Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

893.20 Mission/4–846

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[Washington,] April 8, 1946.

On April 5 we discussed with General Marshall the proposed United States Military Advisory Group to China. Two points of view were represented: The Group should be viewed as similar to our military missions to Latin American countries; that is, as individuals who retain their rank and status in the Army and Navy but who are employed by the Chinese Government and responsible to it for performing the services for which they were sent. The other view is that the Group, although requested by the Chinese Government, is being sent out by the United States Government as a unit and continues to be individually and collectively responsible to the Government of the United States.

It is of course self-evident that an Advisory Group which does not prove satisfactory with the Chinese Government could not function in China and therefore would not remain, but I do think it would lead to confusion to have the Group made responsible to the Chinese Government. I recalled to General Marshall the suggestion he had made in your office that all American activities in China be under the direction of the Ambassador. Except in the matter of technical operations, I felt that the Group should look to the Ambassador for policy direction and for its contact,³⁴ on other than an operational level, with the Chinese Government. General Marshall readily accepted this suggestion.

One of my chief perturbations with regard to the Advisory Group has been what seems to me to be a failure to understand its purposes; that is, (1) is it going out solely to please the Chinese? (2) is it going out as a projection of military policy to reinforce our security by creating for ourselves a military position in China? or (3) is it going out as a projection or adjunct of our general foreign policy towards China to assist in the creation of a unified, peaceful and relatively strong China?³⁴ I have a decided preference for the latter conception of the Group and I was glad to find that General Marshall saw it the same way. Therefore, it seems logical that the Advisory Group should be responsible to the Ambassador who is charged with the duty of carrying out U. S. policy towards China. I may say here parenthetically that much depends on the Ambassador who succeeds General Marshall.

We also discussed the privileges and immunities that might be given members of the Advisory Group. General Marshall agreed that the scale of additional compensation which the Army wanted was rather high and thought that some flexible system should be used which took into account the rate of exchange and living costs in China. The matter of immunity from Chinese legal jurisdiction presented quite a problem. There was general agreement that our Articles of War should cover personnel of the Advisory Group in criminal cases. With regard to civil cases there was some difference of opinion which will have to be settled later. With regard to the families of personnel the War Department is anxious that they be exempted from Chinese jurisdiction; but families apparently do not come under the Articles of War.³⁵ If the War Department had its way members of family would be, I suppose, “outside the law”. Some solution for this difficulty will have to be found for the families of Advisory Group members.

Jim Penfield,³⁶ Colonel Davis³⁷ and Colonel Carter,³⁸ who is taking Jim Davis’ place, were present at the conference.

34. Marginal notation by the Under Secretary: “I agree. DA.”
34. Marginal notation by the Under Secretary: “I agree. DA.”
35. Marginal notation by the Under Secretary: “This won’t work. DA.”
36. James K. Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
37. James C. Davis, recently General Marshall’s representative in Washington.
38. Marshall S. Carter, successor to Colonel Davis as General Marshall’s representative in Washington.