740.00119 Council/10–2447
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ( Beam )
| Participants: | Mr. Hickerson |
| Mr. Reber | |
| Mr. Beam | |
| Sir William Strang | |
| Mr. Dean | |
| Mr. Allen |
At their own request, above-named British officials called to discuss informally further questions for London CFM agenda. They furnished paper, attached herewith,29 showing status of items previously dealt with by Moscow CFM.
Strang pointed out that the deputies meeting starting November 6 would presumably prepare reports to CFM on following items: (1) Compensation for United Nations interests affected by reparations; (2) Provisional political organization of Germany; and (3) Procedure for German peace settlement. Strang agreed with US side that deputies should furthermore be charged with drafting recommendations for main agenda for CFM. He indicated that Bevin, as Chairman, might approach the other three governments suggesting they give such authority to their deputies.
Strang confirmed British agreement with US that CFM agenda should be short and should deal only with principal items. After discussion, [Page 690] summarized below, it was tentatively agreed that participants should suggest to their respective Ministers that US and British deputies should endeavor to obtain an agenda for CFM consisting of following items in order given:
- 1.
- Austria
- 2.
- Economic principles
- 3.
- Deputies report on provisional political organization of Germany (see above)
- 4.
- Four-Power demilitarization treaty
- 5.
- Other business
(British indicated that by later decision by Foreign Office they might also wish to include question of German frontiers, in particular the claims of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).
It was informally agreed that if CFM “failed to succeed” it was better that breakdown occur respecting Germany rather than Austria, which is a more topical question at present time. Austrian question should therefore be placed first and, after brief initial discussion, could be referred by CFM to deputies for study and report. CFM could then pass to concurrent consideration of German problems.
Participants felt that economic principles was item of critical importance and should follow next. A suggestion was rejected that start be made with democratization, since this could lead to fruitless recrimination. British proposed desirability of dealing with the Saar, Ruhr and Rhineland, particularly since they thought it advisable to obtain, if possible, quadripartite agreement to economic integration of Saar with French.30 US side pointed out that Saar involved questions of coal distribution and reparations adjustment and could therefore be discussed under economic principles. British tentatively agreed. US participants were reluctant to present Belgian, Luxembourg and Netherland claims for discussion, feeling these could be settled provisionally on tripartite basis in same manner that eastern area was unilaterally put under Polish provisional administration. US side favored exclusion of eastern frontier from discussion, reserving its decision whether some statement might later be made that US position on this question remains the same. Such statement would obviate inference that US had given tacit consent to present provisional boundary.
It was held possible that Soviets might refuse to follow probing process envisaged in short agenda and might wish to throw entire range of questions open for discussion; they might also make sensational proposal, accepting main points of US and British positions [Page 691] and involving plan for withdrawal of occupation forces. Intention of this maneuver would be to obtain unified Germany in which Soviet participation could sabotage Marshall Plan. It was agreed that US and British might well disapprove withdrawal of occupation forces on ground that job in Germany is not yet done; at all events, as conditions for acceptance of any Soviet offer, US and British would wish to restate their essential requirements, in particular the provisions in the Clay-Robertson paper of December 194631 which set forth the terms on which the US and British would agree to economic unification. It would be understood that pending negotiation for quadripartite unification, the US and British would proceed with plans for a closer integration of the western zones, probably including the French. It was remarked that in view of the political uncertainty at home, the French might prove more difficult to deal with regarding particular German problems, although they would essentially be on the side of the western nations.
It was envisaged that the following incidental items could be dealt with under “other business”: Compensation for United Nations interests affected by reparations, current demilitarization, repatriation of German prisoners of war, and limitation of occupation forces. Should the Ruhr be presented for discussion, it might well be dealt with in connection with the Four-Power demilitarization treaty. British agree with US that further work on treaty procedure is premature at this time.
-
The undated British paper under reference here read as follows:
↩- “(a) Austria—by virtue of report from Treaty Commission
- “(b) Matters left on the Agenda at Moscow
- (1)
- Economic principles, level of industry and reparations.
- (11)
- German frontiers, Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar.
- (111)
- The Four Power (Byrnes) Treaty.
- “(c) Matters to be discussed by the Deputies in
November
- (1)
- Compensation for United Nations interests affected by reparations.
- (11)
- Provisional political organization of Germany.
- (111)
- Procedure for German peace settlement.
- “(d) Matters referred to the Allied Control Council in
Berlin
- (1)
- Disagreed items in Part I of Moscow document M/148.
- (11)
- Repatriation of German prisoners of war.
- (111)
- Limitation of occupation forces.”
- For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the integration of the Saar into the French economy, see pp. 1073 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩