bother me. He said that his Government [Page 157] had given much care and thought to the preparation of these memoranda and he was hopeful that at Moscow we would find the French position not so different from our own as had been the case during previous discussions. His Government is very eager to learn our reactions to its memoranda. I told him that I was going to be quite frank. I had not yet had sufficient time in view of the numerous other problems with which I had to deal to complete my studies of the French memoranda and that therefore I could not this time go into any detailed discussion of them. He could, however, tell his Government that the Department was gratified to observe the direction in which the French Government is leaning. I said that I had been hoping to stop off in Paris on my way to Moscow to have a chance to meet officials of his Government and to talk about the Moscow meeting. Unfortunately, my plans are linked with those of the President and his trip so that I am not certain just when I can get away. I had hoped to spend some 24 hours in Paris but I may only be able to stop for a few hours. The Ambassador said he was very happy to hear that I was planning to stop at Paris and that he had been on the point of asking me whether I could do so. He knew his Government would greatly welcome such a visit and the French people too with their memories of the war would be anxious to have me visit their country.

I asked if General Béthouart was still French Representative on the Control Council in Austria and he replied that he was. I told him that I had had happy associations with him during the war. I then asked especially for General Juin and whether he was still Chief of Staff. M. Bonnet said that he was. I told him at some detail of my great admiration for General Juin’s qualities as a General and especially of his abilities to work with his Allies. I told him how it had been my great pleasure to award the General the DSM in Italy in spite of regulations to the contrary.

After some reminiscences of my service in France during World War I and my trip in 1945 the Ambassador remarked that he had been interested to read what I had said at my press conference concerning security and disarmament.24 He said that he thought my statements would find a very welcome echo in France. Security is still the question that most concerns France. However, much the situation may have changed, the French peasant still thinks of Germany and wonders whether he will have to fight a third war against Germany. I said that I had tried to emphasize that security must be practical. It was easy for France being so close to the Rhine—perhaps we should now say the Elbe—to remain conscious of her security problems. It [Page 158] was less so in the United States in view of the oceans and great distance separating us from centers of possible conflict, especially if one got out in the Mississippi Valley, which is even farther from troubled areas. In all these discussions of disarmament we must take the practical view that finding a dependable basis of security comes first. In this country we have the domestic problem of wishing to balance the budget and the desire in some quarters to cut our military establishment for that purpose. I therefore feel that universal training is the only answer which would give us adequate military strength to back up our views on foreign policy questions at a cost not in excess of financial possibilities. On the materiel side, I said, we were pretty well off and had probably adequate reserves and plant facilities; but we must also have adequate numbers of trained men who could be called up in say a month’s time to fill the skeleton forces which we are maintaining. Universal training is the only way to provide these reserves at a cost which the taxpayer can support. We had made the mistake of disarming unilaterally after the last war with tragic consequences and we were not going to do so again. The Ambassador said he was happy to hear it.

In conclusion, he mentioned the economic assistance, particularly with regard to wheat, concerning which he has been having conversations in the Department and said he hopes this assistance will be forthcoming.25 He reiterated his hope that I would stop over in Paris en route to Moscow.

  1. The reference here is to the memoranda identified in footnote 19, p. 154.
  2. For the text of statements made by the Secretary of State at his press conference on February 7, 1947, see Department of State Bulletin, February 16, 1947, p. 287.
  3. For additional documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the political, economic, and financial situation in France, see volume iii .