Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Lo Lung-chi at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, December 18, 1946, 10 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Underwood |
Dr. Lo stated that he was leaving tomorrow for Shanghai where the Democratic League was to hold a meeting to chart future party activities. He asked if General Marshall could give any advice to the Democratic League.
General Marshall said that it was very difficult to give advice at this time. He was somewhat at a loss to determine the real issues of the moment. There was so much Chinese maneuvering taking place that it was difficult for an American to accurately assess the situation. He had not participated in the negotiations for a considerable period; [Page 633] his usefulness as a negotiator had been practically wrecked by recent Communist actions which played directly into the hands of the reactionaries in the Government. His chief opposition from the Government had always come from the reactionary elements. However, of late, whenever he was able to wring a concession from the Government over the protests of the reactionaries, the Communists in their deep distrust of the Government would oppose these concessions, thereby pleasing the reactionaries and rendering General Marshall practically powerless as a mediator. If the Communist Party had any real desire to enter the Government, their recent actions have been almost stupid.
Unfortunately, the minority parties had allowed themselves to be split by the two major parties and, consequently, they are now unable to influence the situation. If the minority parties would band together into a single, liberal, patriotic organization devoted to the welfare of the people of China and not to the selfish interests of party leaders, they would be able to exert profound influence and this influence would increase as the party received positions, power and patronage. Such a party could stand between the two major parties and neither major party could take a decisive step without the support of the liberal party. Now, however, the minority parties are disunited and unable to prevent the use of military force by the Government or the promotion of economic collapse by the Communist Party. In the midst of this deplorable situation, the people of China stand alone, bearing the full weight of this tragedy.
General Marshall referred to the vicious, reckless propaganda of the Communist Party. Unfortunately, the Communist Party was now convinced of its own propaganda. He was totally exasperated by the anti-American phases of the Communistic propaganda and could not be expected to sit silently forever under this malicious deluge of misrepresentation.
He had remained in China in the hope that his presence would facilitate the adoption of a genuine democratic constitution by the National Assembly. If such a constitution is adopted, followed by an effective reorganization of the State Council with seats left vacant for the Communist Party, by a thorough reorganization of the Executive Yuan, and by concrete measures to enforce the constitution, then the National Government will, in his opinion, be in a strong negotiating position. Attacks by the Communists will have to be concentrated on secondary issues, such as the unilateral convocation of the National Assembly and variance from the procedure prescribed by the PCC. The actual adoption and enforcement of a constitution based on the PCC agreements will leave so little sound ground for continued Communist truculence.
General Marshall read Mr. Philip Fugh’s summary of his recent [Page 634] conversation with Mr. Wang Ping Nan and Mr. Tung Pi Wu (See enclosure),30 He said that the points covered in this summary may mean much or nothing.
General Marshall stated that he had asked Dr. Stuart for suggestions regarding what he (General Marshall) should say to Dr. Lo. Dr. Stuart advised General Marshall to say nothing, but to listen to what Dr. Lo might have to say. General Marshall had not done this. Instead, he had been completely frank. In the past, the Chinese had made generous misuse of his frankness. However, he would continue to be frank, since he considered this the best course in the long run. However, he wanted Dr. Lo to understand fully that he was speaking in confidence and did not wish to read about this conversation in the newspapers.
Dr. Lo expressed his appreciation for General Marshall’s frankness and gave assurance that he would say nothing to the press. Dr. Lo referred to his recent conversation with Mr. Wang Ping Nan and stated that Mr. Wang told him repeatedly that the Communist Party wanted American mediation. General Marshall stated that he had often felt in the past that the National Government desired his mediation as a shield for its military aggression. He referred to the manner in which he had wrung the Kalgan truce proposal from the Government over its bitter resentment that it was being placed in an untenable position by General Marshall’s threat of recall. Now, the Communist Party feels it would be placed in an untenable position if it were to formally refuse American mediation. Therefore, he has now become a convenience to the Communist Party just as he once felt he was used for the convenience of the Kuomintang. General Marshall took little stock of professed desire of the CCP for his further mediation. He had asked the Communist Party a simple, direct question and did not consider his question had as yet been answered. He would not allow himself to be used as a convenience by either party and he definitely would not allow the United States Government to be maneuvered into a position where its integrity could be questioned. Dr. Lo commented on General Chou’s recent speech in Yenan31 and Mao Tze Tung’s press conference as indications of a stiffening Communist attitude. The Communist Party had indicated to Dr. Lo that it intended to take back certain areas in order to strengthen its position in peace negotiations. General Marshall replied categorically that he did not intend to serve as an umpire on the battlefield.
Dr. Lo doubted the ability of the Government to carry out the new [Page 635] constitution since the Communist Party held a large area of China and would not accept this constitution. General Marshall did not agree wholly with Doctor Lo because of National Government entrenchment in Manchuria and North China. The whole matter hinged on the methods used by the Government to enforce the constitution. If the constitution was vitiated and circumvented in favor of a policy of force, tragic economic collapse would follow and China might fall back to the dark ages of warlordism. It was very difficult because of twisted propaganda to make a correct estimate of the military situation. However, he considered the Communists capable of waging effective guerrilla warfare, but incapable of formal positional warfare. On the other hand, the Government was not capable of destroying the Communist Party by force nor was it capable of defending itself against the guerrilla tactics of the Communists. If his estimate is correct, then the people of China can only look forward to tragedy, poverty, and suppression.
Dr. Lo felt that if the reorganization of the Government was accomplished without participation of the Communist Party, the possibilities of peaceful negotiations would be lessened. The Communist Party would construe unilateral reorganization of the Government as positive indication that the Communists were not wanted in the Government. General Marshall asked if the leaving of seats for the Communist Party in the State Council would alter the Communist attitude. Dr. Lo did not think that the Communists would participate in a government which had been reorganized without prior consultation with them. Dr. Lo thought it was better to make a new effort to reopen negotiations. He did not believe that the Communist Party’s two conditions (dissolution of the National Assembly and restoration of 13 January positions) were rigid. The first condition would soon be overtaken by events. He interpreted the second condition as referring not so much to restoration of military positions as of 13 January, but retention of local governments as they existed on 13 January. Dr. Lo thought that there was still a chance for successful negotiations; however, if the National Government expects the Communist Party to give up its army, the Government must be prepared to make broad political concessions.
Dr. Lo then referred to the three conditions for resumption of negotiations which General Chou laid down upon his return to Yenan. These conditions required a new inter-party conference, the establishment of a coalition government, and the convocation of a new national assembly. Dr. Lo recognized that compromise was necessary regarding the third condition since the National Government could not be expected to dissolve the National Assembly, and the Communist Party could not be expected to accept the constitution adopted by [Page 636] this Assembly. The big question, therefore, concerned whether or not an inter-party conference could be called. In reply to General Marshall’s question concerning the type of inter-party conference involved, Doctor Lo stated his understanding that this conference would follow the spirit but not the form of the earlier PCC meetings.
Dr. Lo felt it was still possible for the minority parties to cooperate, although it would be vastly difficult to reconcile all differences. The Democratic League had stayed out of the National Assembly in order to show the Communist Party that it was not alone, that it still had friends who would stand by them in the event of new negotiations. He hoped that following the meeting of the Democratic League in Shanghai a representative of the League could be sent to Yenan to discuss possibilities of further negotiations with Mao Tze Tung. He feared, however, that the Government would oppose this action. General Marshall asked what the Government could do to prevent the trip to Yenan. Dr. Lo replied that the Government might resort to suppression and intimidation of the members of the League on the grounds that the League is functioning as the tail of the Communist kite. Dr. Lo asked if General Marshall would furnish transportation for the League’s peace envoy to Yenan. General Marshall replied affirmatively with the qualification that it might be necessary to use the weekly courier plane of Executive Headquarters.