Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Wei Taoming7 at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, December 9, 1946, 5 p.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Underwood |
Dr. Wei referred to Mrs. Marshall’s departure and said that the General’s own departure was rumored. General Marshall stated that he had no departure plans and that such rumors were getting to be a weekly occurrence. He said the real question was whether or not there was anything that he could do to improve the situation in China. He was watching the National Assembly and the framing of the Constitution. He felt that if a good, sound, democratic constitution were passed, some hope for peaceful settlement might result. If not, the military clique in the Government would probably be given a free hand to attempt extermination of the Communist Party through force. General Marshall was convinced that the military clique had over-estimated the Government’s capabilities and that a final all-out campaign would be overtaken by financial chaos.
Dr. Wei stated that in his opinion the Constitution would be passed by the National Assembly with very few changes and that these changes would not vitiate the Constitution. In this event, he wondered if negotiations could be resumed.
General Marshall stated that adoption of a democratic constitution was not of itself sufficient cause for renewal of negotiations. If, however, the passing of the constitution was followed by reorganization of the State Council and Executive Yuan, with seats left open for the Communist Party, and by concrete measures to enforce the constitution, there would then be a fair chance for negotiations. If these steps were taken, the Government would have done what the Communist Party has been demanding. The National Government would then be in a strong position, and the Communist Party would [Page 603] have little ground for resisting negotiations. However, during the period of reorganization and enforcement of the Constitution, it would be imperative that the Government refrain from fighting, including that based upon the pretext of self-defense. The cessation of hostilities during this period would be the greatest problem of all.
General Marshall stated frankly that he was pleasantly surprised at the behavior of the National Assembly. However he had been optimistic before and was reserving final judgment on the National Assembly until he could see the shape of its final actions. He was simply waiting and watching.
General Marshall stated that democracy probably could be made to work in China if there existed both a free press and an active, unrestricted opposition party. He referred to the deplorable economic situation confronting China. He commented on the vicious inflation which, combined with the low salary of public officials, caused widespread corruption to the detriment of the Government, both as a servant of the people and in the eyes of the world. He stated that economic recovery was blocked by the military stalemate along the railroads of north China. He was sure that the Communist Party was aware of the economic peril of the Government and was planning accordingly. Although the National Government felt that economic collapse was at least two years away, he considered it a definite possibility in a matter of months. He cited the inability of the National Government to keep the Tientsin-Chinwangtao railroad operating as proof that the Government could never attain a total military victory over the Communists.
He stated that a pro-National Government publicity campaign fostered by Mr. Luce and Mr. Roy Howard8 was building up in the United States, and that a counter campaign critical of corruption in the Government and its domination by reactionaries would be initiated. He said that these publicity campaigns would make the situation in China even more difficult to solve by exposing a lot of dirt to the disadvantage of both sides. These campaigns emphasized the necessity of honest, faithful action by the National Assembly. It would be a serious error if the reactionaries crippled the Constitution now before the National Assembly on the hope of aid from the United States as a result of the Luce–Howard publicity campaign.
General Marshall said that the United States was dead set against a policy condoning the civil war in China. He stated that public opinion in the United States was affected by corruption within the Kuomintang more than by fear of Communist ideology. He thought that the existence of the Communist Party as a legal opposition party would force greatly needed reforms within the Kuomintang. If these [Page 604] reforms were actually made, the Kuomintang would be a much stronger party and would probably attract liberals.
He stated that Dr. Stuart had recently suggested that a new beginning for negotiations might be made in a limited way along the two major north and south railroads in north China. This beginning would consist of Communist agreement to allow trains to operate unrestricted in their areas and, at the same time, Government agreement not to interfere with local governments in the Communist areas along the railroad lines. Such a beginning could only be attempted after the Government had taken the preliminary steps mentioned by General Marshall earlier.
Dr. Wei stated that he had been optimistic earlier this year over the possibility of peaceful settlement. However, when he viewed the situation in China in the light of the prevailing world situation, he no longer could find justification for such optimism. The United States wants a strong, united China, but the United States cannot force the Chinese Communist Party to take part in the Government. Only Russia was capable of achieving this, but she would not exert her influence since her ultimate objective was overthrow of the Government of China. He did not see how General Marshall could succeed in China, if Mr. Byrnes could not succeed in Europe, particularly when they were both fighting Soviet influence. He hoped he was wrong but he feared that he was right. General Marshall agreed that the Russian attitude and intentions did not help the situation in China. He then added that reactionary elements in the Government had been operating on the belief that the United States would have to support China because of fear of Russia. This was a serious error and the United States was not going to be dragged through the mud by these reactionaries.
He commented on the change in Communist attitude between March and October of this year. In March, the National Government doubted the Communist sincerity because of the Russian angle. The Government was convinced that the Communist Party members were servants of Russia and would not adhere to any agreements. Now, however, the reverse is true. The Communist Party is completely convinced that the National Government does not intend to keep any agreements and it hardly appears possible to alter the Communist conviction.
Since the trouble in Manchuria in the spring of ’45 [1946], Russia has been standing off, keeping clear of the situation, apparently so that at a propitious moment in the future she can make a clear case for herself in the Far East.
General Marshall then summarized his belief that negotiations might be resumed if a sound democratic constitution were passed, the [Page 605] State Council and Executive Yuan reorganized, the door left open for Communist participation in the Government, and effective measures taken to enforce the Constitution.
Dr. Wei stated that he believed Russia would not interfere in Manchuria in the near future. He expected trouble from Russia to manifest itself first in Sinkiang Province. General Marshall referred to General Chang Chih-chung’s9 need for all types of supplies. He also commented on the Russian medical program in Sinkiang which was winning many friends for Russia.
Dr. Wei thanked General Marshall for his statements and hoped that a way would be found to revive China.