835.00/2–1546: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Berle)

secret

248. Embtel 327, Feb. 15.16 Please express our appreciation assistance offered by FonMin and inform him that our position is as follows:

1.
The information which we have submitted to other American republics in our memo fully justifies and compels our refusal to sign mutual assistant pact with Farrell–Perón Govt or with any Govt controlled by same elements.
2.
We confidently believe that, after other American republics have had an opportunity to analyze information which we have presented, they will take same position and will jointly refuse to conclude mutual assistance pact with Farrell–Perón Govt or with any Govt controlled by same elements.
3.
Our position would not be affected if Perón, by whatever means, is elected next Sunday. Such an event certainly would not remove grounds for distrust which are at foundation of our case, and might well call for even greater caution on part of other American republics.
4.
It is of greatest importance that American republics indicate their position on issue of confidence in Perón, if elected, before any further action or decision is taken with respect to Rio Conference. We believe that if a substantial majority of the Republics jointly declare their lack of confidence in a Perón Govt, such declaration (a precedent for which exists in Res 59 at Mexico) would suffice to exclude Argentina from participation in treaty and to permit ready reconstitution of Conference. With Perón Govt excluded we would wish to go forward with the treaty as soon as possible.

You should stress that mere postponement of Conference in order to avoid embarrassment of decision with regard to Perón Govt would fall far short of needs of situation and responsibility of inter-American system. Such a postponement would mean a failure of the American republics to face squarely the most important issue before them. If American republics lack confidence in one of their number because latter aided and continues to protect our enemies, they should openly declare that lack of confidence and not allow it to block their constructive action. It would, indeed, be ironical if non-cooperation of a single Govt were permitted to block achievement by the other 20.

Furthermore, the inter-American system should take the first and decisive action in handling this problem, as proof to the world organization that our regional system can function as contemplated by the UN Charter.

If for any reason you feel it would be undesirable to deliver foregoing message to FonMin, please cable your comments.

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In general relation to Brazilian position, for your background information only, we are concerned over indications, supported by urdes 4109 Jan 28, 1946,17 that since 1942 Brazil has been inclined to favor existence in Arg of type of Govt which would be incapable of full cooperation with US, as means of maintaining a favored position for Brazil. It is reported that Aranha18 tacitly admitted that some such motivation inspired Brazil’s hasty recognition of military regime in 1943. We hope it is not true but we would appreciate your judgment whether any such inclination exists currently.

Byrnes
  1. Post, p. 212.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Oswaldo Aranha, former Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs.