Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

862.60/8–1347: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent
niact

Paris, August 13, 1947—1 p.m.

3239. For Lovett from Caffery, Douglas and Clayton.

(1) We met last evening personally and wholly informally with Bidault and Monnet, at their suggestion, for about four hours. The subject discussed was level of industry and Ruhr.

(2) Bidault explained that the French Govt sought the following:

(a) A device which would insure that the Ruhr industrial capacity would never again be used for military purposes against France.

(b) A device which would assure French people that access by Western Europe to production of Ruhr would not be subject exclusively to the will of Germany as in the past.

(c) Withholding of publication of level of industry until CFM meeting. In this connection Bidault argued that there was no need for publication now, that inasmuch as we had taken position re Saar that quadripartite action was a prerequisite, we were on invalid legal grounds in proposing a new bizonal level of industry.

(3) Bidault said that without assurances on two (a) and two (b) the proposed level of industry for the bizonal area would be a shock to the French people, would confirm the Communist charges that US and UK were anxious to rehabilitate Germany ahead of other European countries, particularly France, but that with assurances as to two (a) and two (b) France would not want to hold down production in Germany.

(4) We explained to Bidault several reasons which made it necessary to publish a revised level of industry for Germany:

(a) to form a basis for comprehensive European program which could not, we believed, be formulated without estimate of Germany’s production and contribution.

(b) to assure our people and Congress that every possible step was being taken to relieve US as soon as possible of the financial burden of supporting Germany and other European countries whose recovery was so intimately associated with German production.

(c) to hold out promise to German people that through increased production their standard of living would rise as European recovery proceeded. Failure to hold out such promise might mean that Germany, or at least parts of Germany, would fall under Communist influence and that accordingly the present frontier might be pushed westwards to the French boundary.

(5) Clayton recalled the conversation he had had with Bidault and Monnet last week and asked whether in accordance with that conversation an international board to allocate production of Ruhr among western countries would not be satisfactory. Bidault retreated from what Clayton understood his former position to be and said that the French people were concerned about status of Ruhr. He referred in confused way to something similar to TVA but insisted that he did not have in mind international control over Ruhr management and repeated many times that acceptance of level of industry was contingent upon assurances as to two (a) and two (b) above.

(6) We explained: (a) that speaking personally, any complicated system of control would raise many questions and that it would probably not be acceptable to US, (b) that, though views expressed were purely personal, simple international board with authority over allocation might be approved.

(7) Finally, Bidault admitted that question was not one which rested on logic but rather on internal French situation. He said that publication level industry now would be disastrous here, would endanger democracy in France unless prior agreement was had on status of Ruhr. When asked how this could be done and what he had in mind and, again, whether a board to allocate would not be satisfactory, he replied that he would have to consider matter further and consult government, but would have answer in 24 hours.

(8) We fear that meeting on level industry in London as planned without advance agreement on matter with which Bidault is so concerned will produce violent French opposition to level of industry. This, associated probably with publicity, will, we believe (a) put US position of proceeding in face of strong French dissent and otherwise prove embarrassing to US (b) freeze the French position and make it difficult for them later to go along and (c) might involve possible risk, if we decide to go ahead over French opposition, of the fall of present Govt and at least loss of enthusiastic French support and leadership in the European program.

(9) We have meeting with Bidault and Monnet again. We hope you will agree that (a) further conversations be had here to determine what French have in mind, to whittle it down to minimum and to transmit to Dept, (b) no date now be fixed for contemplated London meeting, and (c) you will be promptly informed. We believe that if agreement be had on what French consider basic there will be little difficulty on level of industry and its early publication, though on this point we would want a firm commitment.

(10) Pending advice from you Deptel 2993 August 12⁷⁷ is not being transmitted to French Government.

Caffery

77. Not printed; it instructed Ambassador Caffery to inform the French of the American suggestions regarding procedure for tripartite conversations in London and secure from the French agreement to the earliest possible meeting in London (711.51/8–1147).