Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–547: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers to President Truman, the Acting Secretary of State, and Others

confidential
urgent
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London, December 5, 1947.

6348. Delsec 1523. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally, Eaton, Bloom and Lovett. Tenth CFM meeting, December 5, Molotov presiding, discussed the economic principles of the German settlement. Marshall asked the Council to drop generalities and try to find out what each delegation really has in mind respecting a settlement for Germany. He said the situation in Germany required four-power decisions on matters of substance and asked for action on fundamental points in order to end the present division of Germany. He accepted as a basis for discussion the Moscow proposals of the British delegation to which he said he would add amendments. (See full statement sent Department as Delsec 1522.⁸)

Bidault reaffirmed the French position taken at Moscow. He said France is not opposed to the revival of a peaceful German economy but does not want German resources to be used for the preparation of aggression and does not want the restoration of Germany to have priority over that of the Allied countries. He renewed his request that a special regime be applied to the Ruhr.

Bevin said the proposals he made in Moscow concerning economic principles still represented the British position.

Molotov said the Soviet position taken at Moscow stood unchanged. He then attempted to show that the conclusions of the Harriman Committee on the immediate need for a German Government⁹ are at variance with Marshall’s statement that before the Council decides on the kind of government to be set up in Germany, it must agree on common principles in Germany necessary to enable a government to function effectively. (Marshall in his statement listed these principles as: basic freedoms for the individual; abolition of zonal boundaries, except as delimitation of occupation areas, with no hindrance to the free flow of persons, ideas, and goods throughout Germany; and a clear determination of the economic burdens the German people are to bear.)

Molotov intimated that Marshall’s support of a government for all Germany was insincere and that the Harriman report revealed the US had decided already to set up a separate government for western Germany. He accused the US and UK of taking unilateral actions in their zones which deepened the division of Germany. He alleged that the fusion of the US and UK zones had retarded economic revival in these areas but claimed that industrial production in the Soviet zone had steadily risen. He said the Allies should insist on Germany paying reparations and occupation costs but that the rehabilitation of its peaceful industry should not be hampered. He urged the immediate establishment of central economic administrative agencies as a step toward the creation of an all-German Government and as necessary as the economic rehabilitation of Germany.¹⁰

Marshall refuted Molotov’s allegation of differences within the US Government on the German question. He said our representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany had encountered Soviet opposition to all attempts to achieve German economic unity. He asked whether Molotov meant that the Soviet Union would refuse to accept the political and economic unity of Germany until Germany paid ten billion dollars in reparations to the USSR and, if this were true, how did Molotov expect Germany to pay such a sum. He cited figures to prove that the economic situation in the US-UK zones had improved materially. He again asked Molotov to accept the British proposal as a basis of discussion and to avoid making further irrelevant general statements.¹¹

Bevin deprecated Molotov’s charges, adding that the Council had come to negotiate not to discuss generalities. He said Germany must pay its way and not be a burden on any occupying power as Bidault had stated. Reparations must be arranged, he continued, in such a way that one allied state is not in effect paying reparations to another allied state. He added that at all costs the Allies must not endanger their security by permitting industrial potential in Germany to reach a dangerous point in order to obtain more reparations as was done after the first world war. He said the British proposal included controls to prevent the rehabilitation of Germany at a rate faster than that of liberated countries. He pointed out that the UK proposal called for the creation of central German administrative agencies.

The discussion will be continued tomorrow.

Repeated to Moscow; Paris as 637; Berlin as 516; Vienna as 132; Rome as 163.

8. The telegram under reference is not printed. For the text of the Secretary’s statement, which was circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (L)19, December 5, 1947, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 448–449 or Department of State Bulletin, December 14, 1947, pp. 1184–1185.
9. The reference here is to European Recovery and American Aid: A Report by the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), released, to the press and public in Washington on November 7, 1947. For a summary of the Report, see Department of State Bulletin, November 16, 1947, p. 937. Secretary of Commerce Harriman was Chairman of the President’s Committee.
10. For the text of Molotov’s statement, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 515–524.
11. For the text of the Secretary’s statement summarized here, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 449–450 or Department of State Bulletin, December 14, 1947, pp. 1185–1186.