740.00119 Council/12–1347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 65

top secret
urgent

Martel 77. For Lovett eyes only. Please convey to the President for his information only the following estimate of the conference situation as it exists today.

Today’s meeting was postponed until Monday66 at the suggestion of Mr. Bevin, who had been chairman, and concurred in by the French and U.S. delegations in order to have sufficient time to examine all the implications of the situation produced by Molotov’s position yesterday on reparations.

No decision has been reached as to the exact method of procedure in regard to the conference, but over the weekend there will be informal contacts with the British and French delegations in order to ascertain what their views are as to the future work of the conference.

At the moment Bidault’s position seems to be that it is preferable that if Molotov maintains his present recalcitrant position, to adjourn the conference without discussing the remaining items on the agenda. Bevin’s position, although not quite so clear as Bidault’s, is inclined to this course of action. The views of both, however, will be clarified during the next day or two.

The present Soviet position obviously renders any possibility of achieving an agreement for the economic unity of Germany impossible. [Page 770] I have consistently taken the position at the conference that without the necessary fundamental agreement by the occupying powers effectively to remove the barriers that they themselves have created to German economic unity and promptly to put into effect measures essential to attainment of German economic unity, establishment—even discussion of the establishment—of a German Government or other related matters is entirely unreal.

Over the weekend, therefore, we intend to discuss whether or not in the circumstances there is any point in engaging in futile discussions on the remaining items on the agenda in view of the complete deadlock on economic unity. Such latter discussions would serve no constructive purpose and would merely provide endless opportunities for propaganda to Molotov and would, furthermore, probably reveal considerable divergence between the French point of view on the one hand and the British and American on the other concerning political organization and the question of the Ruhr.

We have not yet reached any decision in the delegation as to what course of action will be pursued at Monday’s meeting, but after the weekend discussions we shall decide on Monday morning before the meeting.

I am sending this to you for the President so that he will have our estimate of the situation as of this moment, as there will certainly be a welter of newspaper speculation over the weekend.

Marshall
  1. This message was sent to President Truman on December 13.
  2. December 15.