711.51/7–1847

The French Foreign Minister ( Bidault ) to the Secretary of State 19

secret

My Dear Secretary of State: I turn to you personally in a situation which is extremely serious for my country and the whole world.

As you know, at the last meetings which took place in Paris the French Government burned its bridges.

Having burned them, it finds itself, on the side that it has chosen, in an absolutely unexpected situation, and one which has developed without its knowledge at the very moment when it was called upon to make a vital decision in another connection.

I can only express my surprise and my concern at the sudden revelation of a line of action which has such painful consequences for us in connection with the effort which I have made.

I went straight ahead in all tranquillity. I committed my country. I regret nothing that I have done. But I fear, if the plans of which I was given a glimpse, materialize at this time, not only will all my efforts have been in vain, but they will be turned against the cause I served.

Decisions concerning Germany such as those which the American and British Governments are contemplating will, without doubt, appear to French public opinion as justifying the position taken by Mr. Molotov and that adopted within France by the adversaries of the French Government.

The Government of the French Republic would be placed in an unexpected and untenable situation if the decisions which are now contemplated were confirmed. I do not wish to stress the obvious fact that I, personally, would be unable to continue my task.

[Page 992]

From the very beginning of the discussions to which your proposal to aid Europe gave rise, the Communists have declared, as has the Soviet Union, that the first result would be the reconstruction of Germany. I denied and fought that idea. Now the time has come to find out whether they or I was right. If I was wrong, I shall pay.

In order to justify the measures contemplated in favor of Germany, I was told that German psychology must be taken into account. I hope that our friends will attach at least equal importance to French psychology. I am compelled to say that to ignore that psychology when or because the French Government has committed itself will in all probability reopen the question of France’s interior equilibrium and, through other men, the very choice she has made.

Now, when the present production of steel in Germany is at a level of three or four million tons and while my English and American, informants admit that there is no hope of reaching the level of seven million and a half tons of steel which has already been agreed upon by all before one year, to decide upon another level at this time would be interpreted in France as a discrimination against her, and this immediately after the unequivocal decision she has made. We have never wanted either to starve Germany or to let her resources lie dormant. But if on the morrow of the Paris Conference, at a time when we are still filled with uncertainty regarding ourselves, there is a certainty for Germany, the consequences of this priority cannot be escaped.

I feel it my duty, in all confidence and frankness, to call your attention to a situation which directly concerns my country and, by its foreseeable repercussions, the entire future of the civilized world.

Believe me, very cordially,

Your very devoted,

Bidault
  1. The source text, a translation, was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 2 to despatch 9253, July 18, from Paris, not printed. The original French text of this message had been transmitted in telegram 2855, July 17, from Paris, not printed (711.51/7–1747). In telegram 2854, July 17, from Paris, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that he and the British Ambassador in France had been called to the French Foreign Ministry on the evening of July 17. Bidault handed Caffery this message, written in longhand. Bidault also handed the British Ambassador a message for Foreign Secretary Bevin. Bidault gave both Ambassadors the communication printed infra. Caffery reported as follows on the course of the interview with Bidault:

    Bidault complained bitterly to us that ‘all of this’ had been done behind his back. When reminded that if he had agreed to the fusion of the French zone with ours this could not have happened, he said ‘Yes, I know that and I know full well that our zone must join yours but I cannot do it at the mouth of the gun. Why won’t your governments let us in on conversations of this kind meanwhile?’ He reiterated that he will leave the French Government at an early date if we remain adamant.” (711.51/7–1747)