740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–1847

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber)

Participants: The Secretary
M. Bonnet, French Ambassador
Mr. Reber (Eur)

M. Bonnet called this morning to explain he had been instructed by M. Bidault to ascertain further the views of the U.S. Government [Page 721] concerning the French proposal for the internationalization of the Ruhr, which Bidault had discussed with the Secretary in New York. The Secretary replied by reading the paragraphs relating to Germany from the speech he is to deliver in Chicago this evening.66

M. Bonnet then said that the French proposals went a good deal further in their conception of international supervision. France felt that it was particularly important that the control of the basic Ruhr industries should be through international management rather than indirectly by supervision of allocation. This in their opinion provided the only guarantee that Ruhr industry would never be developed as a menace.

M. Bonnet went on to say that during the interim period before the peace treaty entered into effect it was most important that the same form of international control be exercised. France had been disturbed by the recent decision of the British and American control authorities to place the Allied-owned mines under German management between the Allied owners and the control group. The Secretary replied that the question of a further international voice in the Ruhr coal management during this period would, of course, have to be discussed in connection with the negotiations for trizonal fusion.

He then inquired as to French thinking with regard to the position of the Soviets in any international control of the Ruhr. M. Bonnet replied that this matter had not been recently discussed with the Soviets who had however indicated that they linked the question of the Saar with Four-power control of the Ruhr implying that their consent to the integration of the Saar in French economy was dependent upon French agreement to their plan for the Ruhr. It had not been possible for France to continue any conversations with the Soviets as the Soviet position for a strong centralized German Government was always the obstacle to any exchange of views. Molotov had recently told Catroux in Moscow that France as well as the other powers was aware of Soviet views on Germany, and that these remained the same although the USSR would naturally take into account the evolution of the situation. Bonnet added that neither he nor his Government knew what the latter reference meant nor had Catroux been able to ascertain.

The Secretary asked whether the French Government had any definite views as to the possibilities which had been so widely discussed recently of proceeding to a three-power peace treaty with Germany if no agreement with the Soviets in London were possible. M. Bonnet replied that he had no information of his Government’s thinking on [Page 722] this subject but felt that they, like ourselves, were awaiting the results of London before taking any definite position. As to our views the Secretary went on to say that he did not wish, of course, to take a final position until we saw what happened in London, but he felt that it would be difficult to conclude a definitive peace without the Soviets. It was however impossible to leave Germany in its present condition. He looked therefore to an interim solution—probably the establishment of some form of German authority which could take over some of the functions of administering Germany and make possible a greater revival of German industry with its consequent benefits to European recovery.

The Secretary then said, speaking personally, that he was somewhat concerned by the possibility that a strong stand against centralized government in Germany had little real substance since it was obvious that certain things would have to be common to the whole of Germany, such as communications and currency. These, he felt, would only be the beginning and, given the mentality of the Germans, would inevitably lead to an increasingly greater and greater degree of centralization. He wondered therefore whether strong opposition to centralization had any great reality and whether the real difficulty lay in this phase of the German problem. Germany he considered could not, particularly if it were a weak state, remain in the middle; that it might very well turn either to the East or to the West. This in his opinion was more important than the kind of government Germany would eventually have and that more attention should be paid to the danger that it might turn the wrong way. M. Bonnet replied that the French Government was fully aware of the dangers of which the Secretary had just spoken. But his Government felt that this same problem would be presented in a more acute form by a strong centralized German Government than by a loose federation of German states. In his opinion the real way to avoid such a danger would be international control of Ruhr industry. If this strong weapon were truly in international hands the risk inherent in a strong revived German power could be minimized and contained under effective guarantees.

S[amuel] R[eber]
  1. For the text of the address by the Secretary of State on the problems of European revival and German and Austrian peace settlements, delivered before a meeting sponsored jointly by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Chicago Chamber of Commerce on November 18, 1947, see Department of State Bulletin, November 30, 1947, p. 1024.