Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

862.60/8–2247: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret
urgent
niact

London, August 22, 1947—midnight.

4579. For Lovett.

I. Before the convening of the first session of the tripartite level of industry talks, we met with the British and agreed to give to the French the text of the plan as agreed in Berlin, minus the preamble and including Section IV. In addition we agreed with the British that the representatives of Benelux would be given an opportunity to examine confidentially but would not be given copy of Appendix A of the plan.

II. Jenkins and Douglas made introductory statements at today’s session in which they pointed out the object of the talks, the desire of all participants for rapid conclusion of them and fact that the plan determines the amount of industrial capacity to be retained in the bizonal area and is not a production plan. Douglas also said while glad to have French views, in absence of French adherence to bizonal fusion ultimate responsibility for decisions must rest with US and UK. We urged and obtained agreement that there be agreed statements to the press at the beginning and end of the discussions and no other publicity except by mutual consent. A brief communiqué was issued at the end of the first session. (See immediately following clear telegram.⁶)

III. Massigli opened the French presentation with a statement very similar to what he told me last night, Embtel 4553, August 21.⁶ He pointed out that the French position was based on the hypothesis that we intended no priority for German industrial recovery over that of our allies and that there will eventually be guarantees for France on security. He mentioned that irresponsible reports of a too sudden end of the occupation of Germany impressed France as unhelpful. He said that the level of industry and the control and management of Ruhr coal are so interconnected that France must discuss them together.

IV. Alphand then read a long prepared statement which he described as a “technical presentation.” He reviewed the background of the present meeting with emphasis on the position taken publicly by Bidault that the Paris Committee cooperation meetings involved no priority for German recovery and did not displace the CFM. He then turned to the bizonal reply to the Paris Committee and said that it convinced the French that there was a serious danger that if the bizonal program for steel were carried out France could not reach the level of 12,000,000 tons which they had planned and “which was the basis for the French financial arrangement with the US.” (Presumably referring to Export-Import Bank loan of 1946. We understand no US approval of Monnet plan was involved in granting this loan. Please comment promptly.⁷)

He said that the coal production program of the bizonal area for 1951 was less than pre-war, while other countries were expected to improve on pre-war production. In conclusion, he summarized the French position as follows:

“The French Government will be able to accept the bizonal level of industry if it is clear that:

(1) It will be reconsidered if the CFM reaches agreement on German economic unification.

(2) Previous agreement is reached on the rate of reactivation of German industry with provision for the export of sufficient coal and coke to insure that German steel production will not absorb so much German coal as to hamper the steel production of other countries, particularly French Monnet plan. To this end the sliding scale should be adjusted and should include coke. In addition provisions to insure adequate coal and coke exports from Germany after the peace settlement should be agreed. (This as well as practically all French proposals are designed to protect Monnet plan.) The adjustment should contemplate inclusion of Saar in French economic system.

(3) The French point of view on the control and management of Ruhr coal mines is that measures taken during the occupation should not prejudice the control of the Ruhr, especially against an international statute for the ownership and management of the coal mines during the period after active occupation ends. During the period of occupation, the occupying powers should retain in their hands not only control of allocations but the details of management in order to avoid the difficulties of resuming such control in the case of internationalization at some later time.

(4) There should be an immediate resumption of reparation removals.

(5) There must be borne carefully in mind the necessity of achieving a balance between German exports and imports.”

V. British and we have agreed to study the French proposals and reply to them tomorrow.

VI. We expect to concert with the British a reply to the French for tomorrow afternoon at 3:00. Points one, two, and three are clearly covered in my instructions as is the general question of French “acceptance”. I have indicated to British that I am unable to state a US position on the resumption of reparations, point four, in the absence of instructions, and will express our regret that Alphand’s fifth point did not receive greater emphasis.

VII. French have requested a statement of our plans on Ruhr control and management which will need urgently as requested in Embtel 4577, August 22.⁸

VIII. Verbatim text both statements available tomorrow. Will send addition to and corrections of this cable if necessary. Will transmit in full both statements as soon as possible.⁹

Sent Department, repeated Paris 472 for Caffery, Berlin 393 for Clay and Murphy.

Douglas

6. Not printed.
6. Not printed.
7. Telegram 3659, August 23, to London, not printed, stated that no approval of the Monnet Plan had been given in connection with the American-French financial arrangements in 1946 (862.60/8–2347). For documentation on American assistance to France in 1946, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. v, pp. 399 ff.
8. Not printed.
9. The records of the Tripartite Talks on the Level of Industry and the Management and Control of the German Coal Mines, are included in CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 85. The dossier includes the formal minutes of the meetings of August 22, August 23, and August 24 (document designation TT/47/Minutes), the numbered formal conference documents (designation TT/47/P 1–11), and the American delegation minutes of the meetings of August 22, 23, 24, and 27.