740.00119 Council/4–2047
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
| Present: | M. Bidault |
| M. Alphand | |
| French Interpreter | |
| Secretary Marshall | |
| Mr. Matthews |
M. Bidault called this afternoon at his request. He said that he regretted to disturb me but certain problems which were of great importance to France have arisen which he wished to set out frankly. (He then produced a memorandum from which he read and which [Page 368] he said had been prepared for him by M. Alphand.) These concerned coal, credits and manpower. France is in a serious situation. She has left but $700,000,000 to care for her needs of construction, and to pay for wheat, coal and other necessities. He wished to say first that France was grateful for all the United States had done during and since the war and would never forget it.
As to specific problems, first, he wished to mention the application which France had filed with the World Bank for a $500 million loan. He realized that the Bank was an international institution. On the other hand, much of its funds and consequently much of the influence on its policies, were American. He therefore felt that he could properly speak to me as concerns American policy in the Bank. He knew that Mr. McCloy, the Bank President, was a good friend of his country. However, France had just received two disillusionments. First the total to be made available to France had been reduced from $500,000,000, to $250,000,000. Secondly, conditions were being attached to the loan which he felt were not acceptable to a sovereign country. These concerned a commitment that France would contract no further foreign loans, the role of the International Bank in the Payments Agreement, requirements of information on commercial policy, etc.2
The next question he wished to raise concerned manpower. To replace German prisoners returning to their homes France was seeking to recruit voluntary German labor. The difficulty concerned remittances by this labor to their dependents in Germany. France urgently needs her remaining dollars for purchases of a million tons of coal a month from the United States, for wheat, oil, copper and other necessities. If, in addition, German remittances must be made available in dollars or otherwise become an added burden on France’s economy an impossible financial situation would result. It was not lack of will but lack of ability to bear this burden in dollars. France had agreed to return the prisoners partly at our request and partly because it was the moral thing to do. That labor, he realized, must be treated humanely. With this he was in full agreement but France could not bear the burden of added dollar commitments. There is soon to be a meeting between the Anglo-American fused zone and France on commercial negotiations. He, Bidault, had agreed to this meeting though the preceding government had opposed any negotiations with our Bizonal authorities. He thought these transfers of German remittances may be discussed at this meeting and he hoped that the American Commander will be given “liberal instructions”. Otherwise both psychologically and financially France would be put in an impossible position.
He digressed to say that he knew that in the minds of some there are [Page 369] uncertainties regarding France and French policy in the future. He felt that anyone that knew France could not doubt the ultimate choice where France would stand. The choice, however, should not be an imposed one. To the American question “Can we rely on France?”, he said, the answer was “Yes”. But France needed time and must avoid a civil war.
The other question he wished to raise concerned the Saar. He greatly appreciated the attitude of the American Delegation on this question and he assured me that the French people knew who were their friends on this. Naturally, the French Communists had been annoyed. That was of no great importance. However, in the light of the Moscow Conference things cannot continue to remain stationary. Positions have been taken at Moscow and such positions can greatly influence both M. Bidault and French policy in general. Without him and his friends there would be no French policy. France cannot wait longer to work out the Saar problems. The people of the Saar would not understand further delay and would think that the French had no influence with regard to the Saar. There must be some agreement on the question of the Saar frontiers. He wanted me to be the first to know that it would be necessary to change the Saar currency and to set up more definitive customs control. German marks are to be exchanged for Saar marks and since the population knows this will probably take place the Saar is beginning to be flooded with German marks. Hence the importance of early agreement on the Saar frontiers.
In conclusion, he said, he was very grateful to me for my understanding of the French position in discussions in the Conference. The facts he submitted were of great importance for his country and of capital importance to the equilibrium of the world. If he could obtain the kind of agreement with the United States he wished the “equilibrium of the world would be assured”.
In reply I said that I would like to answer his specific questions. I would not indulge in the diplomatic refuge of saying that we would give “sympathetic consideration” to France’s viewpoint. With regard to the World Bank loan, I was not sufficiently familiar with the facts to make any reply. I would, however, on my return, examine the question carefully and would speak personally to Mr. McCloy.
On the transfer of funds, I was likewise not familiar with all the implications of the financial transactions involved. I was, however, disposed to do my best to relieve the French Government of any harsh demands from American zonal control. I said that I had talked to General Clay and others concerning our general relationship to France and would talk again on the way home. I wanted him to know that there is every disposition by the United States to help the French Government in its present dilemmas. I said I must be careful in what [Page 370] I say not to get into unfamiliar details but I am impelled and motivated by a desire to assist the French Government. I looked forward to having numerous conversations on my return to the United States with Ambassador Bonnet and would familiarize myself with the details of the questions he raised. I said that I had a general comprehension of the delicate political situation in France and take it into account in my reactions to the problems which arise. M. Bidault said that he realized this and was grateful for it.
I said that I knew the urgency of the Saar situation and that I would treat in confidence what he had told me with regard to the exchange of currency.
Passing to general questions, I said I was deeply concerned over the difficulties in the Conference both as to long-range treaty prospects and those of local importance pertaining to the next 6 months or a year.
I said that I realized there was a great difference in the viewpoint of Americans who were far distant from Europe and that of Frenchmen, or Russians for that matter, who have suffered terrible losses to their homes and lands in the war. I was fearful of the influences their horrible experiences would have upon the Allies. It might lead us to solutions which appeal to us for the present but might be fatal for the future. Reaction of Americans, if they had lived in France, I thought would have been identical with French reactions. The struggle in my mind on the Conference issues concerned the danger that we may now make commitments under the impact of present feelings which would not be logical for an enduring peace.
M. Bidault interrupted to say that he knew what I meant but that France needs time. It will take a little time before Germany can in fact be integrated into the Western World. He referred (as he had at the Conference table) to his personal visits to German prisoners at the time of the Paris insurrection just prior to liberation. He said, however, that there is no question that Germany is a part of Europe.
In conclusion, I said that I was deeply concerned over the situation of France and would give my earnest consideration to what he had said. I was sure that we could develop an understanding relationship between the two of us and, I believed, between our two governments.
M. Bidault again expressed thanks.
- The source text is not signed.↩
- For additional documentation on the concern of the United States over the French political, economic and financial situation, see volume iii .↩