Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

851.014/6–247

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide–Mémoire

Ref: 979/29/47

the saar

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would welcome an early expression of the views of the United States Government on the proposal that a tripartite agreement with the French should be made, recognising on a de facto basis the integration of the Saar in the economic and monetary system of France.

2. Proposals for the integration of the Saar in the French economic and monetary system were submitted by the French Foreign Minister to the Council of Foreign Ministers on April 10th, 1947. The text of his submission is contained in C.F.M. (47)(M) 120 and C.F.M. (47)(M) 114.⁴⁴

3. Owing to the opposition of the Soviet Government, the Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to agree upon the French proposals. However, the question of an agreement on the Saar between the French, the United States and the United Kingdom governments was discussed between representatives of the United Kingdom and French Delegations at Moscow. This subject of a tripartite agreement was also mentioned to Mr. H. Freeman Matthews of the State Department by a member of the British Delegation. Discussions have lately been proceeding in London between the Foreign Office and the French Ambassador.

4. There have hitherto been two main obstacles in the way of a tripartite agreement:

(a) Reparations.

(b) The French claim to extend the permanent boundaries of the Saar in accordance with the administrative arrangements made unilaterally by them in 1946.

5. As regards reparations, the informal discussions in Moscow ended in agreement between the French, United States and United Kingdom Representatives on broad principles for charging the Saar to French reparation account. Although this agreement envisaged action through the Control Council, it should not be difficult to re-write it on a tripartite basis. The British Government attach importance to having a definite agreement on reparations before accepting the French administrative proposals for the Saar.

6. As regards the boundary question, the main object of the recent discussions in London with the French Ambassador has been to induce the French Government to modify their claims. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated in the House of Commons on the 16th May that while not excluding the possibility of minor boundary adjustments, the British Government found the greatest difficulty in accepting the boundary line proposed by the French which would both deprive the Germans of much agricultural land and give them an excuse for irredentism. As a result of our representations, the French Government have now sent us a modified suggestion for the boundary line.⁴⁵ It is thought that this suggestion has also been communicated to the United States Government. This French suggestion represents an improvement but is still not very satisfactory. Most of the North-Western extension of the “Old Saar” to include Saarburg has been abandoned, but the French still claim the Kreis of Wadern and adjacent districts on the ground that the population largely work in the mines and the local railways only serve this traffic. The total population involved in the extensions now proposed by the French is 64,000 as compared with 92,000 under their previous proposals.

7. The British Government are doubtful whether they will be able to move the French to modify further their attitude on the boundary line. If, however, the United States Government feel strongly that further pressure should be applied, the British Government would be prepared to make another attempt. The French Ambassador in London reports that though no formal reply has yet been received to the new French boundary suggestion, the State Department have given the impression that they have no objection to the line now proposed. If a further attempt is to be made the British Government considers that it might be best to revert to an idea which they have repeatedly put to the French Government without success, that a small tripartite commission should be set up to examine the French claims on the spot and report on their justification.

8. The British Government are strongly in favour of early tripartite action for the following reasons.

(i) The French Government have stated that the delay in settling the Saar question is proving particularly awkward owing to their desire to introduce a special Saar currency at an appropriate moment. They do not wish to issue this currency over an area from which it might subsequently have to be withdrawn.

(ii) The British Government have always supported the French proposal in principle and been in favour of treating it as a special case, having priority over other frontier questions. They do not see why Russian unwillingness to consider the matter should be allowed to frustrate the wishes of all three Powers and consider that the disposition of the present French Government to conclude an agreement provides an opportunity of which advantage should be taken.

(iii) The differences between the British and French points of view on the boundary line do not now amount to much in substance. It seems questionable whether the extra losses of German territory now suggested would, in fact, do much to increase the strength of inevitable German opposition to the cession of the Saar itself, while from an economic point of view the extra loss of agricultural land would be relatively small.

(iv) The alternative to early tripartite action will almost certainly be a unilateral fait accompli by the French. The French Ambassador in London has hinted to the British Government that the United States Government migh be satisfied with a fait accompli. The British Government, however, hold strongly to the view that such action would deprive the Americans and the British of the opportunity of showing their friendship to France besides creating an unfortunate precedent for the settlement of other European questions.

(v) Agreement on the Saar is an essential preliminary to any hopes of inducing the French to join in the Fusion Agreement for the Western Zones of Germany. The British Government consider that it would be a price well worth paying for French participation in the Fusion Agreement which would itself have great political, if not economic, advantages. The question of the fusion of the zones of Germany is one of many questions upon which no progress with the French will be possible until some satisfaction has been given to them over the Saar.

(vi) The British Government considers it desirable to strengthen the hands of the present French Government by affording them a political success in German affairs.

9. The attitude of the American Government towards the French claim to the Saar as shown in C.F.M. (47)(M) 116⁴⁶ was originally much the same as that of the British Government. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is now anxious to know as soon as possible whether the United States Government are willing to join in a tripartite agreement on the lines of the French proposals, and if so, whether they regard the latest French boundary suggestion as acceptable.

Washington, 2nd June, 1947.

44. For the texts of the documents under reference, Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement on the Saar to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, April 10, 1947, and a French proposal for a proposed regime for the Saar, dated April 10, 1947, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 40–43. For Secretary Marshall’s report on the 25th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, April 10, at which the question of the Saar was discussed, see telegram 1297, Delsec 1414, April 10, from Moscow, p. 323.
45. The readjustments of the Saar frontier proposed by the French are described in Ambassador Bonnet’s note of May 20 to the Secretary of State, supra.
46. For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement on the Saar made at the Council of Foreign Ministers’ 25th Meeting, April 10, and circulated to the Council as document CFM (47)(M) 116, April 10, see Germany 1947–1949, p. 148, or Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1947, pp. 695–696. The Secretary’s statement is summarized in telegram 1297, Delsec 1414, April 10, from Moscow, p. 323.