740.00119 Council/10–1747
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ( Beam )24
| Participants: | Ambassador Murphy |
| Mr. Hickerson | |
| Mr. Reber | |
| Mr. Beam | |
| Mr. Offie | |
| Sir William Strang | |
| Major General Brownjohn | |
| Mr. Dean |
The above-named British officials called at the Department for an informal discussion, “at the working level”, of preparations for the forthcoming London CFM. Strang said he was generally pessimistic about an agreement at London and he thought this view was shared by Mr. Bevin whose recent statements about the critical nature of the meeting and the undesirability of failure were probably put out necessarily to reassure the public.
Strang agreed with the United States position that Austrian questions should not be discussed at the deputies’ meeting starting November 6, since the report of the Austrian Treaty Commission25 should be sent direct to the CFM. He saw no need for the appointment of an Austrian deputy for the deputies’ meeting.
Strang mentioned that at Moscow CFM had referred to the deputies the questions of prisoners, of war, reduction of forces, and displaced persons. He agreed with the US view that the deputies should avoid, if possible, a discussion of basic issues and should endeavor simply to draw up an agenda for the CFM consisting of a small number of main problems which would determine the success or failure of agreement. Strang concurred with the US opinion that these main problems might be envisaged as follows: Economic principles, including reparations; the demilitarization treaty; provisional government, including electoral procedures, basic freedoms and human rights; and reduction of occupation forces.
Strang thought it possible that the Soviets would concentrate on attacking the US-British bizonal fusion26 but at the same time might put forth proposals which the US and UK might find it embarrassing to reject. These proposals might include the withdrawal of occupation forces, a seemingly reasonable settlement on reparations and economic principles, and possibly an offer of foodstuffs for Germany. He emphasized [Page 688] Soviet interest in obtaining a part in the Ruhr administration and thought they might be prepared to make concessions to this end with a view to confusing and hampering German reconstruction along Marshall Plan lines.27 He stressed the UK was opposed to any premature action in Germany and felt that withdrawal should be postponed until completion of punitive action, such as demilitarization and reparations payment. He mentioned that the UK desired a theoretical equality of forces with the Soviets, and suggested that reduction be approached through the consideration of occupation costs on which some progress had been made in the ACC.
Strang pointed out that Soviet economic and political objectives in Germany contradicted each other. He was doubtful about the desirability of immediate German unification since this might extend the scope of the Marshall Plan to all of Germany under conditions whereby the Soviets nevertheless would be able in effect to siphon out Marshall Plan assistance through reparations claims and the earmarking of current production.
Strang mentioned the problems that would be created by French participation in a trizonal fusion should the CFM fail and considered that many difficulties would ensue from French disagreement with UK and US policies and organization for the western area. He agreed with US informal opinion that while a streamlining of the present organization was necessary and might have to take the form of a virtual provisional government, nevertheless this organization should not in fact be called a government or lead to the setting up of a separate German state but might be conceived of as a kind of provisional administration. He likewise agreed with the desirability of the western allies remaining in Berlin and of continuing to participate in the work of the ACC.
- A virtually identical memorandum of conversation by Beam, dated October 16, 1947, is filed separately under 740.00119 Council/10–1647.↩
- Document CFM/ATC (47) 77, October 11, 1947, p. 631.↩
- For documentation on the economic cooperation and coordination between the United States and United Kingdom zones of occupation in Germany, see pp. 909 ff.↩
- For documentation on the European Recovery Program, see volume iii .↩