Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart at Dr. Stuart’s Residence, Nanking, December 9, 1946, 11 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
General Marshall opened the meeting by asking Dr. Stuart what his reaction was to Mr. Luce’s recent telegraphic message.6 Dr. Stuart told General Marshall that he was still convinced that General Marshall’s mission in China was possible of fulfillment toward the ultimate stability of China. Dr. Stuart stated that his own guess was that nothing would bring the Communists into the picture more quickly than announcing a firm U. S. policy toward China along the lines of the three points which he had previously mentioned; that is, reorganization of the army, technical assistance and technical advice. Dr. Stuart added that the Government, especially the Generalissimo, with all its faults has been moving toward reform within the Government but that the Government needs advice in all sorts of matters, military, political and economic, in order to develop its program. Dr. Stuart added that his chief uncertainty in the above outlined program was how the Communists might react. He felt sure that the Communist Party must realize by this time that their continued separation from the Government would deprive them of things they wanted most.
[Page 600]General Marshall told Dr. Stuart that he agreed with his three points but that he was doubtful as to whether the program could be carried out under the existing conditions. With reference to the military reorganization, General Marshall felt that further demobilization on the part of the Government is not to be expected so long as the Communists retain their armies in the field. The question was whether or not a peaceful atmosphere could be obtained in the field in order to permit advancement along political and economic lines.
With reference to technical assistance and advice, General Marshall felt that such assistance should be given and cited as an example the loan which was recently refused to China for development and rehabilitation of the Canton–Hankow Railroad. General Marshall said that General Yu Ta Wei had mentioned this to him and that he told General Yu Ta Wei he would look into the matter but actually he was hopeful that some sort of an acceptable constitution might have been accepted by the Government before he undertook to approach the United States Government urging again a loan for the Canton–Hankow Railroad.
General Marshall stated that limited support to the Government had two drawbacks in that it would give encouragement to the reactionary elements and the military clique in the Government to make it more impossible to reform the Government, break party domination and keep open a way for the Communists to reenter negotiations. General Marshall stated that the proper balance between these two aspects is what concerned him.
General Marshall then stated that Mr. Luce’s analysis of the situation as reflected in his cablegram ignored the effect of U. S. assistance to the Chinese Government on the reactionary element of the Government at this time and, in this respect, General Marshall felt that Mr. Luce’s viewpoint was shallow, if not completely biased through his (Mr. Luce’s) personal attachment to the Generalissimo. General Marshall felt that his (Mr. Luce’s) campaign for all out support of the Kuomintang may have the opposite effect than what he (Mr. Luce) was hoping for, though it will be a great encouragement to the reactionaries at this time.
General Marshall then referred to the clipping Dr. Stuart had given him which suggested solving the difficult Chinese problem by introducing Russian mediation. Dr. Stuart stated that if American mediation were successful, it is not likely that the Russians would come in. Dr. Stuart admitted that shortly after his appointment as Ambassador he had thought Russian mediation would help, but that with experience his thought in this respect had become somewhat sobered. General Marshall stated that if the Russians were invited to assist in mediation, the British and the French probably would also [Page 601] have to be included. He did not know what role any of these three might assume but he was quite sure that the Generalissimo would be extremely angered if confronted with the idea of Russian participation. Dr. Stuart supplemented this statement with the idea that if the Russians were involved in the mediations, neither the United States nor China would know what to expect.
General Marshall then informed Dr. Stuart that he had received a message from Mr. Acheson in which Mr. Acheson suggested the advisability of issuing a statement on a high level in the U. S. which would be designed to clarify the atmosphere with reference to U. S. aid to China. Mr. Acheson said, of course, that he would not publish such a statement without clearance from General Marshall. General Marshall told Dr. Stuart that he was in favor of Mr. Acheson’s having such a statement prepared by the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee with the understanding that the decision as to timing would be taken later.
Dr. Stuart stated that he did not understand the Communists, he was confused by their apparent adverse technical treatment of procedures throughout the negotiations and the new impossible demands which they had just submitted. Dr. Stuart said he thought that this attitude was indicative of something deeper and more far-reaching than appeared on the surface. Dr. Stuart then stated that if a positive policy were announced by the U. S. that it might test the Communists out. He then added that if some sort of territorial agreement could be reached between the Government and the Communists that negotiations could be commenced again. General Marshall supported Dr. Stuart’s view but added that as soon as the territorial division were struck up it would bring up the question of the two north and south railroads in north China which would be extremely difficult to handle. He stated that the Government could not be expected not to try to open at least one of the railroads and this action would create new complications. General Marshall added however that if some sort of an arrangement whereby the Communists could retain their positions and also retain control over local governments and, at the same time, agree to not molest railroad operations, that this might constitute a new beginning for negotiations. General Marshall stated that he would like Dr. Stuart to sound out Mr. Wang Ping Nan on this subject in his next contact with Mr. Wang. To this Dr. Stuart agreed.
Dr. Stuart stated that there was one more thing that he would like to discuss with General Marshall. Dr. Stuart said that the Generalissimo was still awaiting a definite reply from him to his (the Generalissimo’s) recent proposal to Dr. Stuart concerning the Government’s desire to obtain the services of General Marshall as [Page 602] an advisor. General Marshall stated that he was quite satisfied with Dr. Stuart’s reply to the Generalissimo’s query on this matter (i. e. that Dr. Stuart did not think General Marshall would consider such a position in view of a condition of civil war) and added that probably the best answer now is a definite “No”. General Marshall elaborated on his viewpoint by stating that it is unreasonable to expect that his services as an advisor to the National Government could materially promote a beneficial reaction within the Government when he as a mediator was unable to influence the Government with full backing from the United States Government.
- December 8, not printed; Henry R. Luce was publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines.↩