740.0011 EW Peace/6–247: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
2987. UK Foreign Office requests further informal US-UK discussions on proposed Byrnes treaty in note May 28 which reads:
“As you know, after discussion in Moscow, question of proposed treaty for disarmament of Germany (“Byrnes treaty”)1 was left unsettled, though Mr. Marshall expressly stated that he did not withdraw it. We very much regret that it was impossible to make any further progress on this subject, and we hope that it will be further discussed at next meetings of CFM. You perhaps also know that both before and during Conference we had some discussion with Matthews and other members of State Department, to whom we gave certain comments of our own on American draft. It now seems to us that we could profitably spend some time during interval before next CFM in continuing these informal discussions with you, and perhaps also in holding similar discussions with French. Our general object would be partly to pursue points which we ourselves feel require clarification, and partly to consider together with you whether proposed treaty could be modified so as to become more acceptable to Russians without losing its original character.
We shall be very glad to know whether you will be willing to enter into discussions with us on this whole subject. I enclose a paper summarizing some of the main points which we would suggest for discussion, in order to show what is in our minds.”
Full text enclosure reads:
“Points in connection with the Byrnes treaty requiring further discussion.
The scope of the treaty.
The main objection put forward by the Russians to the American proposal was that it did not go far enough and concentrated too much [Page 677] on the single aspect of disarmament instead of including a number of other questions which would have to be dealt with in the peace settlement with Germany. As against this it seems clear that if we were to try to include all the subjects put forward by the Russians, we could never conclude a treaty of the kind proposed by the US delegation in advance of the final settlement of all outstanding German questions. It seems possible, however, to go some way towards meeting the Russian point of view without losing the advantage of having a treaty which could be accepted at once by all Four Powers without awaiting the settlement of all major German problems. This might be done by adding to a draft on the lines of the American proposal a provision that other questions on which agreement might be reached by the CFM could be brought under the procedure for inspection and enforcement provided for in the Byrnes treaty. The treaty would then consist of:
- (a)
- Agreement to set up the necessary machinery to detect and suppress attempts by Germany to contravene detailed prohibitions relating to rearmament, and para-military organizations, etc., and
- (b)
- Agreement that when decisions were reached by the Four Powers on other subjects e.g., level of industry, control of the Ruhr, etc. the same machinery should be used for detecting and suppressing breaches of such other prohibitions as might be imposed on the Germans in the light of these decisions. Should the treaty provide for unanimous action only?
The American text seems to provide that no action can be taken to enforce the treaty except by the common agreement of all the Four Powers. The United Kingdom view is that there is considerable argument in favor of decisions being taken by a majority (i.e. three) of the Four Powers. It might be supposed that the omission of the phrase “by common agreement” in Article VI of the counter-draft submitted by the Soviet delegation in Moscow means that the Russians are not themselves in favor of the unanimity rule, but it is also arguable that the omission of this phrase means that they are in favor of complete liberty of action on the part of all signatories to the treaty. In these circumstances the best tactics might be simply to enquire of the Russians whether the omission of the phrase in their counter-draft does in fact mean that they are opposed to the unanimity rule, and if so, whether they favor a majority rule.
Location of forces.
The British authorities feel that it would be desirable to lay down in the treaty that a proportion at least of the forces available for enforcing the treaty should be located in Germany. When should the inspectorate be established?
In the American draft the inspectorate is not to be set up until the end of the period of general occupation.
The British authorities feel that there is considerable advantage in setting up an inspectorate immediately upon the conclusion of the treaty. The French delegation at Moscow appeared to share this view.”
[Page 678]Since Foreign Office asks whether Department prepared to enter into such discussions, Embassy would appreciate early instructions regarding nature of reply to be made.2
- For the text of the draft treaty on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, submitted by Secretary of State Byrnes to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on April 30, 1946, see document CFM (46) 21, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 190.↩
- Telegram 2545, June 13, to London, not printed, instructed Ambassador Douglas to inform the Foreign Office that the United States shared the British view that the draft treaty should be further discussed at the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers and that the State Department was reviewing the whole question of one treaty in the light of the Moscow discussions. The Department believed that informal American-British discussions on the matter would be useful (740.0011 EW(Peace)/6–247).↩