740.00119 Council/12–847: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 21
Martel 44. For Lovett from Marshall. Last night Bevin and Hall-Patch and Bidault and Couve de Murville came in for dinner at the Embassy. There followed a lengthy discussion of what Molotov’s present purpose was in the Council proceedings and what should be our procedure at the meeting today following the early adjournment Saturday because of a stalemate on procedure.
The issue Saturday22 was what document could be used as a basis for discussion of economic principles involved in unification of Germany. The British-Moscow proposal, a very complete paper, had been accepted by the French and ourselves as a good work paper to keep the discussion within bounds and Molotov had objected. His reasons remain in doubt. Some think he wished to continue the procedure of frustration while indulging in propaganda statements. Others feel that he probably was trying to drag into item three of the agenda the discussion of the Ruhr problem which now appears in item six, his objective being to capitalize on any differences between the French and the British and ourselves over the Ruhr settlement.
Bevin stated that the feeling of the British Parliament was such that it did not matter to him whether or not a breakdown of the Conference occurred over mere procedural matters or over matters of substance; that the members of the Parliament indicated their disgust at the spectacle of the futile and somewhat undignified proceedings of the past two weeks. Bidault largely concurred and expressed indifference as to how the break occurred. I stated that from the point of view of the American public opinion at the moment a break-off with the Soviets would be applauded but I thought that on sober reflection of the implications that view would change. Therefore to me it was important if a breakdown were to occur it be over matter of substance, that is, something of real importance and that along with it there be clear evidence that we had done our best to go ahead with the business. I had in mind that the final effort or gesture would be to ask for a closed session.
[Page 755]All agreed that the discussion of the Ruhr problem at this stage of the Conference was undesirable. It was then agreed that Bidault as chairman and on my left today would state the situation of Saturday and ask if the Soviets had a complete paper to submit. If they did have such a paper ready, which seems quite unlikely, (and I have just this moment as I read this draft been told that they are submitting such a paper23) we would then ask for a brief recess to compare the British paper and the Soviet paper to decide whether or not we should proceed on the basis of discussing them along parallel lines or if the Soviet paper, as is still more unlikely, was not filled with dangerous implications we might just take the paper, though this last was hardly the view of Bevin and Bidault. If no Soviet complete paper was forthcoming following Molotov’s statement to that effect I would then open the general discussion by putting the question to Molotov regarding the 10 billion dollar demand for reparations with the following question as to how he expected the Germans to meet such a requirement and be able to establish self-supporting economy. Beyond that we could not go as the decision will depend entirely on the developments.
Bidault stated that he thought the British and Americans were unduly concerned over Molotov’s propaganda leads to the German people. He felt they were unimportant, were unsuccessful and therefore should be treated accordingly. He stated that he felt more secure now in France than at any time since he had taken office over three years ago.
Bevin stated that he had talked until late the night before with various members of the British press to regulate their tone towards France which he thought had been unjustifiably sensational and he called attention to the better tone of the Sunday papers. He then turned to the matter of Greece and speaking offhand said that left wing members notably Seymour Cox had now turned on the Greek question in warm support of Bevin’s position and wished to take strong action. He said he must await the US decision as to whether they would take a similar view, the implication being troops. I will have to talk to him later as it is a first indication of this character. I am rather inclined to think that its main purpose was to have US parallel the British troops in Greece rather than by more formidable procedure.24
- A copy of this telegram was transmitted to President Truman on December 9.↩
- Reference to the 11th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, December 6; see telegram 6358, Delsec 1528, December 6, from London, supra.↩
- Reference to document CFM(47) (L)22, December 8, 1947, p. 790.↩
- For additional documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the situation in Greece, see volume v .↩