Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart at Dr. Stuart’s Residence, Nanking, December 18, 1946, 11 a.m.

Nanking, December 18, 1946, 11 a.m.

Also present:	Mr. Butterworth
	Colonel Caughey

Dr. Stuart opened the meeting by reporting that Mr. Wang Pingnan, in furtherance of previous conversations on the same subject, had told Dr. Stuart that he (Mr. Wang) did not think it profitable for the Communist delegation here in Nanking to send another message to Yenan seeking a direct answer to General Marshall’s initial query as to whether the Communist Party desired American mediation. Mr. Wang stated that the last message, although vague, implied the CCP did want American mediation and added that probably what the CCP wanted was a formal reply to that message from the Government. Mr. Wang asked whether Dr. Stuart would make the necessary arrangement to obtain such a reply. General Marshall and Dr. Stuart agreed that they should not press the Government for a reply, since the Communists had not replied to General Marshall’s direct question and if this document was to be construed as a reply, it was not for the Government to acknowledge, also, it is very likely that Mr. Wang is pressing for such a reply (realizing it would probably be vitriolic), since that reply could be a convenient, “face-saving” way for the Communists to refuse entry into Yenan of the special Government delegation.

General Marshall referred to a conference he had this morning; with Dr. Lo Lung-chi, during which he had taken the chance of informing Dr. Lo that he (General Marshall) felt the Government was using him as a convenient cover for continued military operations and that he felt the Communists, at this particular point, were doing the same thing. Dr. Lo’s reaction was merely to the effect that he felt sure, through recent conversations with Mr. Wang and Mr. Tung Pi-wu, that the Communists, in good faith, desired continued American mediation. General Marshall also made reference to a recent discussion with the Generalissimo in which he noted a definite inconsistency with reference to one of Dr. Stuart’s recent proposals concerning the opening of two main railroads in North China. General Marshall stated that the Generalissimo emphasized his desire to make every effort to bring the Communists into the Government, but, at the same time, he said that it was useless to attempt to negotiate with the Communists over the railroad—the lines would have to be cleared by force. The Generalissimo went further by stating that if the railroads were taken by force, the Communists would then be forced to come to terms. General Marshall added that a similar attitude had been evidenced by the Generalissimo last June when he said that “Given time, the ripe apple will fall in our laps” and again in August when he said “If hostilities are stopped, there would be no way to force the Communists to attend the National Assembly”. General Marshall reiterated his conclusion that both the National Government and the Communists find it convenient for continued American mediation: on the Government side, for purposes of covering the active military campaign; on the Communist side, to avoid any possibility of being charged with breaking off negotiations. General Marshall added, as an additional thought along these lines, that in his discussions with the Generalissimo concerning his (General Marshall’s) stay in China as an advisor to the Government, he had categorically refused, since: 1) an American could not accept such a position in the face of civil war in China; and 2) the position of the United States in China would be embarrassed as his services would tend to stultify all his previous actions.

General Marshall said that this request on the part of the Generalissimo probably was an indication of the Government’s desire to use his (General Marshall’s) influence in obtaining future United States loans.

General Marshall said that this all left him with the necessity for decision as to what course of action is best under the circumstances. It seemed, he thought, that about the only thing that could be done immediately is to exert all effort toward seeing that a genuine democratic constitution in keeping with the PCC is passed in the National Assembly, that the Government is reorganized.

Dr. Stuart said that Dr. Pfeiffer³² had recently called on him and that he regretted to report to General Marshall that Dr. Pfeiffer’s viewpoints are at odds with American mediation. Dr. Pfeiffer is presently of the firm view that all U.S. assistance to China must cease and all U.S. personnel, except diplomatic, must be removed from China. His reaction is based on the fact that the present Government is corrupt and that it does not serve the needs of the people and that further support on the part of the United States is like “Pumping blood into a corpse”. General Marshall asked Dr. Stuart what Dr. Pfeiffer’s reactions were towards the Communists. Dr. Stuart replied that Dr. Pfeiffer did not like the Communists, but that his (Dr. Pfeiffer’s) reaction was not based on the Communistic aspect at all, but rather on the fact that the United States is causing civil war, since without U. S. assistance, the Government could not continue its military operations. General Marshall said that the U. S. was not giving any military assistance, to which Dr. Stuart replied that the assistance Dr. Pfeiffer referred to was more a moral assistance by virtue of the fact that American military personnel was present in China and that Americans were attempting to negotiate. Mr. Butterworth added that Dr. Pfeiffer’s contacts were mainly with the intellectual university people who feel that the Generalissimo cannot be reformed and that the Government has “got to go to the cleaners”. Mr. Butterworth continued by stating that the trouble with Dr. Pfeiffer’s views is that they are based on the views of the most oppressed group of people in China, and that the only result of his suggested course of action would be a revolution. Dr. Stuart said that the Generalissimo is perfectly aware of all this, but his “mentality would not let him reform”.

Dr. Stuart reported another depressing matter which was relayed to him by Mr. Hu Lin. Mr. Hu Lin said that lack of education on the part of many military officials, who, suddenly finding themselves in key positions, permitted a situation where these military leaders draw Government funds without accounting and speculate these funds in an already aggravated economic structure. The result is that they line their own pockets rather than devoting finances for the purposes intended.

General Marshall asked Dr. Stuart how Mr. Hu Lin felt about the National Assembly. Dr. Stuart reported that Mr. Hu was favorably impressed and he felt that great improvements were being made toward liberalizing the Government through discussions of the new constitution.

Dr. Stuart informed General Marshall that the Generalissimo did not wish Dr. Stuart to go away to Peiping for the Christmas holidays until Dr. Stuart had advised the Generalissimo as to what course of action the Generalissimo should take with respect to the proposed special Government delegation to Yenan. Dr. Stuart said that an agreement on the North China railroads has got to be put up, since, to a great degree, the economic salvation of the country rests in satisfactory arrangements for full operation of these two railroads. A general discussion ensued during which it was agreed that the question of opening of the two North China railroads should not be made a major issue in any discussion which might take place in Yenan, since it appears quite obvious that if this were made the main issue, the Communists would immediately resist any attempts for subsequent negotiations: that instead, a definite agenda would be prepared and that the Government delegates should go to Yenan prepared to offer sufficient concessions to the Communists to encourage their reentry into the political picture, such as the establishment of the State Council with nine seats left vacant for the Communists, reorganization of the Executive Yuan with definite indications and promises for Communist participation, and a definite and fair proposal for the operation of the two North China railroads. When specific and liberal proposals along these lines are developed by the Government—and not before—then Dr. Stuart should urge that the delegates go to Yenan and clear the matter through the Communist delegation.

Dr. Stuart and General Marshall agreed to this procedure, and then Dr. Stuart asked General Marshall to coach the matter along with the Generalissimo in case definitive results developed prior to Dr. Stuart’s return from Peiping after the holidays. General Marshall stated that he was perfectly willing to take care of this matter during Dr. Stuart’s absence, but that he felt a renewal of negotiations at this time had very slender prospects. General Marshall informed Dr. Stuart and Mr. Butterworth that his opinion was that he (General Marshall) should return to the United States for consultation, and then after the President issued his résumé reaffirming U. S. policy in China, issue a statement of his own which would be designed to tear down the military clique and the reactionaries in the Government, and also tear down the devastating obstructionist attitude on the part of the Communists. By this means, General Marshall said, he would hope to build up the liberals in both parties and at large, and to appeal to the Generalissimo to rely on these liberals for a reformed governmental establishment in China. Dr. Stuart stated that he had continually been trying to get the Generalissimo into the frame of mind that the hope of China rests with the liberals and that these liberals must be gotten into office.

32. Nathaniel Peffer, professor of international relations at Columbia University, New York City, traveling in China as a guest of the Department of State in connection with the Cultural Relationship Program.