740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–1247
The United States Deputy for Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers ( Murphy ) to the Secretary of State 90
London Meeting of the Deputies for Germany
january 14–february 25, 1947
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The following review and analysis of principal developments at the London Meeting of the Deputies for Germany may be of use to the American Delegation at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Verbatim accounts of the Deputies’ sessions have already gone forward to the Department.
i. general summary
The Deputies’ task was twofold: To hear and report Allied views and to submit proposals on procedure.
Allied Views on the German Problem
Moderate versus Repressive Treatment of Germany: As might be expected, there was divergence of view between the “Western States” and the “eastern”. Of sixteen countries which submitted views, eight clearly favored a moderate and constructive policy towards Germany not dissimilar to that expressed in Secretary Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech. The four British Dominions, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, while recognizing the necessity for just reparations, denazification and effective demilitarization controls, viewed the depressed condition of Germany with anxiety on account of its potential effect on their own economies or on the European and world situation at large. They favored a policy which would permit establishment in Germany of democratic political life and a reasonably prosperous economy. In private conversations of representatives of these States, with members of our Delegation, it was clear that they look hopefully to the United States for leadership in bringing healthy economic and political conditions to Germany, their own countries, and to Europe. Privately, there was disclosed apprehension over Russian aims and policy.
On the other hand, the “Soviet Five” or the “Slav Five”—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine—generally [Page 110] followed the Moscow line. They advocated heavy reparations, stringent political and economic restraints, censorship and prolonged military occupation. The program of wide control advocated by Czechoslovakia, I might observe, could hardly be enforced by a military occupation alone, but would appear to require the cooperation of a totalitarian German regime. It is hard to conceive of any German Government except a Communist one providing such cooperation.
In contrast to the “moderates” which favored German political unity but on a federal basis, the Slav States advocated centralized German Government which, as the Czech Delegate pointed out, would be “easier to control”.
It is difficult from the memoranda to say whether Brazil, Greece or Luxembourg favor moderate or repressive treatment. I would place them in the former category. Certainly they do not follow the Soviet line. Brazil’s brief memorandum which gives evidence of French influence was mainly a criticism (of the U.S.) for failure to include Brazil in the reparation awards decided at the Paris Reparations Conference. Brazil and Luxembourg were the only States of the sixteen to favor a German political structure along lines favored by France—a loosely joined federation of states. Greece asked for maximum reparations exactions since thereby the Greek share would increase, but on the other hand, requested trade guarantees such as a twenty-year guarantee to purchase Greek tobacco, which could only be fulfilled by a fairly prosperous Germany. The Luxembourg statement concerned itself mainly with economic and territorial claims and the question of control of the Ruhr.
Polish Boundary Settlement: Only South Africa explicitly called for revision of the de facto Polish-German frontier. Privately, however, Belgium and Dutch representatives stated their view that no peace would endure unless it included either partial restoration of territory now under Polish administration or some arrangement whereby this area and its output would be available for Germany’s over-population and food requirements.
The Ruhr: No State asked for the political separation of the Ruhr, but the majority favored economic control although they offered few details as to its organization. Belgium did, however, make the request that the control be administered by France, Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Belgium also proposed a 25–40 year military occupation, not only of the Ruhr and Rhineland but also of a 100–kilometer strip east of the Rhine.
Reparations: It is of some significance that eleven of the sixteen Allied countries favored, in principle, the taking of reparations from current German production. None opposed such exactions.
Territorial and Economic Claims: Luxembourg, Belgium, and The Netherlands advanced a series of relatively heavy economic claims [Page 111] against Germany (transfer of mining property, power plants, transportation equipment, etc.). The representatives of the latter two States, however, declared privately that their claims were tentative and might be reconsidered if security against German military resurgence were assured and if other claimant States abated their demands. The Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Luxembourg presented territorial claims aggregating 1200 square miles with a population of 177,000. The Netherlands claimed 675 square miles with a population of 119,000.
Allied Views on Procedure and Participation
The majority—especially the British Dominions—were bitterly critical of the limited participation afforded at Paris and the formal auditions by the Deputies at London to which we were restricted by Soviet refusal to permit representatives of other countries to be present at the hearings.
Anxious, as were nearly all of the invited Allies to participate more actively, none, except Canada and Australia, sought explicitly to share the responsibility of the Four Powers in making the final decisions on the settlement. The general claim was for full consultation at all stages and association in the actual study of the various problems. The Belgian and Dutch Delegates, in conversation, and the South African Delegate, in formal statement, made clear that they had little belief in the practicability of working out the details of the settlement in plenary conferences.
Procedural Proposals of the Deputies
The procedural proposals of our Delegation were designed:
- A.
- To provide a definite advance plan of organization and procedure (the lack of which has delayed and harmed the work of most peace gatherings since the Congress of Vienna).
- B.
- To afford the Allies full consultation and a reasonable degree of participation in the peacemaking, but initially at least without plenary conferences which with their accompaniments of rhetorical debate and appeals to public opinion, would certainly delay and might even endanger reaching agreement on Germany.
The British and the French seemed generally to share our views, and it might have been possible to have formulated a tripartite procedural proposal.
The efforts of the Soviets were: (1) to prevent a three to one line-up against them; (2) to exclude true Allied participation in the peacemaking; (3) to block adoption of a definite committee organization and a coordinated approach to the problems of the peace.
The Soviet Deputy was ready to admit the further presentation of Allied views, under restrictive circumstances, mainly before an Information and Consultation Committee on which the Allied States were not to be represented.
[Page 112]The Soviets also proposed limiting any association with committee studies to the 12 Allies whose territory had suffered occupation by Germany. Six of these twelve States, it should be noted, are definitely under Soviet influence.
The Soviet Deputy worked consistently to restrict Allied participation in the preparation of the German peace settlement. In this regard, it is important to note that the hearings showed a probable majority of the invited States to be opposed to some of the Soviet aims and conception of the peace.
I believe that the Soviet representative considered that, if the Allied States really participated in the settlement, no priority could be assured for the questions in which the Soviets are interested. Under a broad program, Russian claims would be seen in their relation to the whole problem and be pared down accordingly. Given this Soviet attitude and reasoning, as well as the French—and British—unwillingness to join in a tri-partite proposal, the final result that each Delegation would submit its own proposals to the Moscow meeting was inevitable.
Thus the London discussion exposed the views on procedure of the four Governments, and while no agreement was reached, the spade work done may facilitate the task of the Ministers in this regard. Fearing to be out-voted, the Soviet Representative clutched firmly to his initial position against practical participation in the peacemaking by the eighteen Allied States.
Whether this Soviet position will be relaxed at Moscow remains to be seen.
[The remainder of this report was devoted to a more detailed summary of the Allied views on the German problem and the negotiations of the Deputies on questions of procedure.]
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The source text was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 9164, March 12, 1947, from Berlin, not printed. Other copies are included in CFM Files, Lot M–88. It is presumed that Murphy presented copies to the Secretary of State and other members of the United States Delegation to the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, March 10–April 24, 1947.
This Report, including its appendices, comprises 84 typewritten pages, of which 12 are printed here. Most of the documents included in the appendices are included elsewhere in this collection of documents.
For the background concerning Murphy’s decision to prepare this report, see telegram 957, Delsec 1222, February 12, 1947, from London, p. 26.
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