862.60/8–747: Telegram
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) to the Secretary of State
urgent
niact
826. For the Secretary and Lovett’s Eyes Only. At suggestion Monnet and Bidault, they had lunch with me Paris August 6, no one [Page 1023] else being present. I previously explained matter to Caffery who was in full agreement. Following the luncheon, I told him what was said.
Bidault said that he did not think there was very much difference between the French and US view regarding level of industry in Germany, that they would interpose no objections to any level of industry which we and the British might agree upon provided the French people had assurance that the resources of the Ruhr would not again be employed in war on France. He believed that such assurance could be had by the creation of an international board which would allocate the Ruhr production of coal, iron and steel and perhaps chemicals between Germany and other countries. After the peace treaty, such board would be composed of representatives of US, UK, France, Benelux and Germany. Prior thereto, it would be composed of the same countries minus Germany. This board would have nothing whatever to do with the administration of the Ruhr properties, its function being confined exclusively to allocation of products. Bidault thought that the board should have authority over the use of such products so far as German consumption was concerned. I pointed out the difficulty of this but said that the same purpose might be accomplished in some other way.
Bidault pointed out that France had abandoned previous suggestions regarding detachment of Ruhr from Germany, internationalization, etc., that France had no interest in the question whether the Ruhr should be nationalized or should be left in hands of private people, that France is entirely willing to leave ownership and administration with the Germans but that France must insist that access by Europe to the products of the Ruhr should not be subject exclusively to the will of the Germans as it was before the war. This seems reasonable to me.
Bidault was careful to point out that the subject was not a simple one and that it needed more study and exploration on his part but that if the two countries could promptly agree that his suggestion offered a basis for further conversations on a high level, he believed satisfactory decisions could be promptly reached.
Bidault said that frankly he could not understand the need for haste on the part of the US and the UK in reconsideration of the level of industry question at this time because whatever the decision might be it would certainly take 18 months before actual production could be increased to the level previously fixed. Hence, no harm would be done to leave the matter until after the meeting of the CFM in November. Nevertheless, he was willing to go along on a prompt decision provided France could have satisfactory assurances as indicated above.
I told Bidault that I would promptly report this conversation to you, that I would probably be back in Paris early next week at which [Page 1024] time we could have another talk. The whole conversation was on a very friendly and cordial basis.
I had expected that Bidault would make a strong plea for US-UK-French security pact vis-a-vis Germany but this was not mentioned.
Have discussed Bidault’s suggestions very briefly with Caffery and Douglas and believe I am correct in reporting that they agree that his suggestions are reasonable and that we should accept same as a basis for further conversations.
I believe France is the key country of the 16 participating in the Paris Conference, or, at any rate, it can be correctly said that if France should withdraw or if her present government should fall as a consequence of deep dissatisfaction over decisions relating to Germany, the whole Marshall program would probably be gravely jeopardized.
Hence, I strongly recommend that we try to come to some arrangement with Bidault. He repeatedly assured me that France did not wish to block any of our plans regarding Germany.
Sent Department 826, repeated London 66 for Ambassador’s eyes only, repeated Paris 67 for Ambassador’s eyes only.