740.00119 Council/11–2847

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret
Present: Secretary Marshall
Ambassador Douglas
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Bohlen
M. Bidault
Ambassador Massigli
Couve de Murville

the procedures of the cfm

During the course of the conversation which took place at luncheon, M. Bidault outlined the French view of procedures which should be [Page 738] followed that afternoon at the conference which as it turned out were completely identical with the procedure agreed on at the U.S. Delegation meeting that morning.

M. Bidault said that it was his desire to maintain the closest and most intimate contact between the American and French Delegations during this conference and assured me that the French Delegation would give us prior notice before making any statement of any importance at this conference. M. Bidault said that he felt it was of the greatest importance that the United States and France should be as close together as possible at this conference and avoid at all costs any split with the Russians and French on one side and the British and the Americans on the other. I assured M. Bidault that we likewise desired to work in the closest harmony as we fully appreciate the importance of the British, French and ourselves who shared a common purpose being as close together as possible.

french policy in regard to germany

I referred to our talks in Moscow and New York88 concerning the French attitude toward certain fundamental questions in regard to Germany and asked M. Bidault if, in view of the political developments in France since that time, the views that he had expressed to me on those occasions still represented French policy.

M. Bidault replied that in so far as he was concerned, he intended to adhere to the point of view expressed to me at Moscow and New York and that there had been no change. He added that he would not accept changes from any force, as he put it, outside of the French Government. With reference to the fusion of the French Zone, he said, without “too much precipitation” and having in mind the complicated and difficult negotiations that would be necessary, it was still the French view that in the event of a failure to agree at this conference that discussion for the fusion of the French zone should be undertaken promptly. He said the same was true in regard to the French attitude toward the Ruhr.

ruhr and level of industry

I told M. Bidault that while appreciating to the full the difficulties that he was laboring under in view of the present situation in France,89 [Page 739] I nevertheless wished to draw his attention to the vital importance of the debates now proceeding in Congress on the European aid program.90 I said that I hoped that he would balance most carefully the relative advantages of possibly a temporary effect on French public opinion of a certain type of statement as against the adverse reaction which such statements might cause in American public opinion and hence in Congress. I said I felt that the debates in Congress and the successful passage of the recovery program was of course of transcendental importance and should always be kept in mind. I would therefore urge M. Bidault to think most carefully concerning the desirability of raising at this conference the question of the bi-zonal level of industry91 in the light of my observations. On the Ruhr, I said I was sure M. Bidault had considered the fact that if the question of a special international regime for the-Ruhr was raised at this conference it would inevitably carry with it the implication of Russian participation in such a regime.

M. Bidault replied that he had these considerations much in mind and in this connection pointed out that the reports that the House of Representatives intended to cut the interim aid appropriations had been seized upon by the Communists in France as confirmation of all their warnings.

On the bi-zonal level of industry he said that it would probably be necessary for the French Delegation to comment on this but he could assure me that these comments would be most carefully worded and would avoid any form of provocation or an attack. As to the Ruhr, he said that I would have noticed yesterday that he had specifically refrained from raising the Ruhr under the subject of frontiers and would only raise it in connection with item 6 dealing with security. He said he was fully aware of the implications of Russian participation that were involved in this matter.

general comment on the situation in france

M. Bidault said that the situation is now clear, namely, that the Communists at present are making their great bid for power, but that he was confident that despite all the difficulties the Government would be able to handle the situation.

  1. For records of the conversations between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Bidault in Moscow on March 10, March 13, and April 20, 1947, see pp. 241, 246, and 367; for records of their conversations in New York on September 18 and October 8, 1947, see pp. 680 and 682.
  2. For documentation on the interest of the United States in the political, economic and financial situation in France, see volume iii .
  3. For documentation on the interest of the United States in European economic recovery, see volume iii .
  4. For additional documentation regarding the revised level of industry plan for the Western zones of occupation of Germany, see pp. 977 ff.