893.00/9–1846
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 11]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 76 of August 30, 1946 and to state that there is now less prospect than ever of immediate cessation of hostilities between the Chinese Government and the Communists.
In my previous despatch I expressed the hope that the informal committee referred to in that and the preceding despatch (no. 33, [Page 202] August 7, 194670) might meet on September 2. General Chou En-lai had assured me again on August 29 that he and his associate would be prepared to participate. But later he maintained that he had been seriously perturbed by at least four published statements on the subject by Government officials, by the signing of our Surplus Property Agreement,71 and by other—to him—menacing developments.
On September 5 a conference with him of some three hours duration, at which General Marshall and I were both present, seemed to mark the end of our efforts to break the deadlock, when, as we were about to adjourn, he saw new significance in a remark one of us made. He thereupon proposed that he draft a message to Yenan asking for fresh instructions and secure our approval of it the next day. This led to another session with him when after certain alterations we authorized his message (Embassy’s telegram no. 1432, September 6, 1946).
General Marshall left the same day for Kuling and on September 10 returned with a memorandum of his latest discussion with President Chiang when—not without much effort—he secured some modifications of the terms which would lead to the cease-firing order. While these terms were slightly less severe in some respects and were in others automatically settled by Nationalist military gains, yet in certain matters they seemed to General Chou to take the form of additional demands. After going over these points at length with General Marshall he had another long session with me in which I began by advising him with all the persuasiveness I could to meet with the informal committee as he had originally promised to do, assuring him that then—and only then—we would be able effectively to urge the Government to speed up the cease-firing order which he so obviously sought. He argued with his usual lucidity and force as to why he could not and should not be asked to do so and even if he did so he would then have no guarantee that the fighting would stop. He made the counterproposal that General Marshall’s Three-Man Committee meet and deal with military issues leading to the cease-firing order. General Marshall saw no advantage in resuming the futile discussions which had previously dragged on for months and ended in June.
On September 13 I replied, therefore, that we both felt that we were not so much rejecting his proposal as reminding him of ours to the effect that the political approach should precede and be the occasion for resuming military consultations and that we would be ready to advise with him further or assist otherwise to the best of our ability whenever he wished us to. I solemnly warned him that the fate of [Page 203] his country was in a sense depending on his decision. Promptly that afternoon his representative returned to arrange another interview for the next morning which implied that there was a glimmer of hope that the negotiations might be renewed.
On September 14 Mr. Wang Ping-nan came again to see me on behalf of Chou En-lai and was obviously very much excited by the elaborate plans of the Government for an all-out military offensive. He enlarged on the disastrous consequences to the Communists if these operations were to be carried out. He also had much to say about the added sufferings of the population and the earnest desire of his Party to avert these. In reply I urged again the meeting of the informal committee, pointing out that even though it failed to secure agreement as to the questions of membership and veto for the State Council it might at least prove to the Government the good faith of the Communists, it would enable General Marshall and me to renew our efforts to end hostilities, and would provide an opportunity for friendly discussion of the points at issue in which atmosphere all the Communist contentions might be presented. I added that if there were any hesitancy about accepting the invitation to meet in my home, General Chou might allow us to come to his and discuss these matters as his guests. When Mr. Wang raised the question of possible changes in American policy, I assured him that there were none as yet and at least for the immediate future we two envoys had full authority. I added that if he feared some trap of the Generalissimo’s, we, in urging this course, were officially taking the responsibility of protecting his group. He once more asked me to secure in advance an assurance from the two Government representatives that they would agree to a “Communist-controlled membership” of fourteen on the State Council in order to give them the veto in any motion for altering the P. C. C. resolutions (see my despatch no. 76). I had, of course, been keeping these two men informed of developments and had already reported their attitude to the effect that it was to discuss these very issues that the committee had been created and that a promise extracted from them in advance rendered its existence unnecessary. I did, however, request them to come to see me and found them as firm but also as reasonable as on previous occasions.
General Chou meanwhile has gone to Shanghai, but before doing so assured us that he would return here as soon as the promise of fourteen votes would accomplish the original purpose of my committee and thus lead on to General Marshall’s original Three-Man Committee for discussing military issues. Before his departure he sent General Marshall a formal request for calling the Three-Man Committee regardless of any preliminary steps and two other rather lengthy communications—one on the immediate ending of hostilities and the other [Page 204] on the inequity of American aid to the Government military activities by the Surplus Property transfer, et cetera.
On September 17 Mr. Wang came again to learn the latest reply from the two Government members of my committee and once more I patiently explained why if only from the standpoint of Communist welfare they should take advantage of our mediatorial efforts by meeting with this committee. Finally, he seemed to agree to this if he could be assured that General Marshall would support me in the assertion that we felt confident this would open the way to the desired cease-firing order. I reminded him that, while we could give no guarantee either as to dates or details of procedure, yet this was the only means for obtaining a negotiated peace and we believed it to be a hopeful one. General Marshall returned that afternoon from Kuling and upon his arrival he confirmed my statements. The next morning I reported this to Mr. Wang who promised to communicate with General Chou in Shanghai about his return to take part in the Five-Man Committee on this basis.
These repeated conferences and those referred to in my previous despatches give some idea of the amount of time and effort we have spent in attempting to induce the Government, and more recently and to a far greater extent the Communists, to be more conciliatory. During this period it has been apparent that the latter have been primarily concerned with ending the civil war. Their arguments and their prerequisites for joining the Committee of Five have varied but not their emphasis on this. On the other hand, despite their worsening military outlook within the past few days, they have been steadily insistent on the protection of the P. C. C. resolutions in the State Council, on the revision of the draft constitution, and on their purpose to participate in a coalition government as the precursor of a democratic structure with a nationalized army. Are these dilatory and often contradictory tactics due therefore chiefly to distrust and suspicious fears stemming from long experience and an instinct for survival, or are they one more instance of a Soviet-trained and inspired technique by which they seek a temporary armistice until they can prepare for a renewal of the struggle for supremacy by armed force? I have thus far inclined to the former theory and do not as yet see any convincing evidence to the contrary, but the latter cannot be too lightly dismissed. Perhaps there is something of both in their strategy; they are ready to join cautiously in a democratic experiment, looking forward meanwhile to the seizure of power in a Communist regimentation of the country as their ultimate objective.
In any case, the Government leaders cannot be too severely criticized for their own misgivings as to Communist sincerity or the possibility of mutual cooperation in view not only of the conflicting ideologies, [Page 205] but even more the long rankling antagonisms, the deep-seated suspicions, and the lust for power on both sides. That the Government intends to end the period of “party tutelage” and to hold the National Assembly on November 12 for adopting a democratic constitution with or without Communist participation, can most probably be assumed. The Government also recognizes the need of radical reforms and is making plans to this end, but there will not be the same grim determination to effect these as is now revealed in fighting their traditional enemies. It is in this perhaps that our country can help most by a friendly but firm insistence.
For the immediate present our course of action would seem to be to encourage both groups, especially now the Communists, to take the prescribed steps leading to constitutional government, and to assist in every way possible; then to urge, especially upon the Government, that hostilities be brought to an end. We are trying to guard particularly against giving the Communist representatives any pretext for alleging that we or the Government have put an end to efforts at negotiation. We are keeping silent in regard to the ungenerous, rudely abusive and largely untrue propaganda from Yenan and even from their headquarters in Nanking, while we continue to exert ourselves on their behalf in their increasingly serious predicament.
Respectfully yours,
- Vol. ix, p. 1465.↩
- Signed at Shanghai, August 30, 1946; for correspondence, see pp. 1033 ff.↩