761.62/1–747: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the Secretary of State
secret
Moscow
, January 7,
1947—9 a.m.
33. At this juncture on eve of Deputies meeting in London it may be helpful for me to report my impressions of Soviet intentions with respect to Germany as seen from Moscow.
- 1.
- Germany has always loomed large in Communist ideologic and practical plans. Lenin considered it to be European country best suited for development of Communism as well as the “principal link in the chain of revolutions”. Stalin has carried on this belief, and authoritative party pundits were not dissuaded even by advent of Nazism from their conviction that proletariat of Germany carried key to proletarian revolution of all of Europe. Absence of overt affirmation of this doctrine today would seem to accord with more sophisticated and subtle line of “non-revolutionary” official pronouncements and propaganda coupled with “dissolution” of Comintern in 1943, but evidence is lacking on which to base assertion that it reflects any actual change in belief. Such evidence as we have of secret CP directives is in fact quite contrary; it must be remembered that war has provided a degree, of political and economic collapse in Germany more favorable to Communist purposes than Kremlin could possibly have hoped for.
- 2.
- From practical viewpoint, Germany represents greatest potential threat or most potent potential associate to Soviet Union. There are signs that dream of happy union between Soviet resources and manpower and German technical skill and administrative ability is again hovering about pillows of Soviet leaders. However, war has left Russia with deep awareness of realities of German aggression. A determination to preclude resurgence of a strong and independent and therefore possibly hostile Germany, is surely major strategic preoccupation of Soviet policy.
- 3.
- These two objectives, one ideological, other practical, complement and support each other. Their complete implementation, in light [Page 140] of Soviet experience, can only be assured through ultimate domination, through definitive inclusion of Germany in Soviet sphere.
- 4.
- This extension of Soviet control over Germany is in fact already partially effected. East Prussia and Silesia are well behind Soviet lines and at rate of Sovietization maintained during first 18 months in its zone, job in Eastern Germany will be completed well before termination of period occupation. Be it of only ten years duration, Soviet bridgehead in Germany will be consolidated. With withdrawal of armies of occupation outcome of struggle for predominance of two systems will determine future character of German state. The viability demonstrated by zones of west at that time will depend on one hand on state of French Communism and degree to which Soviet Union has succeeded in maintaining its present control over central Europe and Balkans, and on other, on measure of attractiveness flowing from such real social, political and economic progress as will have been accomplished in interim.
- 5.
- Briefly then Soviet approach to Germany is based on two elements of (1) maintaining and if possible increasing position of control already achieved in Eastern Germany and (2) endeavoring to assure necessary conditions in western zones most favorable to development of Communist Party and least favorable to development of western orientation. First element is served by high degree of isolation in which Soviet zone is kept and will be kept as long as it is in Soviet power to do so. Current experience in Austria should be proof enough of Soviet ability to neutralize effectiveness of a central government in similar circumstances, and it must be assumed that Kremlin will endeavor to bring about similar situation in Germany following establishment of central administration there unless in meantime is felt it was gaining sufficient control of entire country as to render such tactics unnecessary.
- Central administration will no doubt be sought by Russians, but its purpose will be to restrain rehabilitation of western zone and preclude development of federalism which [to?] Kremlin is an acceptable form of government only when bound by rigid framework of its own authoritative one-party machine. In this respect, I realize now French fears of centralization were not entirely unfounded. Russians will claim all privileges of Anglo-American concept of democracy in western zones, since it is most favorable climate for growth of their organizations above and below ground, while suppressing these privileges in their own. Similarly, they will publicly demand decree [degree?] of denazification in west they have no intention of applying in east, purpose of which is simply elimination of all progressive and democratic leaders and elements who are not prepared to accept Soviet point of view and proletarianization of western zones. Finally, [Page 141] it may be recalled that preview of their political intentions as presented in SED draft constitution was highly revealing in light of Soviet constitutional practice here and elsewhere in Soviet sphere.
- 6.
- Reparations will play a large role on Soviet demands, both to meet very great economic need here and to retard as far as possible renaissance of healthy economy in western zones. Question of Ruhr has similar dual significance of high import. Yet, great as is importance of economic side of German question, we believe that having once gotten its teeth into Germany, Kremlin, as it has always done in past, will, if possible, give precedence to power—political and ideological considerations. It is conceivable that they may make well-timed minor concessions of an economic nature which at first glance might be interpreted as indicating change of basic political policy, by considering stakes involved it is hardly admissible that they should diverge from basic line of operation which offers as reward for its successful prosecution eventual control of continental Europe.
- 7.
- Moscow and foreign Communist line reaction to economic unification of US and British zones in Germany has been extreme. This unification has been presented, with all anti-Soviet implications such line of argumentation can produce, as direct violation of Potsdam agreement designed to promote federalism and facilitate infiltration of monopoly capital into western Germany and thus destroy economic and political unity of country. It is to be expected that following its old practice of loudly charging its opponents with commission of very sins it is in process of committing itself, Kremlin will continue to use Potsdam against west and in support of its own objectives. It will blame us for attempting to split Germany in two, whereas in reality, growing separation of that country is an inescapable result of Soviet totalitarian economic and political treatment of its own zone.
- 8.
- Issue then is Germany and with it future of Europe. It seems inevitable to me that we must be prepared if necessary to accept further separation of eastern and western zones of Germany rather than hollow unification which in fact but opens door to accomplishment of Soviet purpose in Germany as whole. For us there can be but one policy; we must promote and support in word and deed all truly democratic and progressive forces in our zone and at same time we must defend them from infiltration and subversion by totalitarian machinations from east. I use words “support” and “defend” in active sense, as distinguished from moral support and defense we have so far provided.
- 9.
- For all these reasons impending CFM meeting as seen from here promises to afford long and tedious struggle. Russians will be at home and patience for them will be an easy virtue. Issues are such that we must be prepared to sit them out, and I hope it will be possible for [Page 142] our delegation to come to Moscow resigned to indefinite prolongation of deliberations and prepared to carry on at deputy level, in event of recess necessitated by your being in Washington, or because course of negotiations should so dictate.
Dept please repeat to Berlin as Moscow’s 4, to Paris as 2. Moscow passes to London for Delsec as 3.
Smith