740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–647: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
3177. Personal attention Hickerson. 1. For benefit floorwalkers our opinion.
Berlin’s 3329 October 13 to Department (repeated Moscow 529, Paris 461, London 356)89 is clear analysis German aspect of problem which would be presented by Soviet proposal withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany. From Moscow, however, problem appears to transcend German aspect and indeed so many advantages to Soviet power position in Europe would result from such withdrawal that it might seem to Kremlin well worthwhile in spite questionable strength SED in Eastern Germany and initial embarrassment to Communist Party propaganda line certain other countries. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe withdrawal of Soviet troops would have minimal [Page 897] effect considering advanced stage of Sovietization already achieved in most areas, Soviet zone Austria appears only probable exception this principle, but an impoverished Austria languishing in Soviet controlled Danube basin could hardly become political factor of significance.
On other hand withdrawal from Germany of US and allied troops whose presence constitutes political, military and particularly psychological power factor bearing little relationship to their actual numbers and fire power would broach the Lubeck–Trieste line and thus open the gate to flow of Soviet influence into present power vacuum of Western Europe. Implications of such contingency are too obvious to require elaboration. Yet they must be pointed to if only clarify impossibility of US even considering such proposal until power factor now represented by allied troops replaced by native elements of stability. The propaganda problem this proposal would present to Soviet Union and its CP’s in countries bordering Germany should not be exaggerated. Communists are not subject to sustained embarrassment and Germany’s neighbors are presumably coming recognize exaggerated Communist emphasis on bogey of future German aggression as element general Soviet strategy in extending and consolidating its domination Central and Eastern Europe. At any rate CP supporters these areas could be reassured with assertion that Soviet Union had now acquired sufficient strength unilaterally to guarantee against rebirth German military imperialism.
On balance troop withdrawals would offer tremendous boost Soviet aspirations for domination Western Europe particularly if Kremlin, as it gives every indication of doing, really estimates “revolutionary situation” imminent in France and Italy.
2. The foregoing considerations in themselves explain why any show reluctance or hesitation on our part categorically to reject such proposal if made would, as Berlin telegram points out, indeed strike terror into hearts many Europeans and could not but have far-reaching political consequences. It would undo gains achieved by Marshall Plan and convince Europeans that reverting to traditional isolationism we were after all going pull out and let Europe stew in its own juice as in 1922.
My considered opinion is that US tactic face of such Soviet initiative at CFM should be clear and unqualified refusal consider proposal as bona fide contribution to resolution German problem at this time. Our position should be based on fact that when we accepted unconditional surrender we also assumed obligations regarding Germany which have not been fulfilled. Thus our refusal can be accompanied by declaration our desire and recital our many efforts, mostly [Page 898] thwarted by Soviets, to achieve peace treaty and gradual reintegration of democratic Germany into European political and economic picture, our conviction troops should be first withdrawn from Austria, our offer of 40-year treaty, et cetera, without an application of qualified acceptance. This refusal should be coupled with cross-examination of Soviet delegation, based on careful selection and analysis Soviet policy statements on Germany since and before Potsdam, designed to highlight striking inconsistency and transparency such new Soviet task. In order to counteract propaganda value to Soviets inside Germany we should reiterate our belief in need for substantial rectification of Polish-German frontier. We have little left to lose in Poland and cannot afford to run risks where Germany is concerned.
4. It is perhaps noteworthy that Kremlin in weeks before CFM and since Cominform conference90 gives appearance of playing down Germany, possibly deliberately, since Soviet press and publications have shifted aggressive emphasis from that country to other areas principally France and Italy in accordance with Zhdanov line spelled out at conference.
5. If Kremlin is indeed planning advance proposal for troop withdrawals from Germany following precedent already established in Korea, in conviction that whether it be accepted or as is more probable rejected, Soviet Union would in either case draw concrete benefit, then possibility should not be excluded that Kremlin may contemplate a gesture in nature of Litvinoff’s well-known disarmament proposal. Such proposal would not be limited Germany and Austria alone but would be expressly applicable as well such interesting areas as Greece, Indonesia, and in fact all territories with claim to independence on which there are stationed troops another nationality.
- In early October 1947, a Paris newspaper had carried a report about a probably early Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany. Telegram 3329, October 13, from Berlin, not printed, stated that there was little information to confirm such a report and that the available evidence clearly suggested that German Communism, even in the Soviet Zone, was not yet sufficiently consolidated to risk the withdrawal of Red Army support. The telegram pointed out the very considerable strategic and psychological advantages which would accrue to the Soviet Union from any quadripartite withdrawal from Germany. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–1347)↩
- At the end of September 1947, representatives from the Communist Parties in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and France held a conference in Poland at which the decision was reached to establish a Communist Information Bureau.↩