740.00119 Council/10–3047

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ( Beam )

secret
Participants: Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Reber
Mr. Beam
Sir William Strang
General Brownjohn
Mr. Dean
Mr. Allen

Above-named British officials called at their own request to continue, on a purely informal basis, conversations regarding London CFM.

For their purely private information, Mr. Hickerson mentioned to the British that he had just seen Secretary Marshall. The Secretary approved of the idea previously discussed informally with the British that the CFM agenda should be limited to a very few items and that the session should, if possible, be short. He agreed with the British suggestion that Mr. Bevin, as representative of the inviting country, propose to the other three nations that they instruct their deputies [Page 693] to draw up an agenda for the CFM at the deputies meeting starting November 6. As to the list of questions mentioned in the discussion with the British on October 24,34 the Secretary wished to consider this matter further. He also desired to give further consideration concerning the Four-Power demilitarization treaty before issuing instructions to the US deputy.

Sir William Strang said he had received word from his government suggesting that further consultations might be held between the US and British, and possibly the French, concerning the provisional political organization of Germany before the deputies meeting. It was pointed out, that in view of the limited time available, it might be difficult to arrange these in Washington, particularly since the French Embassy here was not au courant with German questions. Although the US could not give its formal consent as yet, it was envisaged these conversations might take place during the early days of the deputies meeting in London.

With reference to earlier talks concerning provisional government and the US suggestion that steps be taken to set up a government without proceeding first to the establishment of administrative agencies and an advisory council,35 Sir William Strang inquired whether it was intended that the Control Council would issue a broad directive and proceed at first to the creation of a German governmental body on a nominative basis. He was advised the US thinking at the working level ran on the lines that the Control Council should issue such a broad charter providing for the nomination at first of a German governing body and the holding of elections as soon as possible thereafter.

Sir William Strang then said that the British authorities in Germany had endeavored to make an evaluation of the electoral strength. They believed that if national elections were held the anti-Communist element would have a substantial majority. They furthermore thought that if agreement on a German government structure were obtained at London, the Soviets would not suppress the non-SED parties, which might even show a gain under internationally supervised elections.

Sir William Strang agreed that further thought should be given to the question whether a demand for licensing of the SPD in the Soviet Zone should be made prior to the holding of the first national elections or whether authorization for the SPD throughout the four zones [Page 694] should be taken up in the constitution for Germany. The British in Berlin believed that the SPD would obtain a sweeping victory if authorized in the eastern zone. Sir William Strang furnished the following estimate of voting strength prepared by the British in Berlin:

Communist Millions
S.E.D. Soviet Zone & Berlin 5. 1
K.P.D. Western Zones 1. 7
6. 8
Anti-Communist
S.P.D. Western Zones only 7. 2
C.D.U. Western Zones 6. 9)
  Soviet Zone 2. 4) 9.3
L.P.D. Four Zones 4. 3
Miscellaneous (Western Zones) 1. 4
22. 2

Sir William Strang referred to conversations which had taken place between the Foreign Office in London and Mr. Chauvel of the French Foreign Office along the lines of the informal talks we have been holding in Washington. For the Department’s strictly private information he left a paper, attached as Annex A, reporting on the conversations with the French, and another paper (Annex B)36 containing certain suggestions made by the French. He inquired whether it might not be useful to enter into informal talks on a tripartite basis during the early days of the deputies meeting in London. He was informed that the Department would wish to give this matter further consideration before giving a reply. With respect to the item “future of the Rhineland” suggested by the French for discussion after the CFM, Strang said this presumably related to the French desire for some form of permanent occupation of the Rhineland.

Strang proposed that should the CFM break down in London conversations should be continued between the U.S., British and French for trizonal fusion and the creation of a necessary administrative or governmental organization. Mr. Hickerson opposed this suggestion on the grounds that there should be a clean break between the quadripartite negotiations and subsequent discussions for a reenforcement of western zonal fusion. Strang admitted the force of this argument, which he would transmit to London.

[
Jacob D. Beam
]
[Page 695]

Annex A

British Paper on Recent British-French Conversations

Conversations have recently taken place at the Foreign Office with M. Chauvel concerning the French view on the Ruhr and the Council of Foreign Ministers.

It was made clear that the Foreign Office would not be able to enter into detailed discussions until the early part of November.

As regards the Ruhr, M. Chauvel reported that M. Bidault had told Mr. Marshall that M. Bidault agreed that the question of international ownership of the mines and steel plant should be held over. As to the occupation regime, M. Chauvel proposed that the agreements recently concluded on the production of coal should be modified to allow for two Directors General instead of one, one being responsible for the Ruhr and the other for the Aachen basin. He also proposed that the Allied Control Group should have the functions of an Administrative Council, approving the general plan of production and policy and having immediate access to any information required. The international authority, when eventually set up, would have the task of allocating coal and coke production between internal German consumption and export and would comprise representatives of the U.S.A., U.K., France and Benelux as well as German representatives.

Concerning the Council of Foreign Ministers, M. Chauvel proposed that there should not be any agenda but that a list of subjects for discussion should be prepared and that agreement should be reached beforehand upon the order of their importance and the tactics to be pursued upon them during the Conference. Discussion should be undertaken of what was to be done if the Conference broke down. Fusion of the zones and connected questions such as guarantees of security and a disarmament treaty on a three-Power basis should be discussed under this head. A definition should also be arrived at of what would be regarded as a failure of the Conference. Either a break down of the Conference or failure to agree on the means of achieving German economic unity might be considered to constitute a failure.

M. Chauvel was particularly anxious for consideration of the action to be taken if the Soviet Government proposed the evacuation of Germany. He suggested that a reply should be given stressing the necessity of previous agreement on economic unity, level of industry, preparations, security, demilitarization, methods of inter-Allied control and the permanent occupation of certain areas.

It became clear that as a result of the trend towards a deGaullist Government in France the French were mostly occupied with the military aspects of the German security problem.

  1. See the memorandum of conversation by Beam, October 24, p. 689.
  2. Mr. Beam, Major General Brownjohn, and other American and British officials informally discussed the future German governmental structure and the creation of central administrative agencies during meetings on October 18 and 22. Beam’s memoranda of these conversations are not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–2047 and 10–2247).
  3. A marginal notation at this point, presumably written by Beam, reads as follows: “Both of these are purely informal and should not be used as the basis for discussion at this stage.” Annex B is not printed.