740.00119 Council/4–1447: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
urgent
1358. Delsec 1426. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson from Marshall. 28th CFM meeting, April 14, Molotov presiding, continued the discussion of procedure for the preparation of the German peace treaty.48 Marshall stated that in general our position has been that the peace conference should function along substantially the same lines as the Assembly of the United Nations. He said it does not seem proper to exclude any state at war with Germany from participation in the conference. However, in counting votes, he suggested that no conference recommendation be considered as accepted by either a 2/3 or a majority vote unless concurred in by 2/3 or by a majority of those states present and voting which are neighbors of Germany or which participated with their armed forces in the common struggle against Germany. He agreed that the CFM in drawing up the final text of the German treaty should take into consideration both 2/3 and majority recommendations of the peace conference in the same way as was done with the satellite treaties. He said the US would not object to the treaty being signed and ratified by the German Government if the German constitution (ratified previously) contained a clause directing the German Government to accept and ratify the peace treaty.49
[Page 332]The Council agreed to consider the peace conference’s recommendations in the same way as was done for the satellite treaties. Molotov and Bidault agreed to study but indicated opposition to Marshall’s proposal to include a treaty clause in the German constitution. No decision was taken on the suggested composition of the peace conference.
The Council agreed on: (1) the right of Allied states to present their views on the German problem, and (2) the creation of four permanent committees to study questions relating to the treaty. Agreement was not reached on the states which would be members of these committees.
The Council approved the establishment of an information and consultation conference of Allied states which will keep these states informed of CFM work on the preparation of the treaty and will organize consultations with representatives of these states. However, disagreement over the membership of this conference was not resolved.50
The Council then considered the US draft treaty under which the four principal Allied powers would undertake to work together to keep Germany disarmed for 25 years or more.51 Marshall said the US believes the time has now come for the three other powers to decide whether or not they want a four-power treaty to keep Germany disarmed. He suggested that if the other three powers want such a treaty in principle, negotiators be named immediately to draft a final text on the basis of the US draft and all other suggestions.52
Bidault said France had already accepted in principle the US proposal for such a treaty, adding that the signing of this treaty would prove that the Allies, despite their differences, are agreed on preventing the rearmament of Germany. He welcomed the US commitment to take an active part in keeping Germany disarmed, but presented numerous considerations. Bevin reaffirmed British acceptance in principle and agreed that negotiators be named. He said that had such a treaty existed after World War I, the recent war might have been prevented.53
[Page 333]Molotov submitted specific amendments to the US draft treaty.54 He criticized the preamble of the draft because it does not mention as an objective of the treaty the eradication of German [militarism and?] Nazism and the creation of a democratic peaceful Germany. He said the draft was based on a different premise than that included in the Crimea and Potsdam Agreements because it provides only for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. He asked that clauses be added to the draft providing for: (1)destruction of German industrial potential; (2) quadripartite control of the Ruhr and its resources; (3) abolition of German cartels and monopolies and transference of ownership of these properties to the German state; (4) land reform involving the breaking up of large estates; (5) termination of the occupation of Germany only when the occupying powers agree that the basic objectives of the occupation have been achieved such as (A) completion of demilitarization; (B) creation of a democratic state; and (C) fulfillment of obligations, including reparations, to the Allied states.
Molotov also suggested: (1) that the title of the treaty be changed to “Treaty on Demilitarization of Germany and on the Prevention of German Aggression”; and (2) that its duration be increased from 25 to 40 years. He finally circulated a redraft of the treaty as the Soviets proposed it.55 In effect he virtually made it a peace treaty.
The Council adjourned to continue discussion of the treaty proposal tomorrow.
Department please pass to Vienna as 36, to Rome as 33, and to Paris as 135.
Repeated London as 154, Berlin as 265.
- Under discussion at this point was the Report of the Deputies, document CFM(47) (M)125, April 12, 1947, p. 452.↩
- For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement summarized here, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)126, April 14, 1947, see Germany 1947–1949, p. 197, or Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1947, pp. 742–743.↩
- For the text of the Council’s decision with respect to CFM(47) (M)125, see footnote 9, p. 452.↩
- For the text of the draft treaty, see document CFM(46) 21, April 30, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 190.↩
- For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement summarized here, circulated to Council as document CFM(47) (M)127, April 14, 1947, see Germany 1947–1949, p. 101, or Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1947, p. 742.↩
- Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement summarized here, which was circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)128, April 14, 1947, is printed in Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 46–49.↩
- For the text of the Soviet Draft Treaty on the Demilitarization of Germany, circulated to the Council as document CFM(47) (M)129, April 14, 1947, see Documents on International Affairs 1947–1948, pp. 445–449, or Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 601–608.↩
- For the text of Molotov’s comments on the American draft treaty, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 434–442.↩