740.00119 Council/4–1547: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
urgent
1388. Delsec 1428. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson from Marshall. Twenty-ninth CFM, 15 April, Marshall presiding, resumed discussion of the four power treaty.56 Bidault saw no great disagreement in views of four powers on demilitarization and disarmament as expressed yesterday, felt that Molotov’s amendments on those items did not involve radical change of substance and suggested a special committee to study these items. On the other Soviet proposals, he stated they covered almost every point on which ministers had already disagreed. He saw no reason for trying to tie Soviet proposals in a four power treaty, and repeated his agreement in principle to United States proposal as made yesterday.57
Marshall pointed out (complete text cabled Department58) that the extraneous Soviet amendments would totally alter the scope and purpose [Page 335] of the treaty and had no place in it. He understood French and British had agreed in principle, and asked whether Soviets were willing to refer the matter to plenipotentiaries for negotiation on basis the United States proposed.
Molotov said his amendments were designed purely to lend some measure of implementation procedures to the disarmament problem and to tie in all the related factors. He repeated most of the points he covered yesterday, dragged up both Crimea and Potsdam again, and stood fast on including his so-called amendments. Molotov proposed agreement in principle for some form of four-power treaty, a special committee to consider all drafts and amendments thus far or to be proposed, and a report to next session of CFM, the committee to consider Crimea and Potsdam as obligatory in their consideration of problem.59
Bevin defended the American proposal for four-power treaty as the basis of negotiation and launched a general attack, applicable primarily to Soviets, on fact we have been here five weeks and accomplished little, and it is now proposed to refer all our points of disagreement to a special committee to report by next session. Bevin said let’s do first things first and get a CFM agreement on this.
Marshall pointed out that Molotov’s attempt to introduce all the disagreements of the past five weeks into discussions of the four powers meant in effect no four-power treaty. He said that Molotov’s amendment for placing industry and resources under control of German central government would indeed create a nation that would menace the peace of the world. Such considerations, he continued, are for the peace settlement, and have no place in a simple treaty to keep Germany disarmed. If we cannot agree to the basic first step of keeping Germany disarmed and unable to wage war, Marshall said, we have indicated to the world a complete lack of unity of purpose in our approach to the German settlement. Marshall said he did not recognize any accusation against the United States to abrogate any portion of Potsdam. He stated that the failure of other signatories to act in accordance with Potsdam had forced US action to protect its taxpayers against paying reparations out of their own pockets. The Soviets, he pointed out, had clearly departed from Potsdam by their unfounded insistence that economic unity be conditioned by reparations from current production. [Page 336] This, he said was the basis and origin of most of our disagreements at CFM. To accede to Molotov’s proposal for a special committee to consider all the proposals he had advanced would leave us in exactly this same position of disagreement at next session of CFM.
Molotov denied that Soviets were demanding reparations from current production as a condition to economic unity. He said we should have a four-power treaty on demilitarization and democratization to insure our security. He said the only purpose in Soviet amendments was to try to meet the allies half way to insure a lasting peace. He then went into a long perversion of our draft treaty which nullified his previous remarks.
Marshall quoted the Coordinating Committee report which said “the acceptance of reparations from current production is an absolute condition of the Soviet delegation’s acceptance of the principle of the economic unity of Germany.” He stated we happen to have a general agreement on disarmament alone, and considered the insistence upon extraneous and unrelated factors (largely of disagreements) in the four-power treaty a very serious stand for one government to take in the face of the entire world. “Since we have failed to reach agreement on the four-power treaty,” Marshall said (as chairman), “I suggest we move to the next item.”
The Council then discussed briefly the report of the experts on the production and allocation of German coal.60 The discussion will continue tomorrow after which the draft Austrian treaty will be taken up.
Repeated London 158, Berlin 271, Paris 142.
Department please pass to Vienna as 38, Rome as 35.
- This was a continuation of the discussion begun at the Council’s previous meeting; see ante, p. 331.↩
- For the text of Bidault’s statement summarized here, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 49–51.↩
- For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1947, pp. 741–742.↩
- For the Molotov statement summarized here, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 443–447.↩
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The reference here is to the Preliminary Report of the Committee of Coal Experts on the Measures to Increase Coal Production and the Principles of Allocation of German Coal, September 6, 1946. This long report is not printed, but a summary of it is included in telegram 2120, September 10, 1946, from Berlin, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. v, p. 791. The Committee of Coal Experts had been appointed by the Allied Control Council for Germany in August 1946 in pursuance of a decision by the Council of Foreign Ministers at its Paris Session, 42nd Meeting, July 12, 1946; see the United States Delegation Record and the Agreed Record of Decisions of that meeting, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, pp. 918, 937. At its New York Session, November–December 1946, the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to consider the Report of the Coal Experts at its forthcoming Moscow Session; see document CFM(46) (NY)74, December 12, 1946, ibid., p. 1557.
At this meeting of the Council, Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Bidault made statements with respect to the Report of the Committee of Coal Experts. For the text of Marshall’s statement, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 447–448, or Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1947, p. 741. For Bidault’s statement, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 52–53.
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