851.014/6–247

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Lightner) to the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)

Subject: British Note Regarding Changes in the Saar.

As you know Mr. Henderson of the British Embassy handed me a [Page 1081] note on the above subject on the afternoon of June 3.51 At that time he indicated his Government hoped for an early reply as the matter was considered urgent.

On June 4 Mr. Henderson telephoned to say that Mr. Bevin had sent a telegram requesting the Embassy to endeavor to obtain the State Department’s reaction to the British note at once. Mr. Henderson emphasized that if favorable joint US–UK action was to be taken it should be taken very quickly in as much as the French were probably going to act themselves. Therefore, if we wish to be given the credit in France for supporting them we should make our views known. Mr. Henderson indicated that Mr. Balfour would be glad to discuss the subject with Mr. Matthews if the latter wished to see him.

On June 5 Mr. Henderson telephoned again to report another urgent message from Mr. Bevin requesting a reply from the State Department. The French Ambassador in London has informed Mr. Bevin that the French are about to issue a special currency for the Saar on June 15 to be used in the expanded Saar area excluding 11 communes south of Trêves. The French would be willing to reduce the area of the Saar still further, to the territory tentatively worked out in recent discussions with the British (see British note under reference), provided the US and UK were agreeable to the French proposals.

Mr. Bevin replied that the British hoped to give a formal answer to the French at an early date and that they would do so as soon as they had obtained the views of Washington. He indicated that if Washington would agree the British would accept the boundary changes as discussed in London without prejudice to final delimitation at the peace settlement and subject to reparations adjustments.52

I indicated that we were apparently being faced with a fait accompli on this whole question. The French were about to take action anyhow and now that Mr. Bevin has transmitted his views to the French, we would be the “bad boys” if we failed to go along. The main argument in favor of going along seemed to be that we would gain a further slight reduction in the area of the Saar and would gain a certain amount of credit with the French. I mentioned that there were other considerations to be considered and that it was unfortunate that a decision was being forced when the whole question was a very complicated one which deserved close study. There was the coal angle, for example, what effect would the contemplated changes have on the [Page 1082] coal situation? Mr. Henderson did not know. I told him we were discussing this angle of the question with the French this afternoon and that it certainly was one which must be examined before giving an answer to the British. There were other angles to be considered as well, including the effect of our action in the Soviet Union and Poland. Mr. Henderson said that Mr. W. D. Allen of the Embassy was coming over to the Department to see Mr. Matthews or Mr. Hickerson on another matter and that he would probably take occasion to discuss the Saar question at that time.

  1. Reference to note 979/29/47, June 2, from the British Embassy to the Department of State, p. 1075.
  2. On June 11, 1947, Foreign Secretary Bevin informed the House of Commons of the British Government’s approval of the new Saar frontier, subject to the conditions described here. An explanation of Bevin’s statement was set forth in an aide-mémoire, dated June 10, 1947, from the British Embassy to the Department of State, not printed (862.014/6–1047).